A game-theoretic formulation of joint implementation of environmental projects

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 168, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 221-239

  Breton, Michèle ^a   Zaccour, Georges ^a   Zahaf, Mehdi ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Environmental economics; Foreign investment; Game theory; Joint implementation

Indexed keywords

ANTHROPOMETRY; CONSTRAINT THEORY; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; INVESTMENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; OPTIMIZATION; PARTICULATE EMISSIONS; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

ANTHROPOGENIC EMISSIONS; ENVIRONMETAL ECONOMICS; FORIEGN INVESTMENTS; JOINT IMPLEMENTATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 16244405596     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2004.04.026     Document Type: Article

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