Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 51-68

  Miller, Nolan ^a   Pazgal, Amit ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17144412009     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1045     Document Type: Article

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