Interpreting a bill of rights: The importance of legislative rights review

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 235-255

  Hiebert, Janet L ^a  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 16644389704     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000712340500013X     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
2. This phrase is taken from Ronald Dworkin's influential book, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).
3. Richard Bellamy, 'Constitutive Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on the EU Charter and the Human Rights Act', in T. Campbell, K. E. Ewing and A. Tomkins, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 15-39, at p. 22.
4. Bellamy, 'Constitutive Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights', p. 22.
5. Alexander Hamilton, 'No. 78' in The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961), pp. 464-72, at p. 465.
6. Once John Marshall's treatment of this question in Marbury v. Madison was accepted as authoritative, American scholarly debate has generally assumed that judicial review is both legitimate and paramount in terms of giving meaning to the Constitution. There are, of course, exceptions. See, for example, Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Paul Brest, 'The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation', Stanford Law Review, 27 (1975), 585-601; and Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
7. Once John Marshall's treatment of this question in Marbury v. Madison was accepted as authoritative, American scholarly debate has generally assumed that judicial review is both legitimate and paramount in terms of giving meaning to the Constitution. There are, of course, exceptions. See, for example, Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Paul Brest, 'The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation', Stanford Law Review, 27 (1975), 585-601; and Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
8. Once John Marshall's treatment of this question in Marbury v. Madison was accepted as authoritative, American scholarly debate has generally assumed that judicial review is both legitimate and paramount in terms of giving meaning to the Constitution. There are, of course, exceptions. See, for example, Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Paul Brest, 'The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation', Stanford Law Review, 27 (1975), 585-601; and Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
9. See Tom Campbell, 'Incorporation through Interpretation', pp. 79-101; Martin Loughlin, 'Rights, Democracy, and Law', pp. 41-60; K. D. Ewing, "The Unbalanced Constitution', pp. 103-77, all in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights.
10. See Tom Campbell, 'Incorporation through Interpretation', pp. 79-101; Martin Loughlin, 'Rights, Democracy, and Law', pp. 41-60; K. D. Ewing, "The Unbalanced Constitution', pp. 103-77, all in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights.
11. See Tom Campbell, 'Incorporation through Interpretation', pp. 79-101; Martin Loughlin, 'Rights, Democracy, and Law', pp. 41-60; K. D. Ewing, "The Unbalanced Constitution', pp. 103-77, all in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights.
12. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 149.
13. Ronald Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 4-11, p. 11.
14. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (New York: Foundation Press, 1988), p. 15.
15. See in particular Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution', Columbia Law Review, 34 (1934), 431-65; 'A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step', Columbia Law Review, 30 (1930), 1-40; and 'Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound', Harvard Law Review, 44 (1931), 1222-56.
16. See in particular Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution', Columbia Law Review, 34 (1934), 431-65; 'A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step', Columbia Law Review, 30 (1930), 1-40; and 'Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound', Harvard Law Review, 44 (1931), 1222-56.
17. See in particular Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution', Columbia Law Review, 34 (1934), 431-65; 'A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step', Columbia Law Review, 30 (1930), 1-40; and 'Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound', Harvard Law Review, 44 (1931), 1222-56.
18. See for example Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Fin de Siècle) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Allan C. Hutchinson and Andrew Fetter, 'Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter', University of Toronto Law Journal, 34 (1988), 278-97.
19. See for example Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Fin de Siècle) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Allan C. Hutchinson and Andrew Fetter, 'Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter', University of Toronto Law Journal, 34 (1988), 278-97.
20. See for example Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989);
21. Lynn Hecht Schafran, 'Is the Law Male? Let Me Count the Ways', Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69 (1993), 397-411; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
22. Lynn Hecht Schafran, 'Is the Law Male? Let Me Count the Ways', Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69 (1993), 397-411; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
23. For a selection of this scholarship, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas, eds, Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement (New York: New Press, 1995).
