Stack-based access control and secure information flow

Journal of Functional Programming

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 131-177

  Banerjee, Anindya ^a   Naumann, David A ^b  

^a Sunflower Networking Group   (United States)

^b Stevens Institute of Technology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCESS CONTROL; CONTROL MECHANISM; DYNAMIC BINDING; INFORMATION FLOW;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER SYSTEMS PROGRAMMING; DATA PRIVACY; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; JAVA PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE; OBJECT ORIENTED PROGRAMMING; SECURITY OF DATA; SEMANTICS; USER INTERFACES;

INFORMATION ANALYSIS;

EID: 17044429386     PISSN: 09567968     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0956796804005453     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Abadi, M. and Fournet, C. (2003) Access control based on execution history. Proc. 10th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pp. 107-121.
2. Abadi, M., Banerjee, A., Heintze, N. and Riecke, J. G. (1999) A core calculus of dependency. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 147-160.
3. Arnold, K. and Gosling, J. (1998) The Java Programming Language, 2nd ed. Addison-Wesley.
4. Banerjee, A. and Naumann, D. A. (2002a) Ownership confinement ensures representation independence for object-oriented programs. Revised and extended from ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL). ACM Press. Submitted.
5. Banerjee, A. and Naumann, D. A. (2002b) Representation independence, confinement and access control. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 166-177. ACM Press.
6. Banerjee, A. and Naumann, D. A. (2002c) Secure information flow and pointer confinement in a Java-like language. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pp. 253-270. IEEE Press.
7. Banerjee, A. and Naumann, D. A. (2003) Using access control for secure information flow in a Java-like language. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pp. 155-169. IEEE Press.
8. Barthe, G. and Serpette, B. (1999) Partial evaluation and non-interference for object calculi. In: Middeldorp, A. and Sato, T. (eds.), Proceedings of FLOPS'99: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1722, pp. 53-67. Springer-Verlag.
9. Barthe, G., Basu, A. and Rezk, T. (2004) Security types preserving compilation. Proc. Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI): Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2937. Springer-Verlag.
10. Bell, D. E. and LaPadula, L. J. (1973) Secure computer systems: Mathematical foundations. Technical report MTR-2547, MITRE Corp.
11. Boyland, J., Noble, J. and Retert, W. (2001) Capabilities for sharing: A generalisation of uniqueness and read-only. European Conference on Object Oriented Programming (ECOOP), pp. 2-27.
12. Chen, Z. (2000) Java Card Technology for Smart Cards. Addison-Wesley.
13. Clarke, D. G., Noble, J. and Potter, J. M. (2001) Simple ownership types for object containment. European Conference on Object Oriented Programming (ECOOP): Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag.
14. Denning, D. (1976) A lattice model of secure information flow. Comm. ACM, 19(5), 236-242.
15. Denning, D. and Denning, P. (1977) Certification of programs for secure information flow. Comm. ACM, 20(7), 504-513.
16. Erlingsson, U. and Schneider, F. B. (1999) SASI enforcement of security policies: A retrospective. Proc. New Security Paradigm Workshop, pp. 87-95.
17. Ferrari, E., Samarati, P., Bertino, E. and Jajodia, S. (1997) Providing flexibility in information flow control for object-oriented systems. Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, pp. 130-140.
18. Fournet, C. and Gordon, A. D. (2002) Stack inspection: Theory and variants. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 307-318. ACM Press.
19. Goguen, J. and Meseguer, J. (1982) Security policies and security models. Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, pp. 11-20.
20. Gong, L. (1999) Inside Java 2 Platform Security. Addison-Wesley.
21. Gough, J. (2001) Compiling for the .NET Common Language Runtime. Prentice Hall.
22. Heintze, N. and Riecke, J. G. (1998) The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 365-377.
23. Hennessy, M. and Riely, J. (2002) Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus. ACM Trans. Program. Langu. & Syst. 24(5), 566-591.
24. Hogg, J. (1991) Islands: Aliasing protection in object-oriented languages. ACM Symposium on Object Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA). ACM Press. (SIGPLAN Notices, 26, 11.)
25. LaMacchia, B. A., Lange, S., Lyons, M., Martin, R. and Price, K. T. (2003) .NET framework security. Addison-Wesley.
26. Leino, K. R. M. and Nelson, G. (2002) Data abstraction and information hiding. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. & Syst. 24(5).
