Complex networks: Dynamics and security

Pramana - Journal of Physics

Volumn 64, Issue 4 SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 483-502

  Lai, Ying Cheng ^a   Motter, Adilson ^b   Nishikawa, Takashi ^c   Park, Kwangho ^d   Zhao, Liang ^e  

^a Arizona State University   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUT FÜR PHYSIK KOMPLEXER SYSTEME   (Germany)

^c SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Attacks; Cascading breakdown; Network security; Phase transition; Scale free network

Indexed keywords

CASCADE CONNECTIONS; NETWORKS (CIRCUITS); NUMERICAL METHODS; PHASE TRANSITIONS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

ATTACKS; CASCADING BREAKDOWN; NETWORK SECURITY; SCALE-FREE NETWORKS;

LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS;

EID: 15744374640     PISSN: 03044289     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf02706197     Document Type: Conference Paper

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