Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing

Economic Theory

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 643-658

  Friedman, Eric J ^a  

^a Cornell University   (United States)

Author keywords

Almost flat; Axiomatic analysis; Cost allocation; Monotonicity; Spread; Surplus sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642618456     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0377-0     Document Type: Article

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