24. See for example Mary Eaton, 'Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equality Rights: Reversing the Progressive Hypothesis', Dalhousie Law Journal, 17 (1994), 130-86; Didi Herman and Carl Stychin, eds, Legal Inversions: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
25. See for example Mary Eaton, 'Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equality Rights: Reversing the Progressive Hypothesis', Dalhousie Law Journal, 17 (1994), 130-86; Didi Herman and Carl Stychin, eds, Legal Inversions: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
26. These inquiries have become an explicit part of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to section 1 of the Charter, which provides: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gurantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'. But Mark Tushnet confirms that they also comprise part of the American judiciary's contemplation of what constitutes a right and whether it has been infringed. See Mark Tushnet, 'Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World', University of Toronto Law Journal, 53 (2003), 89-100, pp. 92-3.
27. The discretionary nature of these inquiries is discussed in more length by the author in Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
28. Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 25-6.
29. Quoted from 'Judges ignorant of science: Binnie', Ottawa Citizen, 8 March 2003, A6.
30. James Allan, 'Bills of Rights and Judicial Power - A Liberal Quandary', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 16(1996), 337-52.
31. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
32. Jeremy Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51.
33. F. L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), p. 41.
34. Hutchinson and Petter, 'Private Rights/Public Wrongs'.
35. The name 'notwithstanding clause' is taken from the constitutional provision in s. 33 of the Charter, which states: 'Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision therefore shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter'.
36. Cécile Fahre, 'A Philosophical Argument for a Bill of Rights', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2002), 77-98, p. 89.
37. The Supreme Court of Canada has revised many common law rules to make these consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Commentators anticipate that British courts will also alter common law rules under the Human Rights Act. See, for example, Gavin Phillipson, 'The Human Rights Act, "Horizontal Effect" and the Common Law: A Bang or a Whimper?' Modern Law Review, 62 (1999), 824-49; Murray Hunt, "The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act', Public Law (1998), 423-43.
38. The Supreme Court of Canada has revised many common law rules to make these consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Commentators anticipate that British courts will also alter common law rules under the Human Rights Act. See, for example, Gavin Phillipson, 'The Human Rights Act, "Horizontal Effect" and the Common Law: A Bang or a Whimper?' Modern Law Review, 62 (1999), 824-49; Murray Hunt, "The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act', Public Law (1998), 423-43.
39. The legislation arose in response to a change to the common law in which the Supreme Court created a new defence in sexual assault trials: extreme intoxication. The legislative debate and response indicated that parliament believed that this defence violated women's rights of security of the person and equality. For more discussion, see Janet L. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament's Role ? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), pp. 96-107.
40. See Rainer Knopff, 'Populism and the Politics of Rights', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 31 (1998), 683-705, p. 700; and Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 171-83.
41. See Rainer Knopff, 'Populism and the Politics of Rights', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 31 (1998), 683-705, p. 700; and Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 171-83.
42. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, p. 153.
43. Peter Russell put it slightly differently, when he argued that the significance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not whether we will have rights but what limits it is reasonable to attach to them and how decisions about these limits should be made. See Peter H. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms', Canadian Bar Review, 61 (1983), 30-54, p. 43.
44. New Zealand is a unicameral system while Canada and the United Kingdom have upper houses with legitimacy problems arising from the appointed rather than elected nature of members.
45. Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991).
46. Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991).
47. In its very earliest Charter decisions, the Supreme Court indicated that it must reassess the conservative and reluctant character of its earlier rulings. See decisions such as Hunter et al. v. Southern Inc. [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 154-157; R. v. Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 638-639; Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177 at 209; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 331-332, 344-346.
48. For discussion of how the Charter has influenced lesbian and gay political strategies, see Miriam Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada: Social Movements and Equality-Seeking, 1971-1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
49. For more discussion of how the Charter has influenced judicial and political behaviour on a range of policies, see Hiebert, Charter Conflicts.
50. Christopher Wolf, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 94.
51. For discussion of this idea that the judicial-legislative relationship should be conceived of in dialogic terms, see Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975) ; Barry Friedman, 'Dialogue and Judicial Review', Michigan Law Review, 91 (1993), 571-682; and Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
52. For discussion of this idea that the judicial-legislative relationship should be conceived of in dialogic terms, see Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975) ; Barry Friedman, 'Dialogue and Judicial Review', Michigan Law Review, 91 (1993), 571-682; and Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
53. For discussion of this idea that the judicial-legislative relationship should be conceived of in dialogic terms, see Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975) ; Barry Friedman, 'Dialogue and Judicial Review', Michigan Law Review, 91 (1993), 571-682; and Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
54. Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1993), p. 869.
