Mechanism design for multi-agent meeting scheduling including time preferences, availability, and value of presence

Proceedings - IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology. IAT 2004

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 253-259

  Crawford, Elisabeth ^a   Veloso, Manuela ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE (IC) MECHANISMS; INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL (IR) MECHANISM; TIME PREFERENCES; VALUE OF PRESENCE;

AVAILABILITY; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; FUNCTIONS; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SCHEDULING; TAXATION;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 16244376797     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/IAT.2004.1342952     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

1. H. E. Clarke. Multi-part pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17-33, 1971.
2. E. Ephrati, G. Zlotkin, and J. S. Rosenschein. A non-manipulable meeting scheduling system. In Proc. International Workshop on Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Seatie, WA, 1994.
3. A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes, a general result. Econometrica, 41:587-602, 1973.
4. A. Gonzlez and J. Santos. A negotiation protocol for meeting scheduling based on a multiagent system.
5. J. R. Green and J.-J. Laffont. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica, 45:427-438, 1977.
6. T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
7. N. R. Jennings and A. J. Jackson. Agent based meeting scheduling: A design and implementation. IEE Electronics Letters, 31(5):350-352, 1995.
8. D. Parkes. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Achieving economic and computational efficiency, 2001.
9. M. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10:187-217, 1975.
10. S. Sen and E. H. Durfee. A formal study of distributed meeting scheduling. Group Decision and Negotiation, 7:265-289, 1998.
11. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.