Economic interest group allocations in open-seat senate elections

American Politics Research

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 347-362

  Gaddie, Ronald Keith ^a   Regens, James L ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

^b TULANE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER   (United States)

^c University of Oklahoma ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642269966     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9702500305     Document Type: Article

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