A game model of people's participation in forest management in Northern India

Environment and Development Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 217-240

  Lise, Wietze ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17144410743     PISSN: 1355770X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X04001688     Document Type: Article

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