Sympathy in space(s): Adam Smith on proximity

Political Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 189-217

  Forman Barzilai, Fonna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Adam Smith; Cosmopolitanism; Proximity; Space; Sympathy

Indexed keywords

EID: 16344391189     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591704272277     Document Type: Article

References (191)

1. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1982). Hereafter, TMS.
2. One notable exception is Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics, trans. Graham Burchell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, Smith is somewhat incidental to Boltanski's larger project, and his thoughts on distance are not fully investigated.
3. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. J. B Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 48-50.
4. For a classic statement, see D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie's "Introduction" to TMS, pp. 10-15.
5. Useful accounts can be found in Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 52-79; and F. L. von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy," Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: that while Smith adopted and integrated Hume's description of sympathy in A Treatise of Human Nature as the "communication" of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry, in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.... But I still affirm that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation."
6. Useful accounts can be found in Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 52-79; and F. L. von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy," Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: that while Smith adopted and integrated Hume's description of sympathy in A Treatise of Human Nature as the "communication" of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry, in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.... But I still affirm that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation."
7. Useful accounts can be found in Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 52-79; and F. L. von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy," Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: that while Smith adopted and integrated Hume's description of sympathy in A Treatise of Human Nature as the "communication" of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry, in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.... But I still affirm that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation."
8. Useful accounts can be found in Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 52-79; and F. L. von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy," Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: that while Smith adopted and integrated Hume's description of sympathy in A Treatise of Human Nature as the "communication" of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry, in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.... But I still affirm that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation."
9. Useful accounts can be found in Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 52-79; and F. L. von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy," Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: that while Smith adopted and integrated Hume's description of sympathy in A Treatise of Human Nature as the "communication" of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry, in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.... But I still affirm that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation."
10. Useful accounts can be found in Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 52-79; and F. L. von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy," Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: that while Smith adopted and integrated Hume's description of sympathy in A Treatise of Human Nature as the "communication" of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry, in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.... But I still affirm that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation."
11. For discussion, see my "Adam Smith as Globalization Theorist," Critical Review 14, no. 4 (2002): 391-419, at 393-401.
12. See, for example, TMS III.3.21 (p. 145).
13. A theme pursued by Charles L. Griswold Jr. in Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
14. A good introduction to Smith's empiricism is found in D. D. Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator," in Essays on Adam Smith, ed. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 83-99, at 96-99.
15. TMS II.i.5.10 (p.77).
16. For an excellent discussion of the descriptive and normative dimensions of Smith's morality, see James R. Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 199-257.
17. TMS I.i.1.1 (p. 9); VII.ii.4 (pp. 306-14); VII.iii.1 (pp. 315-17).
18. TMS I.i.1.1 (p. 9); VII.ii.4 (pp. 306-14); VII.iii.1 (pp. 315-17).
19. TMS I.i.1.1 (p. 9); VII.ii.4 (pp. 306-14); VII.iii.1 (pp. 315-17).
20. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
21. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
22. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
23. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
24. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
25. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
26. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
27. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
28. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modern turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social order in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriated Foucault's two well known descriptions of modern life - "surveillance" and "discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moral culture that it produces. Surely, the Foucauldian or Benthamite architect is absent in Smith's account (indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformity are remarkably similar. What gave sympathy ethical point for Smith was its power to discipline modern individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuate cultural norms without traditional forms of coercion. Smith used the word discipline over and again to describe the socializing work that sympathy performed in moral education: TMS III.3.20 (p. 145); III.3.22 (p. 145); III.3.24 (p. 146); III.3.45 (p. 156); III.5.1 (p. 163). He also often referred to our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural" and "untaught feelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18(p.245).
29. TMS I.i.1.2 (p.9).
30. I b i d.
31. I b i d.
32. I b i d.
33. I b i d.
34. TMS I.i.4.7 (pp. 21-22).
35. TMS I.ii.2.1 (p. 31).
36. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de inégalité parmi les hommes, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Œuvres complètes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, vol. III (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothéque de la Pléiade, 1959-1966), 109-223.
37. TMS I.i.4.7 (p. 22).
38. TMS I.i.1.2-3 (pp. 9-10).
39. TMS I.i.3.5-8 (p. 18) (emphasis mine).
40. TMS I.i.3.1 (p. 16).
41. TMS I.i.3.10 (p. 19).
42. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 67-71.
