'Presidentialization' in Japan? the prime minister, media and elections in Japan

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 357-368

  Krauss, Ellis S ^a,b   Nyblade, Benjamin ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16644379772     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000190     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Mughan, Anthony, Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, eds, The Presidentialization of Democracy: A Study in Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
2. Mughan, Anthony, Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, eds, The Presidentialization of Democracy: A Study in Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
3. Mughan, Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections, p. 7
4. Rose presents a two-by-two typology of prime ministerial roles, with number of parties in government on one dimension, and the degree to which the constitution centralizes government on the other; see Richard Rose, 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies', Studies in Public Policy No. 185 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1990). These dimensions are similar to Lijphart's conception of majoritarian and consensual democracies, and generally fit with Tsebelis's conceptualization of veto players ( Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-326; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002)).
5. Rose presents a two-by-two typology of prime ministerial roles, with number of parties in government on one dimension, and the degree to which the constitution centralizes government on the other; see Richard Rose, 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies', Studies in Public Policy No. 185 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1990). These dimensions are similar to Lijphart's conception of majoritarian and consensual democracies, and generally fit with Tsebelis's conceptualization of veto players ( Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-326; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002)).
6. Rose presents a two-by-two typology of prime ministerial roles, with number of parties in government on one dimension, and the degree to which the constitution centralizes government on the other; see Richard Rose, 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies', Studies in Public Policy No. 185 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1990). These dimensions are similar to Lijphart's conception of majoritarian and consensual democracies, and generally fit with Tsebelis's conceptualization of veto players ( Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-326; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002)).
7. Rose presents a two-by-two typology of prime ministerial roles, with number of parties in government on one dimension, and the degree to which the constitution centralizes government on the other; see Richard Rose, 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies', Studies in Public Policy No. 185 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1990). These dimensions are similar to Lijphart's conception of majoritarian and consensual democracies, and generally fit with Tsebelis's conceptualization of veto players ( Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-326; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002)).
8. Kenji Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
9. Aurelia George Mulgan, 'Japan's Political Leadership Deficit', Australian Journal of Political Science, 35 (2002), 183-202.
10. Tomohito Shinoda, Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000).
11. Hayao argues that there is sufficient capacity for change and policy innovation in the Japanese political system even with the weakness of the Japanese prime minister, while Mulgan finds the lack of executive leadership much more problematic. See Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy, pp. 202-10; and Mulgan, Leading Japan, pp. 200-1.
12. Hayao argues that there is sufficient capacity for change and policy innovation in the Japanese political system even with the weakness of the Japanese prime minister, while Mulgan finds the lack of executive leadership much more problematic. See Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy, pp. 202-10; and Mulgan, Leading Japan, pp. 200-1.
13. Ellis S. Krauss and Michio Muramatsu, 'The Dominant Party and Social Coalitions in Japan', in T. J. Pempel, ed., Uncommon Democracies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 282-305.
14. Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy.
15. The House of Representatives had a multi-member district, SNTV system to which each district elected between two and six representatives, theoretically according to population, but each voter had only one ballot. This placed candidates of the largest, ruling party, the LDP, into competition with each other in the district. See J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
16. On Japan, see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, and Steven R. Reed, 'Democracy and the Personal Vote: A Cautionary Tale from Japan', Electoral Studies, 13 (1994), 17-28. For a comparative perspective, see Brace Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); and John Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formula', Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417-39.
17. On Japan, see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, and Steven R. Reed, 'Democracy and the Personal Vote: A Cautionary Tale from Japan', Electoral Studies, 13 (1994), 17-28. For a comparative perspective, see Brace Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); and John Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formula', Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417-39.
18. On Japan, see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, and Steven R. Reed, 'Democracy and the Personal Vote: A Cautionary Tale from Japan', Electoral Studies, 13 (1994), 17-28. For a comparative perspective, see Brace Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); and John Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formula', Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417-39.
19. On Japan, see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, and Steven R. Reed, 'Democracy and the Personal Vote: A Cautionary Tale from Japan', Electoral Studies, 13 (1994), 17-28. For a comparative perspective, see Brace Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); and John Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formula', Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417-39.
20. Much depended on the number of candidates that the LDP ran in that district. The fewer the candidates, the more important the party label became. See Thomas Rochon, 'Electoral Systems and the Basis of the Vote: The Case of Japan', in John Creighton Campbell, ed., Parties, Candidates, and Voters in Japan: Six Quantitative Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 1981), pp. 1-28; Bradley M. Richardson, 'Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 695-718; Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson and Joji Watanuki, The Japanese Voter (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); Stephen M. Swindle, 'The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications of Collective Electoral Incentives', Party Politics, 8 (2002), 279-300.
