On personal responsibility and the human right to healthcare

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 224-234

  Denier, Yvonne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACHIEVEMENT; COMPETENCE; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH CARE NEED; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HUMAN RIGHTS; MORALITY; RESPONSIBILITY; REVIEW;

HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE; HEALTH CARE RATIONING; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANS; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY;

EID: 17144377924     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180105050309     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. Following the authors of Health and Human Rights, I take the human rights approach as something that "seeks to describe - and then to promote and protect - the societal-level prerequisites for human well-being in which each individual can achieve his or her full potential." In: Mann JM, Gruskin S, Grodin MA, Annas GJ, eds. Health and Human Rights, New York: Routledge; 1999:2. As such, I understand a human right to hold both an ethical or moral component and a legal component of established rights and obligations. From the standpoint of ethics, human rights serve as a statement of the aspirations of peoples and governments toward ideals that are not always attained in practice. The legal component refers to the recognition and protection of these aspirations by governments through actual domestic legislation and international agreements. This article focuses primarily on the moral component by concentrating on the extent to which human rights are guidelines for how governments should behave, rather than on various legal descriptions of how they actually do behave.
2. Partially based on: Buchanan A. Philosophic perspectives on access to health care: Distributive justice in health care. The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 1997;64(2):90-5.
3. Dworkin R. Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth: London; 1977; Waldron J. When justice replaces affection: The need for rights. In: Waldron J. Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993:370-91.
4. Dworkin R. Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth: London; 1977; Waldron J. When justice replaces affection: The need for rights. In: Waldron J. Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993:370-91.
5. Daniels N. Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985:27-8; Daniels N. Health-care needs and distributive justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981; 10(2):149-79; Daniels N. Justice, health, and healthcare. American Journal of Bioethics 2001;1(2):2-16.
6. Daniels N. Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985:27-8; Daniels N. Health-care needs and distributive justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981; 10(2):149-79; Daniels N. Justice, health, and healthcare. American Journal of Bioethics 2001;1(2):2-16.
7. Daniels N. Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985:27-8; Daniels N. Health-care needs and distributive justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981; 10(2):149-79; Daniels N. Justice, health, and healthcare. American Journal of Bioethics 2001;1(2):2-16.
8. Veatch RM. Voluntary risks to health. Journal of the American Medical Association 1980;243(1):50-5; Veatch RM. What is a "just" health care delivery? In: Veatch RM, Branson R, eds. Ethics and Health Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: Balinger Publishing Company; 1976:127-53.
9. Veatch RM. Voluntary risks to health. Journal of the American Medical Association 1980;243(1):50-5; Veatch RM. What is a "just" health care delivery? In: Veatch RM, Branson R, eds. Ethics and Health Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: Balinger Publishing Company; 1976:127-53.
10. Braybrooke D. Meeting Needs. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1987:29-75.
11. Frankfurt H. Necessity and desire. In: Frankfurt H. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1988:104-16.
12. See note 1, Mann, Gruskin, Grodin, Annas 1999:25.
13. Rawls J. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 2001:173-4; see note 2, Buchanan, 1997:92
14. Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. London: Cassell; 1999:5-49.
15. Losing the full range of entitlements would be impossible because healthcare also involves public health measures like the provision of clean water, adequate sanitation, vaccination, and so on.
16. See note 1, Mann, Gruskin, Grodin, Annas 1999:2-3.
17. Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1971: 102; rev. ed. 1999:87; see also Miller D. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1976, repr. 2002.
18. Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1971: 102; rev. ed. 1999:87; see also Miller D. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1976, repr. 2002.
19. Dworkin R. What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981;10:283-345, reprinted in Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 2000:65-119.
20. Dworkin R. What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981;10:283-345, reprinted in Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 2000:65-119.
21. See note 14, Dworkin 2000:73-5.
22. For reference of the term "volitional needs," see note 7, Frankfurt 1988:107. For "adventitious needs," see note 6, Braybrooke 1987:29-33.
23. Dworkin G. Taking risks, assessing responsibility. Hastings Center Report 1981;11:26-31.
24. See also Sen A. Why health equity? Health Economics 2002;11:659-66.
25. Leichter H. Public policy and the British experience. Hastings Center Report 1981; 11:32-9, incorporated in Leichter H. Free to Be Foolish: Politics and Health Promotion in the United States and Great Britain. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991; Russell LB. Some of the tough decisions required by a national health plan. Science 1989;246:892-6; Schwartz RL. Life style, health status, and distributive justice. In: Grubb A, Mehlman MJ. Justice and Health Care: Comparative Perspectives. New York: John Wiley and Sons; 1995:244-8.
26. Leichter H. Public policy and the British experience. Hastings Center Report 1981; 11:32-9, incorporated in Leichter H. Free to Be Foolish: Politics and Health Promotion in the United States and Great Britain. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991; Russell LB. Some of the tough decisions required by a national health plan. Science 1989;246:892-6; Schwartz RL. Life style, health status, and distributive justice. In: Grubb A, Mehlman MJ. Justice and Health Care: Comparative Perspectives. New York: John Wiley and Sons; 1995:244-8.
27. Leichter H. Public policy and the British experience. Hastings Center Report 1981; 11:32-9, incorporated in Leichter H. Free to Be Foolish: Politics and Health Promotion in the United States and Great Britain. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991; Russell LB. Some of the tough decisions required by a national health plan. Science 1989;246:892-6; Schwartz RL. Life style, health status, and distributive justice. In: Grubb A, Mehlman MJ. Justice and Health Care: Comparative Perspectives. New York: John Wiley and Sons; 1995:244-8.
28. Leichter H. Public policy and the British experience. Hastings Center Report 1981; 11:32-9, incorporated in Leichter H. Free to Be Foolish: Politics and Health Promotion in the United States and Great Britain. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991; Russell LB. Some of the tough decisions required by a national health plan. Science 1989;246:892-6; Schwartz RL. Life style, health status, and distributive justice. In: Grubb A, Mehlman MJ. Justice and Health Care: Comparative Perspectives. New York: John Wiley and Sons; 1995:244-8.