43. TMS I.i.4.4 (p. 20), (emphasis mine).
44. TMS I.i.3.10 (p. 19), (emphasis mine).
45. TMS I.i.3.9 (p. 18).
46. TMS III.1.3 (p. 110).
47. TMS I.ii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18 (p. 245).
48. TMS I.ii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18 (p. 245).
49. TMS I.ii.3.1 (p. 34); III.3.28 (p. 148); VI.iii.18 (p. 245).
50. TMS I.i.4.7-10 (pp. 22-23).
51. Smith's frequent use of the term "coolness" might have been borrowed from Bishop Joseph Butler. See his discussion in Sermons, xi, 20-21, of "coolness" and "reasonable selflove," which Smith's references throughout the Moral Sentiments indicate he had read; TMS I.iii. 1.1 (p. 43); III.5.5 (pp. 164-65). Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, vol. I of The Works of Bishop Butler, 2 vols., ed. J. H. Bernard (1726; London: Macmillan, 1900).
52. Smith's frequent use of the term "coolness" might have been borrowed from Bishop Joseph Butler. See his discussion in Sermons, xi, 20-21, of "coolness" and "reasonable selflove," which Smith's references throughout the Moral Sentiments indicate he had read; TMS I.iii. 1.1 (p. 43); III.5.5 (pp. 164-65). Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, vol. I of The Works of Bishop Butler, 2 vols., ed. J. H. Bernard (1726; London: Macmillan, 1900).
53. Smith's frequent use of the term "coolness" might have been borrowed from Bishop Joseph Butler. See his discussion in Sermons, xi, 20-21, of "coolness" and "reasonable selflove," which Smith's references throughout the Moral Sentiments indicate he had read; TMS I.iii. 1.1 (p. 43); III.5.5 (pp. 164-65). Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, vol. I of The Works of Bishop Butler, 2 vols., ed. J. H. Bernard (1726; London: Macmillan, 1900).
54. TMS I.i.4.7 (p. 22).
55. TMS III.3.22 (p. 145).
56. TMS I.i.4.7 (p. 22); I.ii.intro.1 (p. 27); VI.iii.14 (pp. 242-43).
57. TMS I.i.4.7 (p. 22); I.ii.intro.1 (p. 27); VI.iii.14 (pp. 242-43).
58. TMS I.i.4.7 (p. 22); I.ii.intro.1 (p. 27); VI.iii.14 (pp. 242-43).
59. TMS I.i.4.7 (p. 21).
60. TMS VII.ii.1.12 (pp. 270-71).
61. Hume, Enquiry, 49.
62. Ibid., 50.
63. Ibid., 48 (emphasis mine).
64. Ibid., 41.
65. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1943-1971).
66. TMS I.i.1-2 (pp. 9-16), throughout.
67. On the "drama" and "theatricality" of Smithian sympathy, see David Marshall, "Adam Smith and the Theatricality of Moral Sentiments," Critical Inquiry 10 (June 1984): 592-613, esp. p. 612, n. 14; and The Figure of Theatre: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
68. On the "drama" and "theatricality" of Smithian sympathy, see David Marshall, "Adam Smith and the Theatricality of Moral Sentiments," Critical Inquiry 10 (June 1984): 592-613, esp. p. 612, n. 14; and The Figure of Theatre: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
69. Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 52.
70. TMS I.i.1.3 (p. 10).
71. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 254-59.
72. TMS III.3.22 (p. 145).
73. TMS I.i.2.4 (p. 15).
74. For example, at TMS I.i.4.9 (p. 23).
75. Boltanski, Distant Suffering, 39.
76. I am referring of course to Foucault's memorable overture in Discipline and Punish, 3-6.
77. TMS I.ii.1.1 (p. 28). Note also "Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress"; TMS I.i.1.4 (p. 10).
78. TMS I.ii.1.1 (p. 28). Note also "Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress"; TMS I.i.1.4 (p. 10).
79. Luc Boltanski has offered a very thoughtful discussion of Smithian sympathy and media representations of "distant suffering" in Distant Suffering, See my review essay, "And Thus Spoke the Spectator: Adam Smith for Humanitarians," Adam Smith Review I (September 2004): 167-74.
80. Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762-1766), vol. V of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein (Oxford: Oxford University Press; repr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1982), A iii.109, (emphasis mine).
81. Although Smith acknowledges that we can feel affection, regardless of such connection, for a person who has demonstrated exceptional "personal qualities," for someone exceptionally needy, or for someone from whom we have experienced "past services"; TMS VI.ii.1.15-20 (pp. 223-26).
82. For general discussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors' "Introduction" to Smith, Moral Sentiments, 1-52, at 5-10; Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994); Griswold, Adam Smith, 217-27, 317-24; most recently, Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191 -212; and Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
83. For general discussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors' "Introduction" to Smith, Moral Sentiments, 1-52, at 5-10; Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994); Griswold, Adam Smith, 217-27, 317-24; most recently, Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191 -212; and Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
84. For general discussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors' "Introduction" to Smith, Moral Sentiments, 1-52, at 5-10; Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994); Griswold, Adam Smith, 217-27, 317-24; most recently, Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191 -212; and Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
85. For general discussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors' "Introduction" to Smith, Moral Sentiments, 1-52, at 5-10; Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994); Griswold, Adam Smith, 217-27, 317-24; most recently, Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191 -212; and Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
86. For general discussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors' "Introduction" to Smith, Moral Sentiments, 1-52, at 5-10; Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994); Griswold, Adam Smith, 217-27, 317-24; most recently, Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191 -212; and Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
87. For general discussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors' "Introduction" to Smith, Moral Sentiments, 1-52, at 5-10; Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994); Griswold, Adam Smith, 217-27, 317-24; most recently, Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191 -212; and Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
88. See Hierocles's fragment on concentric circles in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 57.G (I., pp. 349-50; II., pp. 347-48). For Cicero, see Of Duties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Bk. I. 46-59 (pp. 20-25). For further discussion of Smith's appropriation of the Stoic circles, see my "Adam Smith," 393-401.
89. See Hierocles's fragment on concentric circles in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 57.G (I., pp. 349-50; II., pp. 347-48). For Cicero, see Of Duties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Bk. I. 46-59 (pp. 20-25). For further discussion of Smith's appropriation of the Stoic circles, see my "Adam Smith," 393-401.
90. See Hierocles's fragment on concentric circles in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 57.G (I., pp. 349-50; II., pp. 347-48). For Cicero, see Of Duties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Bk. I. 46-59 (pp. 20-25). For further discussion of Smith's appropriation of the Stoic circles, see my "Adam Smith," 393-401.
91. Jacob Viner, The Role of Providence in the Social Order: An Essay in Intellectual History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 80-81.
92. TMS I.ii.1.7 (p. 220), (emphasis mine). For discussion of the "familiarity principle" in Smith (in Wealth of Nations and TMS), see Otteson, Marketplace, 183-89.
93. TMS I.ii.1.7 (p. 220), (emphasis mine). For discussion of the "familiarity principle" in Smith (in Wealth of Nations and TMS), see Otteson, Marketplace, 183-89.
94. TMS I.ii.1.7 (p. 220), (emphasis mine). For discussion of the "familiarity principle" in Smith (in Wealth of Nations and TMS), see Otteson, Marketplace, 183-89.
95. TMS VI.ii.1.11 (p. 222).
96. TMS III.3.9 (p. 140).
97. TMS III.3.11 (p. 140).
98. A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974-1986), 184-89.
99. TMS VII.ii.1.46 (pp. 292-93).
100. TMS III.3.9 (p. 140).
101. See TMS VII.ii.1.44 (p. 292): "By nature the events which immediately affect that little department in which we ourselves have some management and direction, which immediately affect ourselves, our friends, our country, are the events which interest us the most, and which chiefly excite our desires and aversions, our hopes and fears, our joys and sorrows."
102. As Viner described it, "The sentiments weaken progressively as one moves from one's immediate family to one's intimate friends, to one's neighbors in a small community, to fellowcitizens in a great city, to members in general of one's own country, to foreigners, to mankind taken in the large, to the inhabitants, if any, of distant planets"; Providence, 80-81.
