International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Global Governance

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 53-65

  Caplan, Richard ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b LINACRE COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642383051     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01001006     Document Type: Review

References (34)

1. One scholar, for instance, suggests that Somalia today, while considered by many to be a "failed" state, in some respects functions better than numerous "successful" states. See Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force: Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 200.
2. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 4.
3. Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, chap. 1
4. Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1995).
5. Olav Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995).
6. Colonial administration and the Allied occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan entailed a comparably ambitious range of responsibilities. However, in contrast with today's international administrations, they were undertaken principally by individual states, sometimes acting in concert, and were not accountable to international organizations. Similarly, the United States and its allies exercise sweeping authority in post-Saddam Iraq, but they do so as occupying powers and not as representatives of the international community.
7. This categorization borrows from Jarat Chopra's work on peace maintenance. See, in particular, his Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority (London: Routledge, 1999). Chopra employs the terms assistance, partnership, control, and governorship to describe the range of authority (p. 16).
8. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 10, Art. II.1(a)(b)(f).
9. The powers of the Brčko supervisor are specified in the "Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko Area Award," 14 February 1997, and "Final Award," 5 March 1999, both available online at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/archive.asp under "Brčko Arbitration" (accessed 10 October 2003).
10. The General Framework Agreement, Annex 10, Art. I.
11. For a discussion of U.S. opposition to a strong high representative, see Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), pp. 130-132.
12. The responsibilities of the state-level institutions are enumerated in Art. III.1 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (The constitution is Annex 4 of The General Framework Agreement). All governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the joint institutions belong to the entities, as specified in Art. III.3(a).
13. See Bildt, Peace Journey, chap. 15, for a discussion of the initial failure of the state-level authorities to cooperate - a pattern that would continue more or less unbroken until the non-nationalist "Alliance for Change" government took office in January 2001.
14. "Bosnia: Ashdown Tasked with Fortifying Weak State," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief (30 May 2002).
15. The PIC, established by the Peace Implementation Conference in London in December 1995, subsumed the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which had been the principal forum for peacemaking efforts in Bosnia. The high representative is accountable to the PIC, although he reports regularly to the UN secretary-general and his appointment is endorsed by the UN Security Council.
16. Peace Implementation Council, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-Sustaining Structures," Bonn, 10 December 1997.
17. Caplan, A New Trusteeship? pp. 43-44.
18. Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (July 2003): 68.
19. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 341.
20. Charles A. Kupchan, "Democracy First," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 (May-June 1998): 122-125.
21. James Dobbins, Rachel Swanger, John McGinn, Rollie Lal, and Andrew Rathmell, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003).
22. International Crisis Group, State of the Balkans, ICG Balkans Report No. 47 (Brussels: ICG, 4 November 1998), p. 13.
23. Wolfgang Petritsch, "Bosnien und Herzegowina fünf Jahre nach Dayton," (Bosnia and Herzegovina five years after Dayton), Südosteuropa Mittellungen 40, no. 4 (2000): 301.
24. For a discussion of these events, see European Stability Initiative, Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part 2: International Power in Bosnia (Berlin: ESI, 30 March 2000), pp. 34-35.
25. Office of the High Representative Bulletin, No. 54, 15 July 1997.
26. Office of the High Representative, "Inaugural Speech by Paddy Ashdown," 27 May 2002, available online at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417 (accessed 10 October 2003).
27. UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1031 (15 December 1995), par. 26.
28. Florian Bieber, "Far from Raj," Balkan Reconstruction Report/Transitions Online, 31 July 2003, available online at http://balkanreport.tol.cz/look/BRR/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication= 9&NrIssue=1&NrSection=2&NrArticle=10315 (accessed 10 October 2003).
29. "Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council," 23-24 May 2000, Brussels, available online at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5200 (accessed 10 October 2003).
30. The high representative's decisions are available online at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp.
31. Constitution of the Republika Srpska, Art. 68
32. The World Bank Inspection Panel, established in 1993, is a three-member body that hears complaints from private individuals who believe that they have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected by the Bank's own policies. See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (New York: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2000).
33. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping, pp. 92-93
34. UN Charter, Chap. XIII, Art. 87.