A Research on internal capital allocation efficiency based principal-agent models for provincial power grid corporation

Power System Technology

Volumn 29, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 12-17

  Qiu, Yong Zhi ^a   Wang, Xian Jia ^a  

^a WUHAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Efficiency of capital allocation; Electricity market; Incentive mechanism; Mechanism design; Power grid corporation; Principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COSTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INVESTMENTS; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EFFICIENCY OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION; ELECTRICITY MARKET; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; MECHANISM DESIGN; POWER GRID CORPORATION; PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 17144387870     PISSN: 10003673     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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