Why Stakeholding?

Politics and Society

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 41-60

  Ackerman, Bruce ^a   Alstott, Anne ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Basic income; Capital grant; Social inheritance; Stake; Stakeholder

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642269773     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329203261096     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (56)

1. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
3. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
4. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
5. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
7. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 185-246; Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981): 283-345; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
8. Only citizens may claim stakes. The citizenship restriction raises a number of moral quandaries, which we explore in Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 46-49. We permit citizens not yet twenty-one to receive advance stake payments to fund higher education. Ibid., 51-52.
9. Only citizens may claim stakes. The citizenship restriction raises a number of moral quandaries, which we explore in Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 46-49. We permit citizens not yet twenty-one to receive advance stake payments to fund higher education. Ibid., 51-52.
10. Interest on a principal amount is not equivalent to the annuitized payment, which includes a partial return of principal, but especially for a long-term annuity, the numbers are close.
11. In many cases, commission of a crime should only lead to a postponement of a stake, not forfeiture. But we do support the selective use of forfeiture if the alternative is a lengthy term in prison. See Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 49-51.
12. College-bound stakeholders may collect $20,000 each year beginning at eighteen. To equalize the present value of payments made to college-bound stakeholders and others, who wait until age twenty-one, we provide for the accrual of interest. Ibid., 51.
13. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
14. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
15. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
16. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
17. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
18. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
19. Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000. Ibid., 94-112. That proposal was based on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time. As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution grew significantly. Mark Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances" (unpublished paper on file with authors, 2001), 1. These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of Stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; $378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Ibid. We estimate that the 1998 cost of Stakeholding would be $268 billion. Authors' calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 219-20. We propose to take advantage of the nation's increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax. With an exemption of $230,000 per individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax, table 3, 10. Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 dollars). Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Never-theless, there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001. As of June 2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials are higher than in 1998; and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year. See "Corporate Snapshot: New Standard & Poors," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= SPX&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: Dow Jones 30 Industrials, " Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol=. DJI&Timespan=2600; "Corporate Snapshot: NASDAQ Composite," Business Week Online (Web site stock quote, ten-year time period chart). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?Symbol= NASD&Timespan=2600.
20. Of course, those who have not done well financially will not be able to contribute to the Stakeholding fund at death. Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 77-93.
21. For feminist support of basic income, see, for example, Carole Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," in Democracy and the Welfare State, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 231-60. For data on African American wealth, see Lisa Keister, "Family Structure, Race, and Wealth Ownership: A Longitudinal Exploration of Wealth Accumulation Processes," working paper no. 304 (Annandale-on-Hudson: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, May 2000). Keister notes that in 1992, median black income was 60 percent of whites', but median black wealth was only 8 percent of whites'. In the same year, 25 percent of white families but 60 percent of black families had zero net wealth. Ibid., 1.
22. For feminist support of basic income, see, for example, Carole Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," in Democracy and the Welfare State, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 231-60. For data on African American wealth, see Lisa Keister, "Family Structure, Race, and Wealth Ownership: A Longitudinal Exploration of Wealth Accumulation Processes," working paper no. 304 (Annandale-on-Hudson: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, May 2000). Keister notes that in 1992, median black income was 60 percent of whites', but median black wealth was only 8 percent of whites'. In the same year, 25 percent of white families but 60 percent of black families had zero net wealth. Ibid., 1.
23. For feminist support of basic income, see, for example, Carole Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," in Democracy and the Welfare State, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 231-60. For data on African American wealth, see Lisa Keister, "Family Structure, Race, and Wealth Ownership: A Longitudinal Exploration of Wealth Accumulation Processes," working paper no. 304 (Annandale-on-Hudson: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, May 2000). Keister notes that in 1992, median black income was 60 percent of whites', but median black wealth was only 8 percent of whites'. In the same year, 25 percent of white families but 60 percent of black families had zero net wealth. Ibid., 1.
24. One of us has praised basic income for this reason. See Anne Alstott, "Work versus Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies," Yale Law Journal 108, no. 5 (1999): 967-1058.
25. Philippe Van Parijs, "Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 2 (1991): 101-31.
