The Citizen's Stake and Paternalism

Politics and Society

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 61-78

  White, Stuart ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asset based welfare; Basic income; Freedom; Paternalism; Stakeholding

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642409577     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329203261098     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (49)

1. Stephen Spender, World within World (New York: St. Martin's, [1951] 1994), 119.
2. I say "largely" because the proposal set out in their 1999 book, when described in full, is not in fact a proposal for a capital grant (CO) rather than a citizen's income (CI) but for a hybrid form of citizen's stake that combines a generous CG on maturity with an age-related CI (a "citizen's pension" of $670 paid to all from the age of sixty-five). See Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), especially 129-54 on the CI element of their proposal.
3. See, in particular, Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society; Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995); Van Parijs, ed., Arguing for Basic Income (London: Verso, 1992), especially 81-98; and Tony Fitzpatrick, Freedom and Security: An Introduction to the Basic Income Debate (London: Macmillan, 1999).
4. See, in particular, Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society; Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995); Van Parijs, ed., Arguing for Basic Income (London: Verso, 1992), especially 81-98; and Tony Fitzpatrick, Freedom and Security: An Introduction to the Basic Income Debate (London: Macmillan, 1999).
5. See, in particular, Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society; Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995); Van Parijs, ed., Arguing for Basic Income (London: Verso, 1992), especially 81-98; and Tony Fitzpatrick, Freedom and Security: An Introduction to the Basic Income Debate (London: Macmillan, 1999).
6. See, in particular, Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society; Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995); Van Parijs, ed., Arguing for Basic Income (London: Verso, 1992), especially 81-98; and Tony Fitzpatrick, Freedom and Security: An Introduction to the Basic Income Debate (London: Macmillan, 1999).
7. Here I follow Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom," in Liberal Rights, by Waldron (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 309-38. See also G. A. Cohen, "Back to Socialist Basics, Appendix: On Money and Liberty," in Equality, edited by Jane Franklin (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), 29-47, specifically 41-43.
8. Here I follow Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom," in Liberal Rights, by Waldron (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 309-38. See also G. A. Cohen, "Back to Socialist Basics, Appendix: On Money and Liberty," in Equality, edited by Jane Franklin (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), 29-47, specifically 41-43.
9. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 85-87. See also Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
10. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 85-87. See also Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
11. Pettit also argues, in contrast to Skinner, that interference as such does not diminish the freedom of the person subject to this interference if it tracks the interests of this person. Thus, for Pettit, not only is the absence of interference not sufficient for personal freedom, but it is also not necessary for freedom. I do not follow Pettit in making this second claim. Nor do I follow either Pettit or Skinner is asserting that the conception of freedom as involving non-dependency is somehow outside the "liberal" tradition of thinking about freedom.
12. For relevant analysis of the concept of exploitation, see Robert E. Goodin, "Exploiting a Person and Exploiting a Situation," in Modern Theories of Exploitation, edited by Andrew Reeves (London: Sage, 1987), 166-200.
13. See G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989): 912-44; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 83-345. I do not mean to imply that either Cohen or Dworkin would necessarily sympathise with the "So what?" response to the alienation objection.
14. See G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989): 912-44; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 83-345. I do not mean to imply that either Cohen or Dworkin would necessarily sympathise with the "So what?" response to the alienation objection.
15. This concern for vulnerability and resulting exploitation and domination is, I think, one of the considerations that Elizabeth Anderson advances for rejecting what she calls "luck egalitarianism." See Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999): 287-337.
16. See John Roemer, Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy (London: Radius/Century Hutchinson, 1988), 152-53.
17. Ibid., 152-53.
18. A particularly helpful survey is provided by Ray Boshara, ed., Building Assets: A Report on the Asset-Development and IDA Field (Washington, DC: Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2001). See also Larry W. Beeferman, Asset Development Policy: The New Opportunity (Waltham, MA: Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University, 2001), especially 27-28, 85-87.
19. A particularly helpful survey is provided by Ray Boshara, ed., Building Assets: A Report on the Asset-Development and IDA Field (Washington, DC: Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2001). See also Larry W. Beeferman, Asset Development Policy: The New Opportunity (Waltham, MA: Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University, 2001), especially 27-28, 85-87.
20. See Colleen Dailey, "IDA Practice," in Building Assets, edited by Boshara, 51-64, specifically 53.
21. See Sondra G. Beverley and Michael Sherraden, "How People Save and the Role of IDAs," in Building Assets, edited by Boshara, 65-80, specifically 75.
22. See Saving and Assets for All (London: HM Treasury, 2001).
23. This view has been most explicitly and systematically defended by Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, "Foundations of Liberal Equality," in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values, edited by Stephen Darwall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 190-306, especially 262-73.
24. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, [1859] 1985), 173.
25. I take the notion of a side-constraint, of course, from Robert Nozick. See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1974), 28-30.
26. For relevant discussion, see Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Oxford, UK: Polity, 2000), 155-93, especially 163-64.