103. TMS III.3.38 (pp. 153-54).
104. TMS III.3.2-3 (pp. 134-35) (emphasis mine).
105. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960-1992), 265-428, at §13 (pp. 275-76).
106. Hume, Enquiry, 49.
107. Locke, Second Treatise, 275-76.
108. Hume, Enquiry, 49.
109. TMS III.3 (pp. 134-56). Samuel Fleischacker emphasizes the difference in Smith between unreflexive perception and a more responsible "determining judgement" in A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgement and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
110. TMS III.3 (pp. 134-56). Samuel Fleischacker emphasizes the difference in Smith between unreflexive perception and a more responsible "determining judgement" in A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgement and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
111. TMS III.3.4 (p. 137).
112. TMS III.3.3 (p. 135).
113. TMS III.4.4 (p. 158). For discussion, see Harvey Mitchell, "The Mysterious Veil of Self-Delusion in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Eighteenth-Century Studies 20 (1987): 405-21.
114. TMS III.4.4 (p. 158). For discussion, see Harvey Mitchell, "The Mysterious Veil of Self-Delusion in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments" Eighteenth-Century Studies 20 (1987): 405-21.
115. I b i d.
116. TMS III.3.38 (pp. 153-54).
117. Ibid. (emphasis mine).
118. TMS III.3.41 (p. 154).For further discussion of Smith's thoughts on impartiality in international relations, see my "Adam Smith," 406-11.
119. TMS III.3.41 (p. 154).For further discussion of Smith's thoughts on impartiality in international relations, see my "Adam Smith," 406-11.
120. TMS I.i.4.10 (p.23).
121. IMS I.i.4.6, 10 (pp. 21, 23).
122. My thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
123. TMS I.i.3 (pp. 16-19).
124. TMS VI.ii.1.2 (p. 219) (emphasis mine).
125. I b i d.
126. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 134, n. 23. But surely there is a crucial difference. Impartial judgement for Smith entailed not a "standing back," a "veiling" of self but the imaginative insertion of a fully developed self into the circumstances of another. Rawls noted the crucial "contrast": for Smith, he wrote, spectators "possess all the requisite information" and "relevant knowledge" of their "natural assets or social situation," while in the original position, parties are "subject to a veil of ignorance"; John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 183-87. See also T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), 127-41 ; Raphael, "Impartial Specta tor," 96-97; and Knud Haakonssen, "Kantian Themes in Smith," in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151-52.
127. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 134, n. 23. But surely there is a crucial difference. Impartial judgement for Smith entailed not a "standing back," a "veiling" of self but the imaginative insertion of a fully developed self into the circumstances of another. Rawls noted the crucial "contrast": for Smith, he wrote, spectators "possess all the requisite information" and "relevant knowledge" of their "natural assets or social situation," while in the original position, parties are "subject to a veil of ignorance"; John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 183-87. See also T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), 127-41 ; Raphael, "Impartial Specta tor," 96-97; and Knud Haakonssen, "Kantian Themes in Smith," in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151-52.
128. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 134, n. 23. But surely there is a crucial difference. Impartial judgement for Smith entailed not a "standing back," a "veiling" of self but the imaginative insertion of a fully developed self into the circumstances of another. Rawls noted the crucial "contrast": for Smith, he wrote, spectators "possess all the requisite information" and "relevant knowledge" of their "natural assets or social situation," while in the original position, parties are "subject to a veil of ignorance"; John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 183-87. See also T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), 127-41 ; Raphael, "Impartial Specta tor," 96-97; and Knud Haakonssen, "Kantian Themes in Smith," in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151-52.
129. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 134, n. 23. But surely there is a crucial difference. Impartial judgement for Smith entailed not a "standing back," a "veiling" of self but the imaginative insertion of a fully developed self into the circumstances of another. Rawls noted the crucial "contrast": for Smith, he wrote, spectators "possess all the requisite information" and "relevant knowledge" of their "natural assets or social situation," while in the original position, parties are "subject to a veil of ignorance"; John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 183-87. See also T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), 127-41 ; Raphael, "Impartial Specta tor," 96-97; and Knud Haakonssen, "Kantian Themes in Smith," in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151-52.
130. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 134, n. 23. But surely there is a crucial difference. Impartial judgement for Smith entailed not a "standing back," a "veiling" of self but the imaginative insertion of a fully developed self into the circumstances of another. Rawls noted the crucial "contrast": for Smith, he wrote, spectators "possess all the requisite information" and "relevant knowledge" of their "natural assets or social situation," while in the original position, parties are "subject to a veil of ignorance"; John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 183-87. See also T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), 127-41 ; Raphael, "Impartial Specta tor," 96-97; and Knud Haakonssen, "Kantian Themes in Smith," in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151-52.
131. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 73.
132. Von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume," 47; and Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator, 56.
133. Von Holthoon, "Adam Smith and David Hume," 47; and Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator, 56.
134. Griswold, Adam Smith, 92, 96-99.
135. For further discussion, see my book review of Griswold's Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment in Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000): 122-30.
136. Note, I am not denying the general theoretical possibility of unbiased cross-cultural judgements. As a political theorist committed to liberal-democratic principles, I resist assertions about the absolute impenetrability of otherness and am ultimately committed to the enterprise of articulating and defending such a perspective. But I am less convinced than others that Adam Smith's theory of conscience is the most plausible or compelling way to do this. I argue that Smith's idea of negative justice does more work in this regard. See Knud Haakonssen's brief comments about negative justice and universality in his "Introduction" to Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vii-xxiv, at viii-x.
137. Fleischacker recognized that Smith was concerned more with moral action than with moral epistemology in "Philosophy in Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith," Kant-Studien 82 (1991): 249-69, at 255-56.
138. Griswold, Adam Smith, 102; Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 58-59; and Hope, Virtue by Consensus, 87.
139. Griswold, Adam Smith, 102; Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 58-59; and Hope, Virtue by Consensus, 87.
140. Griswold, Adam Smith, 102; Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 58-59; and Hope, Virtue by Consensus, 87.
141. Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 58.
142. TMS III.2.7 (p. 117); 2.32 (pp. 130-31).
143. TMS III.2.7 (p. 117); 2.32 (pp. 130-31).
144. TMS III.2.7 (p. 117); and III.5.6 (p. 165), respectively.
145. TMS III.2.7 (p. 117); and III.5.6 (p. 165), respectively.
146. Sheldon Wolin, "Liberalism and Conformity: The Socialized Conscience," in Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 343-51, at 344.
147. For discussion, see Campbell, Science of Morals, 149, 165; Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator," 83-99, at 97-98, and Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 41-44; and Samuel Fleischacker, "Philosophy in Moral Practice," 259.
148. For discussion, see Campbell, Science of Morals, 149, 165; Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator," 83-99, at 97-98, and Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 41-44; and Samuel Fleischacker, "Philosophy in Moral Practice," 259.
149. For discussion, see Campbell, Science of Morals, 149, 165; Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator," 83-99, at 97-98, and Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 41-44; and Samuel Fleischacker, "Philosophy in Moral Practice," 259.
150. For discussion, see Campbell, Science of Morals, 149, 165; Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator," 83-99, at 97-98, and Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 41-44; and Samuel Fleischacker, "Philosophy in Moral Practice," 259.
151. A reference again to Smith's description of the "measure" spectators use when they determine the propriety of others; TMS I.i.3.10 (p. 19).
152. The phrase I borrow from Nagel, View from Nowhere, 86.
153. TMS VI.ii.1.10 (p. 222).
154. I b i d.
155. TMS I.i.4.6 (p. 21).
156. TMS VI.ii.1.10 (p. 222).
157. Surely some of Smith's distinctions ring true, as when he discusses various practices in honor societies that would have struck his European readers (as they do this reader) as cruel and inhumane. See, for example, TMS V.2.8-11 (pp. 204-209) and Lectures on Jurisprudence(B) 346-47 (pp. 548-49).
158. Surely some of Smith's distinctions ring true, as when he discusses various practices in honor societies that would have struck his European readers (as they do this reader) as cruel and inhumane. See, for example, TMS V.2.8-11 (pp. 204-209) and Lectures on Jurisprudence(B) 346-47 (pp. 548-49).
159. On the circumstances surrounding Elliot's 1759 letter to Smith, see D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie's editorial "Introduction" to Moral Sentiments, 16-17; and Raphael, "Impartial Spectator," 90-93. Biographical information about Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto and his relations with Smith can be found in Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 113, 153, 157, 183. For insightful discussion, see also Vincent Hope, "Smith's Demigod," in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Vincent Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 157-67, at 167.
