Counterfactuals, causal attributions, and the hindsight bias: A conceptual integration

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 197-227

  Roese, Neal J ^b   Olson, James M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16144366429     PISSN: 00221031     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jesp.1996.0010     Document Type: Article

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