Investigating conflict, power, and status within and among groups

Small Group Research

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 44-72

  Sell, Jane ^a   Lovaglia, Michael J ^b   Mannix, Elizabeth A ^c   Samuelson, Charles D ^a   Wilson, Rick K ^d  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^c Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^d RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict; Institutions; Power; Small groups; Status

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642455796     PISSN: 10464964     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1046496403259813     Document Type: Article

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