27. In view of Erik Olin Wright's class-power argument for CI over CG, I am not sure that only an appeal to Millian paternalism will settle the issue in favour of CI. This is, however, the appeal that Van Parijs makes in his book, Real Freedom for All. See Erik Olin Wright, "Basic Income, Stakeholder Grants, and Class Analysis" (2004 [this issue]), for the non-paternalist, class-power argument for CI over CG.
28. In view of Erik Olin Wright's class-power argument for CI over CG, I am not sure that only an appeal to Millian paternalism will settle the issue in favour of CI. This is, however, the appeal that Van Parijs makes in his book, Real Freedom for All. See Erik Olin Wright, "Basic Income, Stakeholder Grants, and Class Analysis" (2004 [this issue]), for the non-paternalist, class-power argument for CI over CG.
29. See Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, especially 89-130.
30. Ibid., 45-48.
31. Ibid., 47-48.
32. See David Nissan and Julian Le Grand, A Capital Idea: Start-up Grants for Young People (London: Fabian Society, 2000).
33. Ibid., 12-13.
34. See Robert Haveman, Starting Even: An Equal Opportunity Program to Combat the Nation's New Poverty (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 168-71.
35. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Cornel West, The Future of American Progressivism: An Initiative for Political and Economic Reform (Boston: Beacon, 1998), 62. Unger and West write, "American democracy should work toward the generalization of a principle of social inheritance. Everyone should be able to count on a minimum of resources. These resources are the tools of self-reliance, not an alternative to self-reliance. People should have a social-endowment account so that society can do for everyone a little bit of what family inheritance does for a few. At major moments in their lives - when they go to college, make a down payment on a house, or open a business - they should be able to draw on this account." I interpret Unger and West to mean that the account should be geared specifically to these investment purposes, though, strictly speaking, what they say here does not rule out use of the account for other purposes.
36. See Ted Halstead and Michael Lind, The Radical Center: The Future of American Politics (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 101.
37. Ibid., 101. They estimate that their proposed scheme would cost $24 billion annually.
38. For an excellent discussion of these problems, see Michael Lewis, "Perhaps There Can Be Too Much Freedom." Paper prepared for the Real Utopias conference, "Rethinking Redistribution: Designs for a More Egalitarian Capitalism," A. E. Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and Social Change, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2-5 May 2002.
39. See Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," in Morality and the Law, edited by Richard Wasserstrom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971), 107-26, especially 120-23.
40. The idea of a prudential general will probably has to be qualified to some extent. In any given case, it is possible that a minority has values such that they would reject a proposed paternalistic intervention even in the state of sober, considered judgment we here imagine - for example, a religious group might regard the wearing of seat belts in cars as contrary to God's will. Can paternalistic measures still be justified in view of the possible burden to such minorities? Adopting a Rawlsian approach to the question, we might ask whether parties in an original position, behind a veil of ignorance, would consent to a degree of paternalism as a way of protecting their long-term interests given this risk of burden. I think that a reasonable balancing of interests by parties in the original position would suggest something like a principle of supermajoritarian paternalism: measures are justified if a large majority regard the measures as restrictions they would consent to in a state of considered judgment. The parties might also consider supplementary principles, such as one aimed at compensating minorities for their burdens based on how additionally costly it is for members of the minority groups to pursue their goals as a result of paternalistic measures. I do not think the parties would choose a complete rejection of paternalism, for that would be to give effectively no weight to their very real interest in being able to enact laws to protect themselves against their own fallibility. For Rawls's own discussion of the issue, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1971] 1999), 218-20.
41. Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, 47.
42. See Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society, 133-42.
43. I should add that I think a hybrid citizen's stake with a similar structure can also be defended on non-paternalistic grounds, as a way of balancing justice-related concerns for freedom and reciprocity. I have developed this argument in another paper, "Freedom, Reciprocity, and the Citizen's Stake," in The Ethics of Stakeholding, edited by Keith Dowding, Jurgen De Wispelaere, and Stuart White (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), and available from the author on request.
44. In discussion at the conference for which this paper was originally written, Julian Le Grand indicated that monitoring the use of development grants for the purpose of establishing a new business was particularly tricky and that this problem had discouraged the British government from structuring the Child Trust Fund on the model of a development grant.
45. A further point to bear in mind concerns the degree to which there are administrative economies in stakeholder schemes: that is to say, the extent to which the cost of administering a single dollar of a development grant varies with the level of the grant, If there are economies of scale in the sense that the unit administrative cost falls as the average grant level rises, then the relative desirability of taking some of the stake as a development grant may increase as the generosity of the grant increases. Citizens may quite reasonably feel that it is not worth paying, say, twenty-five cents to administer each dollar of a very modest development grant but that it is worth paying, say, five cents to administer each dollar of a large development grant.
46. I am grateful to Karl Widerquist for pressing this objection.
47. See Will Paxton, "Assets: A Third Pillar of Welfare," in Assets and Progressive Welfare, edited by Sue Regan (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2001), 17-33.
48. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xiv-xvi; Idem., Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 135-40.
49. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xiv-xvi; Idem., Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 135-40.