160. On the circumstances surrounding Elliot's 1759 letter to Smith, see D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie's editorial "Introduction" to Moral Sentiments, 16-17; and Raphael, "Impartial Spectator," 90-93. Biographical information about Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto and his relations with Smith can be found in Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 113, 153, 157, 183. For insightful discussion, see also Vincent Hope, "Smith's Demigod," in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Vincent Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 157-67, at 167.
161. On the circumstances surrounding Elliot's 1759 letter to Smith, see D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie's editorial "Introduction" to Moral Sentiments, 16-17; and Raphael, "Impartial Spectator," 90-93. Biographical information about Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto and his relations with Smith can be found in Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 113, 153, 157, 183. For insightful discussion, see also Vincent Hope, "Smith's Demigod," in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Vincent Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 157-67, at 167.
162. On the circumstances surrounding Elliot's 1759 letter to Smith, see D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie's editorial "Introduction" to Moral Sentiments, 16-17; and Raphael, "Impartial Spectator," 90-93. Biographical information about Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto and his relations with Smith can be found in Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 113, 153, 157, 183. For insightful discussion, see also Vincent Hope, "Smith's Demigod," in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Vincent Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 157-67, at 167.
163. See Michael Ignatieff, "Smith, Rousseau and the Republic of Needs," in Scotland and Europe, 1200-1850, ed. T. C. Smout (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986), 187-206, at 201-202. See also chapter 4 of his related book, The Needs of Strangers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984; repr., London: Hogarth Press, 1990), 105-31.
164. See Michael Ignatieff, "Smith, Rousseau and the Republic of Needs," in Scotland and Europe, 1200-1850, ed. T. C. Smout (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986), 187-206, at 201-202. See also chapter 4 of his related book, The Needs of Strangers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984; repr., London: Hogarth Press, 1990), 105-31.
165. For example, in Michel Launay, ed., Lettre à M. D'Alembert sur son Article Genève (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1967), 141-56; and Du Contrat Social; ou, principes de droit politique, in Œuvres complètes III, pp. 347-470, at IV.vii (p. 458). This way of thinking pervaded such political works later in Rousseau's as Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation projettée and Projet de constitution pour la Corse.
166. For example, in Michel Launay, ed., Lettre à M. D'Alembert sur son Article Genève (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1967), 141-56; and Du Contrat Social; ou, principes de droit politique, in Œuvres complètes III, pp. 347-470, at IV.vii (p. 458). This way of thinking pervaded such political works later in Rousseau's as Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation projettée and Projet de constitution pour la Corse.
167. TMS I.iii.2.1-2 (pp. 50-52).
168. TMS I.iii.2.7 (p. 57).
169. See TMS I.iii.3 (pp. 61-66), titled, "Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments..." which Smith added to his text in 1790. For a useful interpretation of this addition, see D. D. Raphael, "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series-vol. LXXIII (London: Methuen, 1972-73), 87-103, at 101, and "Adam Smith 1790: The Man Recalled; The Philosopher Revived," in Adam Smith Reviewed, ed. Peter Jones and Andrew Skinner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 93-118. For other interpretations, see Laurence Dickey, "Historicizing the 'Adam Smith Problem': Conceptual, Historiographical, and Textual Issues," Journal of Modern History 58 (September 1986): 579-609; and John Dwyer, "Theory and Discourse: The 6th Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments" in Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), 168-85.
170. See TMS I.iii.3 (pp. 61-66), titled, "Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments..." which Smith added to his text in 1790. For a useful interpretation of this addition, see D. D. Raphael, "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series-vol. LXXIII (London: Methuen, 1972-73), 87-103, at 101, and "Adam Smith 1790: The Man Recalled; The Philosopher Revived," in Adam Smith Reviewed, ed. Peter Jones and Andrew Skinner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 93-118. For other interpretations, see Laurence Dickey, "Historicizing the 'Adam Smith Problem': Conceptual, Historiographical, and Textual Issues," Journal of Modern History 58 (September 1986): 579-609; and John Dwyer, "Theory and Discourse: The 6th Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments" in Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), 168-85.