27. Mantel, H. and Sabelfeld, A. (2001) A generic approach to the security of multi-threaded programs. Proc. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 126-142. Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada. IEEE Press.
28. McLean, J. (1994) A general theory of composition for trace sets closed under selective interleaving functions. Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, pp. 79-93.
29. Mitchell, J. C. (1996) Foundations for Programming Languages. MIT Press.
30. Morrisett, G., Crary, K., Glew, N. and Walker, D. (1999) From system F to typed assembly language. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. & Syst. 21(3), 528-569.
31. Myers, A. and Liskov, B. (1998) Complete, safe information flow with decentralized labels. Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, pp. 186-197.
32. Myers, A., Sabelfeld, A. and Zdancewic, S. (2004) Enforcing robust declassification. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW). pp. 172-186.
33. Myers, A. C. (1999) JFlow: Practical mostly-static information flow control. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 228-241.
34. Naumann, D. A. (2004). Machine-checked correctness of a secure information flow analyzer (preliminary report). (Unpublished typescript, available at http://www.cs.stevens-tech.edu/~naumann/accinfPVS.ps.)
35. Necula, G. C. (1997) Proof-carrying code. Proceedings, POPL. ACM Press.
36. Ørbæk, P. and Palsberg, J. (1997) Trust in the λ-calculus. J. Funct. Program. 7(6), 557-591.
37. Owre, S., Rushby, J. M. and Shankar, N. (1992) PVS: A prototype verification system. In: Kapur, Deepak (ed.), 11th International Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE): Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 607, pp. 748-752. Springer-Verlag.
38. Pottier, F. and Conchon, S. (2000) Information flow inference for free. Proc. Fifth ACM International Conference on Functional Programming, pp. 46-57.
39. Pottier, F. and Simonet, V. (2002) Information flow inference for ML. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 319-330.
40. Pottier, F. and Simonet, V. (2003) Information flow inference for ML. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. & Syst. 25(1), 117-158.
41. Pottier, F., Skalka, C. and Smith, S. (2001) A systematic approach to static access control. In: Sands, D. (ed.), European Symposium on Programming (ESOP): Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2028, pp. 30-45. Springer-Verlag.
42. Reynolds, J. C. (1984) Types, abstraction, and parametric polymorphism. In: Mason, R. E. A. (ed.), Information Processing '83, pp. 513-523. North-Holland.
43. Rushby, J. (1992) Noninterference, transitivity, and channel-control security policies. Technical report SRI.
44. Sabelfeld, A. and Myers, A. C. (2003) Language-based information-flow security. IEEE J. Selected Areas in Comm. 21(1), 5-19.
45. Sabelfeld, A. and Sands, D. (2000) Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded prgorams. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pp. 200-215.
46. Sabelfeld, A. and Sands, D. (2001) A Per model of secure information flow in sequential programs. Higher-order & Symbolic Comput. 14(1), 59-91.
47. Skalka, C. and Smith, S. (2000) Static enforcement of security with types. Proc. Fifth ACM International Conference on Functional Programming, pp. 34-45.
48. Smith, G. (2001) A new type system for secure information flow. Proc. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 115-125.
49. Smith, G. and Volpano, D. (1998) Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language. ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pp. 355-364.
50. Stoughton, A. (1981) Access flows: A protection model which integrates access control and information flow. Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, pp. 9-18.
51. Strecker, M. (2003) Formal analysis of an information flow type system for MicroJava (extended version). Technical report, Technische Universität München.
52. Sun, Q., Banerjee, A. and Naumann, D. A. (2004) Modular and constraint-based information flow inference for an object-oriented language, Static Analysis Symposium (SAS), Springer Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3148, 84-99.
53. Vitek, J. and Bokowski, B. (2001) Confined types in Java. Software-Practice & Experience, 31(6), 507-532.
54. Volpano, D. (1999) Safety versus secrecy. Static Analysis Symposium (SAS): Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1694, pp. 303-311. Springer-Verlag.
55. Volpano, D. and Smith, G. (1997) A type-based approach to program security. Proc. TAPSOFT'97: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1214, pp. 607-621. Springer-Verlag.
56. Volpano, D. and Smith, G. (1999) Confinement properties for multi-threaded programs. Electr. Notes in Theor. Comput. Sci. 20.
57. Volpano, D., Smith, G. and Irvine, C. (1996) A sound type system for secure flow analysis. J. Comput. Security, 4(3), 167-187.
58. Wallach, D., Appel, A. and Felten, E. (2000) SAFKASI: a security mechanism for language-based systems. ACM Trans. Software Eng. & Methodology, 9(4).