A Kind of Network Security Behavior Model Based on Game Theory

Parallel and Distributed Computing, Applications and Technologies, PDCAT Proceedings

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 950-954

  Xia, ZhengYou ^a   Zhang, Shiyong ^a  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Defender; Game theory; Hacker; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

DEFENDER; HACKER; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COMPUTER CRIME; COSTS; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RISK ASSESSMENT;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 1642529483     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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