55. K. J. Keith, "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Experience: Lessons for Australia' (paper presented to the Bill of Rights Conference, University of New South Wales, 2002).
56. Huscroft argues that it is important to distinguish between government and non-government bills that receive s.7 reports. He is not surprised that a government is more likely to report inconsistencies with private member bills because sponsors of these bills do not have the same benefit of the support and advice as do ministers. See Grant Huscroft, "The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 195-216, at p. 214.
57. The New Zealand Bill of Rights has adopted the general limitation clause found in s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See fn. 16.
58. Huscroft, 'The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', p. 215. Emphasis in original.
59. For example, in the Transport Safety Bill (1991) the Attorney-General reported that a provision authorizing random breath-screening of drivers infringed upon the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure and the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained, and could not be justified as a reasonable limit. The president of the Law Commission (who is now a justice of the Court of Appeal) challenged this report, arguing that mandatory breath-screening is consistent with the Bill of Rights. See K. Keith, 'Road Crashes and the Bill of Rights: A Response', New Zealand Recent Law Review (1994), 115-19. In the Films, Videos, and Publication Classification Bill (1992), which proposed a comprehensive scheme of censorship, the Attorney General's s. 7 report focused on a strict liability offence of possession of objectionable materials, as an inconsistency with the Bill of Rights. But this advice was challenged by the Legislation Advisory Committee, arguing that although the strict liability provision may be criticized as bad policy, it was not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. For discussion of parliamentary evaluation of bills that have been accompanied by s. 7 reports, see Huscroft, "The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', pp. 202-15.
60. For example, in the Transport Safety Bill (1991) the Attorney-General reported that a provision authorizing random breath-screening of drivers infringed upon the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure and the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained, and could not be justified as a reasonable limit. The president of the Law Commission (who is now a justice of the Court of Appeal) challenged this report, arguing that mandatory breath-screening is consistent with the Bill of Rights. See K. Keith, 'Road Crashes and the Bill of Rights: A Response', New Zealand Recent Law Review (1994), 115-19. In the Films, Videos, and Publication Classification Bill (1992), which proposed a comprehensive scheme of censorship, the Attorney General's s. 7 report focused on a strict liability offence of possession of objectionable materials, as an inconsistency with the Bill of Rights. But this advice was challenged by the Legislation Advisory Committee, arguing that although the strict liability provision may be criticized as bad policy, it was not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. For discussion of parliamentary evaluation of bills that have been accompanied by s. 7 reports, see Huscroft, "The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', pp. 202-15.
61. See Huscroft's discussion of the Land Transport Bill, Casino Control (Moratorium) Amendment Bill, and the Electoral Amendment Bill (No. 2), and the Social Security (Residence of Spouses) Amendment Bill. See Huscroft, 'The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', pp. 210-13.
62. Huscroft, 'The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', p. 210.
63. Electoral Amendment Bill (No. 2), as reported from the Justice and Electoral Committee, p. 11, available at http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/publications/committeereport/default.htm/
64. Philip Joseph characterizes the s. 7 reporting obligation as 'an administrative mechanism for monitoring legislative proposals'. See Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, p. 869.
65. Huscroft, The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', p. 213.
66. Huscroft, 'The Attorney-General's Reporting Duty', p. 213.
67. A good example was the federal government's attempt to establish a national DNA data bank for resolving previously unsolved crimes. The opposition wanted stronger measures that would allow police to collect DNA samples from criminal suspects at the point of arrest. The federal government rejected this position, arguing that the judiciary would be likely to rule this unconstitutional, and promoted legislation that allows for DNA samples to be obtained only after individuals have been convicted of serious offences, such as murder, sexual assault, and break and enter. See Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, pp. 118-45.
68. The process of executive review is discussed in more depth in Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, pp. 7-19, 195.
69. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, pp. 7-19.
70. The most important of these early decisions, in terms of conveying the message that the Supreme Court would not be easily convinced of the justification of legislation that restricted rights, and that judicial rulings could have serious policy and fiscal consequences, were: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker [1984] 1 SCR 357; Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc. [1984] SCR 145: Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177; R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103; and R. v. Schachter [1992] 2 SCR 679.
