Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games

Journal of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 445-459

  Eshel, Ilan ^a   Sansone, Emilia ^b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES FEDERICO II   (Italy)

Author keywords

Asymptotic stability; Continuous population games; Continuous replicator stability; CSS; ESS; Long term evolution; NIS; Replicator dynamics; Strong uninvadability; Weak topology

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

EID: 1642380502     PISSN: 03036812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00285-002-0194-2     Document Type: Article

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