21. Much depended on the number of candidates that the LDP ran in that district. The fewer the candidates, the more important the party label became. See Thomas Rochon, 'Electoral Systems and the Basis of the Vote: The Case of Japan', in John Creighton Campbell, ed., Parties, Candidates, and Voters in Japan: Six Quantitative Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 1981), pp. 1-28; Bradley M. Richardson, 'Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 695-718; Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson and Joji Watanuki, The Japanese Voter (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); Stephen M. Swindle, 'The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications of Collective Electoral Incentives', Party Politics, 8 (2002), 279-300.
22. Much depended on the number of candidates that the LDP ran in that district. The fewer the candidates, the more important the party label became. See Thomas Rochon, 'Electoral Systems and the Basis of the Vote: The Case of Japan', in John Creighton Campbell, ed., Parties, Candidates, and Voters in Japan: Six Quantitative Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 1981), pp. 1-28; Bradley M. Richardson, 'Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 695-718; Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson and Joji Watanuki, The Japanese Voter (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); Stephen M. Swindle, 'The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications of Collective Electoral Incentives', Party Politics, 8 (2002), 279-300.
23. Much depended on the number of candidates that the LDP ran in that district. The fewer the candidates, the more important the party label became. See Thomas Rochon, 'Electoral Systems and the Basis of the Vote: The Case of Japan', in John Creighton Campbell, ed., Parties, Candidates, and Voters in Japan: Six Quantitative Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 1981), pp. 1-28; Bradley M. Richardson, 'Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 695-718; Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson and Joji Watanuki, The Japanese Voter (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); Stephen M. Swindle, 'The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications of Collective Electoral Incentives', Party Politics, 8 (2002), 279-300.
24. The few exceptions include Sadafumi Kawato, 'Shū-San Dōjitsu Senkyo to Nakasone Ninki' [An Analysis of Voting Behavior in the 1986 'Double Elections'], Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū [Hokkaido Law Review], 39 (1988), 432-90, and more recently Ikuo Kabashima and Ryosuke Imai, 'Evaluation of Party Leaders and Voting Behaviour: An Analysis of the 2000 General Election', Social Science Japan Journal, 5 (2002), 85-96.
25. The few exceptions include Sadafumi Kawato, 'Shū-San Dōjitsu Senkyo to Nakasone Ninki' [An Analysis of Voting Behavior in the 1986 'Double Elections'], Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū [Hokkaido Law Review], 39 (1988), 432-90, and more recently Ikuo Kabashima and Ryosuke Imai, 'Evaluation of Party Leaders and Voting Behaviour: An Analysis of the 2000 General Election', Social Science Japan Journal, 5 (2002), 85-96.
26. See Laurie Ann Freeman, Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan's Mass Media (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ofer Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 67-93; and Ivan P. Hall, Cartels of the Mind (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), pp. 45-79.
27. See Laurie Ann Freeman, Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan's Mass Media (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ofer Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 67-93; and Ivan P. Hall, Cartels of the Mind (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), pp. 45-79.
28. See Laurie Ann Freeman, Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan's Mass Media (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ofer Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 67-93; and Ivan P. Hall, Cartels of the Mind (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), pp. 45-79.
29. Michael Cockerell, Peter Hennessey and David Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister; Inside the Hidden World of the News Manipulators (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 9-12, 31-47. See also Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan, pp. 196-7
30. Michael Cockerell, Peter Hennessey and David Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister; Inside the Hidden World of the News Manipulators (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 9-12, 31-47. See also Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan, pp. 196-7
31. Ellis S. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000).
32. Joseph Massey, Youth and Politics in Japan (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 27-31.
33. In part this is because of a fixed 'news hole' in newspapers in which stories were never continued on later pages and each topic - such as politics, economics or international affairs, also appeared daily in the same, fixed number of pages.
34. Matthew S. Shugart, 'The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 327-43; David Samuels, 'The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 240-53. Karen E. Cox and Leonard J. Schoppa, 'Interaction Effects and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 1027-53.
35. Matthew S. Shugart, 'The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 327-43; David Samuels, 'The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 240-53. Karen E. Cox and Leonard J. Schoppa, 'Interaction Effects and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 1027-53.