71. These are the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs and the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.
72. Individual members have requested copies of reports from the Minister of Justice to explain conclusions reached from its process of evaluating bills. In the early days of the Charter, requests by committee members to speak to the person 'who has certified a bill' in terms of the Charter were met with various explanations of why this was not possible, Included in these were that the concept or word 'certify' is a 'misnomer' for the process undertaken; that the person certifying a bill is the chief legislative counsel but he or she acts on the advice that is provided by the department; and that 'ultimately, the guardian of our Charter advice is the human rights law section' (Canada: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 21 June 1993, 50:44-8).
73. The 1960 statutory Canadian Bill of Rights was expected to create a new impetus for government to be more sensitive of rights when developing legislation. This impetus arose from the requirement of having to examine bills for their consistency with rights and report to parliament any fundamental inconsistencies. Together, these innovative features were expected to ensure that governments did not willingly violate rights and that if they did err, or exercise poor judgement, parliamentary scrutiny would use sufficient pressure to redress the problem. For discussion of this development, and why these salutary benefits did not materialize, see Hiebert, Chaner Conflicts, pp. 4-7.
74. Special Senate Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, First Report, Senate Journals, 1 November 2001, http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/sm36-e/rep-e/rep01 oct0l-e.htm.
75. Explanation for the government's amendment provided on Department of Justice website, 20 November 2001. http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc, 27902.html.
76. For more discussion of parliament's evaluation of this legislation, see Kent Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), pp. 56-84.
77. David Feldman, 'Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights', Public Law (2002), 323-48, pp. 333-4.
78. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Special Report: Implementation of the Human Rights Act, 10 April 2001 (2000-01 HL 66-1, HC 332-1), Appendix 19, Memorandum by Justice. See also discussion by Liberty, 'Re: Proceeds of Crime Bill: Draft Consultation Paper,' www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk, and 'Anti-Terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom and the Human Rights concerns arising from it,' www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/terrorism.html
79. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Special Report: Implementation of the Human Rights Act, 10 April 2001 (2000-01 HL 66-1, HC 332-1), Appendix 19, Memorandum by Justice. See also discussion by Liberty, 'Re: Proceeds of Crime Bill: Draft Consultation Paper,' www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk, and 'Anti-Terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom and the Human Rights concerns arising from it,' www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/terrorism.html
80. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Special Report: Implementation of the Human Rights Act, 10 April 2001 (2000-01 HL 66-1, HC 332-1), Appendix 19, Memorandum by Justice. See also discussion by Liberty, 'Re: Proceeds of Crime Bill: Draft Consultation Paper,' www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk, and 'Anti-Terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom and the Human Rights concerns arising from it,' www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/terrorism.html
81. For discussion of how the bill affects rights, see Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 16 November 2001 (2001-02 HL 37, HC 372).
82. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, para. 30.
83. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, paras 17-68.
84. Nevertheless the Committee still has concerns about whether other changes, which could permit a person to be detained indefinitely, even after new evidence or a change of circumstances shows no basis for this detention. See Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Fifth Report, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Further Report, 5 December 2001 (2001-02 HL 51, HC 420), paras 8-15.
85. The original proposed definition referred to people who have 'links with' an international terrorist or international terrorist group. The amended version limits this to people who have links with international terrorist organizations, and includes a sub-clause that explains that a person has links with such an organization if he or she 'supports or assists' it. The Parliamentary Committee still was concerned by the reference to 'supports' and suggested that this meaning will have to be interpreted as meaning 'supports in a material or active way' to avoid infringing rights. See Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Fifth Report, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Further Report, para. 19.
86. Under this sunset clause, the detention provisions in clauses 21 to 23 of the Bill will cease to have effect at the end of 10 November 2006. See Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Fifth Report, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Further Report, para. 20.
87. Canada's earlier experiment with a statutory bill of rights relied heavily upon expectations that legislative proposals would be evaluated before and after they were introduced into Parliament, and that political pressure to conform to these principles would ensure that a government did not deliberately violate rights. This bill of rights did not have an appreciable effect on government decisions. The biggest obstacles were that the political culture of the time did not compel the government to explain or justify the effects of its decisions in terms of rights, in parliament or in the courts.