171. See TMS I.iii.3 (pp. 61-66), titled, "Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments..." which Smith added to his text in 1790. For a useful interpretation of this addition, see D. D. Raphael, "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series-vol. LXXIII (London: Methuen, 1972-73), 87-103, at 101, and "Adam Smith 1790: The Man Recalled; The Philosopher Revived," in Adam Smith Reviewed, ed. Peter Jones and Andrew Skinner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 93-118. For other interpretations, see Laurence Dickey, "Historicizing the 'Adam Smith Problem': Conceptual, Historiographical, and Textual Issues," Journal of Modern History 58 (September 1986): 579-609; and John Dwyer, "Theory and Discourse: The 6th Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments" in Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), 168-85.
172. See TMS I.iii.3 (pp. 61-66), titled, "Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments..." which Smith added to his text in 1790. For a useful interpretation of this addition, see D. D. Raphael, "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series-vol. LXXIII (London: Methuen, 1972-73), 87-103, at 101, and "Adam
173. See TMS I.iii.3 (pp. 61-66), titled, "Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments..." which Smith added to his text in 1790. For a useful interpretation of this addition, see D. D. Raphael, "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series-vol. LXXIII (London: Methuen, 1972-73), 87-103, at 101, and "Adam Smith 1790: The Man Recalled; The Philosopher Revived," in Adam Smith Reviewed, ed. Peter Jones and Andrew Skinner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 93-118. For other interpretations, see Laurence Dickey, "Historicizing the 'Adam Smith Problem': Conceptual, Historiographical, and Textual Issues," Journal of Modern History 58 (September 1986): 579-609; and John Dwyer, "Theory and Discourse: The 6th Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments" in Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), 168-85.
174. TMS I.iii.3.7 (p. 64).
175. TMS I.iii.2.7 (p. 57).
176. For further discussion, see my book review of Griswold, pp. 124-30.
177. See Joseph Cropsey, Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith (The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957).
178. I provide such an account in my forthcoming book Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy.
179. Notably, TMS III.3.21-44 (pp. 145-56); VI.iii (pp. 237-62); and VII ii.1.21 (pp. 24-47).
180. Notably, TMS III.3.21-44 (pp. 145-56); VI.iii (pp. 237-62); and VII ii.1.21 (pp. 24-47).
181. Notably, TMS III.3.21-44 (pp. 145-56); VI.iii (pp. 237-62); and VII ii.1.21 (pp. 24-47).
182. TMS III.4-5 (pp. 156-70).
183. TMS V.2 (pp. 200-11).
184. See particularly TMS VII.ii.2-6 (pp. 227-30). In "Adam Smith," I argue that Smith saw commercial intercourse among self-interested nations as a way to emulate sympathy on a global scale.
185. TMS II.ii (pp. 78-91). Judith Shklar recognized this in passing in Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 117-18. See also Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 83-87; idem., "Introduction," viii-x; and my forthcoming essay, "Smith on 'Connexion', Culture and Judgment" in New Voices Explore Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (London: Routledge).
186. TMS II.ii (pp. 78-91). Judith Shklar recognized this in passing in Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 117-18. See also Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 83-87; idem., "Introduction," viii-x; and my forthcoming essay, "Smith on 'Connexion', Culture and Judgment" in New Voices Explore Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (London: Routledge).
187. TMS II.ii (pp. 78-91). Judith Shklar recognized this in passing in Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 117-18. See also Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 83-87; idem., "Introduction," viii-x; and my forthcoming essay, "Smith on 'Connexion', Culture and Judgment" in New Voices Explore Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (London: Routledge).
188. TMS II.ii (pp. 78-91). Judith Shklar recognized this in passing in Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 117-18. See also Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 83-87; idem., "Introduction," viii-x; and my forthcoming essay, "Smith on 'Connexion', Culture and Judgment" in New Voices Explore Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (London: Routledge).
189. TMS II.ii (pp. 78-91). Judith Shklar recognized this in passing in Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 117-18. See also Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, 83-87; idem., "Introduction," viii-x; and my forthcoming essay, "Smith on 'Connexion', Culture and Judgment" in New Voices Explore Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (London: Routledge).
190. TMS (p. 3). The initial promise was made at TMS VII.vi.37 (p. 341).
191. TMS (p. 3). The initial promise was made at TMS VII.vi.37 (p. 341).