26. See Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 145-48.
27. Throughout our discussion of basic income, we assume that a basic income would be paid to adults from, say, age twenty-one to retirement age. We do this because we advocate Stakeholding in lieu of basic income only for this group. We favor children's allowances and other initiatives for children, and a flat-rate pension for old age. See Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 129-54. It is only for the group rising to maturity that we believe Stakeholding is the right idea.
28. Or will Van Parijs allow them, covertly, to capitalize their stake by taking out a mortgage on their home, pledging their basic income as security? If so, he is well on the way to the stakeholder society. We will return to this point shortly.
29. In 1998, the median wealth for all U.S. households was $60,700. Thirty percent of U.S. households had net worth of less than $10,000. Edward N. Wolff, "Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998," working paper no. 300 (Annandale-on-Hudson: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, April 2000), table 1, 10. Wolff does not provide data on median wealth by age, but he does show that mean wealth of households headed by adults under age thirty-five was just 22 percent of mean wealth. Ibid., table 10,18.
30. In 1998, the median wealth for all U.S. households was $60,700. Thirty percent of U.S. households had net worth of less than $10,000. Edward N. Wolff, "Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998," working paper no. 300 (Annandale-on-Hudson: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, April 2000), table 1, 10. Wolff does not provide data on median wealth by age, but he does show that mean wealth of households headed by adults under age thirty-five was just 22 percent of mean wealth. Ibid., table 10,18.
31. This point, unfortunately, has great salience for minorities, who live with multiple injustices, including greater poverty rates, poorer health, and greater exposure to violence. African American men, for example, have an average life expectancy of just sixty-six years at birth, compared to seventy-four for white men. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999 (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1999), table 127. Black men are far more likely to die from criminal violence than are white men. Ibid., table 145.
32. This point, unfortunately, has great salience for minorities, who live with multiple injustices, including greater poverty rates, poorer health, and greater exposure to violence. African American men, for example, have an average life expectancy of just sixty-six years at birth, compared to seventy-four for white men. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999 (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1999), table 127. Black men are far more likely to die from criminal violence than are white men. Ibid., table 145.
33. See Ackerman, Social Justice, 49-53.
34. To respond to these difficulties, some have suggested a more elaborate form of "spendthrift" trust under which young adults receive $80,000 but can only obtain access to their money by convincing a bureaucrat of the merits of their proposed expenditures. See, for example, David Nissan and Julian Le Grand, A Capital Idea: Start-up Grants for Young People (London: Fabian Society, 2000), 12-13. But bureaucrats will inevitably import their own value judgments into the process, and claimants will be made to feel like supplicants. A standard list of worthy projects would avoid egregious forms of caseworker paternalism but would encourage legalistic manipulation and downright cheating. In purely practical terms, it would be impossible to design a process that is flexible and fair. Think of the borderline cases, which would quickly discredit the system. Amy may use her stake to open a hair salon because that is entrepreneurship, but Ben may not become a street musician because it is not a "business." Chris can enroll in divinity school and become an ordained minister because that is "education," but Dana may not travel to Asia to live in Buddhist monasteries because that is merely "travel." Extra procedural protections - like agency adjudication or judicial review - may worsen the situation. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980). More fundamentally, stakeholders are free men and women, not claimants on state charity. They should not be required to bend the knee to some caseworker before moving on with their lives. The entire ritual smacks of a welfare state mentality inconsistent with the liberal spirit of Stakeholding.
35. To respond to these difficulties, some have suggested a more elaborate form of "spendthrift" trust under which young adults receive $80,000 but can only obtain access to their money by convincing a bureaucrat of the merits of their proposed expenditures. See, for example, David Nissan and Julian Le Grand, A Capital Idea: Start-up Grants for Young People (London: Fabian Society, 2000), 12-13. But bureaucrats will inevitably import their own value judgments into the process, and claimants will be made to feel like supplicants. A standard list of worthy projects would avoid egregious forms of caseworker paternalism but would encourage legalistic manipulation and downright cheating. In purely practical terms, it would be impossible to design a process that is flexible and fair. Think of the borderline cases, which would quickly discredit the system. Amy may use her stake to open a hair salon because that is entrepreneurship, but Ben may not become a street musician because it is not a "business." Chris can enroll in divinity school and become an ordained minister because that is "education," but Dana may not travel to Asia to live in Buddhist monasteries because that is merely "travel." Extra procedural protections - like agency adjudication or judicial review - may worsen the situation. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980). More fundamentally, stakeholders are free men and women, not claimants on state charity. They should not be required to bend the knee to some caseworker before moving on with their lives. The entire ritual smacks of a welfare state mentality inconsistent with the liberal spirit of Stakeholding.