36. Matthew S. Shugart, 'The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 327-43; David Samuels, 'The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 240-53. Karen E. Cox and Leonard J. Schoppa, 'Interaction Effects and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 1027-53.
37. Gary D. Allinson, 'Japan's Independent Voters', Japan Interpreter, 11 (1976), 36-55.
38. Jiji Press, ed., Sengo Nihon no Seitō to Naikaku [Postwar Japanese Parties and Cabinets] (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1982); Jiji Press, ed., Nihon no Seitö to Naikaku, 1981-1991 [Japanese Parties and Cabinets 1981-1991] (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1982).
39. Jiji Press, ed., Sengo Nihon no Seitō to Naikaku [Postwar Japanese Parties and Cabinets] (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1982); Jiji Press, ed., Nihon no Seitö to Naikaku, 1981-1991 [Japanese Parties and Cabinets 1981-1991] (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1982).
40. Flanagan et al, The Japanese Voter.
41. Allinson, 'Japan's Independent Voters'.
42. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in Japan.
43. The data are derived from articles published inAsahi Shimbun, Japan's national 'paper of record', for a sample of five days from each official election period. These articles featured the prime minister in all aspects of his role, governmental and political, and included election and non-election-related activities. Election campaign periods for the House of Councillors varied from seventeen to twenty-four days (with the latter being prevalent prior to the 1980s); twelve to twenty-one days for the House of Representatives (again with the longer periods common before the 1980s). The five-day sample in each case consisted of one of the weekdays for each of the weeks of the campaign, chosen so that all the weekdays were represented in the sample.
44. For example, see Gary C. Jacobson, Samuel Kernell and Jeffrey Lazarus, 'Assessing the President's Role as Party Agent in Congressional Elections: The Case of Bill Clinton in 2000', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 29 (2004), 159-84.
45. Tanaka seems to be an anomaly: in the end his final support averaged close to that of the LDP overall, but his popularity varied more extremely than any other pre-Nakasone prime minister. It started out at record levels and then dropped like a stone.
46. The two exceptions, Takeshita and Mori, follow the pattern of Tanaka mentioned in the previous footnote, and so in essence, all post-Nakasone prime ministers in office for more than three months have been quite distinct from the LDP.
47. Sec Ichiro Miyake, Yoshitaka Nishizawa and Masaru Kohno, 55-Nen Taiseika no Seiji to Keizai - Jiji Seron Chosa Deeta no Bunseki [The Economy and Politics Under the 1955 System: An Analysis of Jiji Poll Data] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2001).
48. In order to test our argument we require data that go back at least through the 1970s - this prohibits the use of the major academic election studies and surveys by other organizations, such as the Akarui Senkyo Kyokai, which do not ask the appropriate questions.
49. The table reports results for a random-effects OLS model, but fixed-effects specification finds similar results for the effect of cabinet support in the two periods.
50. We limit ourselves to the old electoral system for several reasons: it is the 'hardest' test of any change in impact of cabinet support; as was noted earlier, the emphasis in this system was on the personal vote for individual candidates. And by limiting ourselves to one electoral system we can avoid issues of cross-system comparability and still are able to have the necessary timeframe to test our theory.
51. Steven R. Reed, Japanese Election Data: The House of Representatives 1947-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1992).
52. Some scholars may be surprised that economic control variables are not reported; however, generally little evidence is found of economic voting in Japan (see Christopher J. Anderson and Jun Ishii, 'The Political Economy of Election Outcomes in Japan', British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1997), 619-30), and normally are not included in district-level analyses; for a recent example, see Eric C. Browne and Sunwoong Kim, 'Factional Rivals and Electoral Competition in a Dominant Party: Inside Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, 1958-1990', European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003), 107-34.
53. Some scholars may be surprised that economic control variables are not reported; however, generally little evidence is found of economic voting in Japan (see Christopher J. Anderson and Jun Ishii, 'The Political Economy of Election Outcomes in Japan', British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1997), 619-30), and normally are not included in district-level analyses; for a recent example, see Eric C. Browne and Sunwoong Kim, 'Factional Rivals and Electoral Competition in a Dominant Party: Inside Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, 1958-1990', European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003), 107-34.
54. This is necessary as not only the slope but also the intercept for the variables may vary between the two periods. The variable, although significant, is not substantively important, however.
55. A Chow test gave a computed F of 5.98, meaning the difference between the two periods is significant for this sample size at 0.0146.
56. Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).