36. To respond to these difficulties, some have suggested a more elaborate form of "spendthrift" trust under which young adults receive $80,000 but can only obtain access to their money by convincing a bureaucrat of the merits of their proposed expenditures. See, for example, David Nissan and Julian Le Grand, A Capital Idea: Start-up Grants for Young People (London: Fabian Society, 2000), 12-13. But bureaucrats will inevitably import their own value judgments into the process, and claimants will be made to feel like supplicants. A standard list of worthy projects would avoid egregious forms of caseworker paternalism but would encourage legalistic manipulation and downright cheating. In purely practical terms, it would be impossible to design a process that is flexible and fair. Think of the borderline cases, which would quickly discredit the system. Amy may use her stake to open a hair salon because that is entrepreneurship, but Ben may not become a street musician because it is not a "business." Chris can enroll in divinity school and become an ordained minister because that is "education," but Dana may not travel to Asia to live in Buddhist monasteries because that is merely "travel." Extra procedural protections - like agency adjudication or judicial review - may worsen the situation. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980). More fundamentally, stakeholders are free men and women, not claimants on state charity. They should not be required to bend the knee to some caseworker before moving on with their lives. The entire ritual smacks of a welfare state mentality inconsistent with the liberal spirit of Stakeholding.
37. In fact, Stakeblower would be lucky to get a half-decent handout in America today. So much the worse for America.
38. See Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 129-80.
39. For details, see HM Treasury, Saving and Assets for All: The Modernization of Britain's Tax and Benefits System, Number Eight, consultative document online (London, 2001), 17-23. Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.Uk/media//71C90/36.pdf. Contributions would be based on a sliding scale - $750 to children born to poor families, reduced to a minimum of $450 for children in better-off circumstances. See Ibid.; see also David Broder, "Tony Blair's Eye-Catchers," Washington Post, 2 May 2001, 21(A).
40. For details, see HM Treasury, Saving and Assets for All: The Modernization of Britain's Tax and Benefits System, Number Eight, consultative document online (London, 2001), 17-23. Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.Uk/media//71C90/36.pdf. Contributions would be based on a sliding scale - $750 to children born to poor families, reduced to a minimum of $450 for children in better-off circumstances. See Ibid.; see also David Broder, "Tony Blair's Eye-Catchers," Washington Post, 2 May 2001, 21(A).
41. For details, see HM Treasury, Saving and Assets for All: The Modernization of Britain's Tax and Benefits System, Number Eight, consultative document online (London, 2001), 17-23. Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.Uk/media//71C90/36.pdf. Contributions would be based on a sliding scale - $750 to children born to poor families, reduced to a minimum of $450 for children in better-off circumstances. See Ibid.; see also David Broder, "Tony Blair's Eye-Catchers," Washington Post, 2 May 2001, 21(A).
42. As noted above, we focus on a basic income for working-age adults; we have endorsed a basic income-type scheme of our own for the elderly, in addition to Stakeholding. Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 129-54.
43. Translated into dollars, the baby bond proposal would pay up to $750 to each of the 750,000 infants born in Britain annually, or a total of $563 million, That estimate overstates the first-year cost of the program, because a means-testing rule would limit to $450 the grant to babies bom to higher-income parents. But the first-year estimate also understates the steady-state program cost, because in future years the Blair plan would make deposits into each child's account of $75 to $150 at ages five, eleven, and sixteen. For purposes of a rough estimate, we have settled on $750 per newborn. According to Downing Street statisticians, there are 36.1 million Britons between the ages of sixteen and retirement age. See National Statistics, Census 2001: United Kingdom, Web site (London, 2003). Retrieved 24 May 2003 from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/default.asp. Thus, a basic income costing $563 million and paid only to working-age adults would yield $15.60 per year, or $1.30 per month.
44. For the particular details of the Blair plan, see HM Treasury, Saving and Assets for All, 17-23; for a discussion in U.S. terms, seeBroder, "Tony Blair'sEye-Catchers,"21(A).
45. For the particular details of the Blair plan, see HM Treasury, Saving and Assets for All, 17-23; for a discussion in U.S. terms, seeBroder, "Tony Blair'sEye-Catchers,"21(A).
46. Wilhelm, "A Proposed Wealth Tax," 10.
47. I b i d.
48. For a more detailed discussion of the ideas in this paragraph and the next, see Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 96-101. For additional arguments on behalf of wealth taxation, see David Shakow and Reed Shuldiner, "A Comprehensive Wealth Tax," Tax Law Review 53, no. 4 (2000): 499-584.
49. For a more detailed discussion of the ideas in this paragraph and the next, see Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 96-101. For additional arguments on behalf of wealth taxation, see David Shakow and Reed Shuldiner, "A Comprehensive Wealth Tax," Tax Law Review 53, no. 4 (2000): 499-584.
50. We emphasize that stakeholding alone will not guarantee anything like true equality of opportunity. Aggressive steps are also required to ensure liberal education for all, to fight racial and other forms of invidious discrimination, and to remedy serious handicaps. See Ackerman, Social Justice, 3-227.
51. Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizens' Guide to the Great Debate over Tax Reform (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 179.
52. For a detailed consideration, see Ackerman and Alstott, Stakeholder Society, 101-9.
53. Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, 100-102, 113-19.
54. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, table 1373 (1996 data). France collects a larger percentage of its revenue in social security wage taxes and in consumption taxes. Ibid.
55. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, table 1373 (1996 data). France collects a larger percentage of its revenue in social security wage taxes and in consumption taxes. Ibid.
56. The age distribution of wealth is heavily skewed toward the middle-aged and elderly. In 1998, households headed by someone under age thirty-five had average wealth of just 22 percent of mean wealth, while those headed by persons age thirty-five to forty-four had 68 percent of the mean. Wealth is highest in the fifty-five- to seventy-four-year-old age group. Wolff, "Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership," table 10, 18. Younger voters, then, are likely to appraise their future wealth tax prospects in probabilistic terms, Some, with secure jobs and good retirement plans, may count on being in the wealthy group burdened by the tax. But others will take the security of a good start for their children against the gamble of future wealth.