Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the Cold Warriors, 1945-46

Diplomatic History

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 321-356

  Beisner, Robert L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 1542745037     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1996.tb00270.x     Document Type: Review

References (130)

1. Byrnes spent 350 of his 562 days as secretary of state out of the country. I have not run into a numerical account of Marshall's absences from Washington, but they were frequent, and extended, as well.
2. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 34 (hereafter PAC). Acheson to FDR, 28 January 1944, Acheson Papers, box 27, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
3. George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973), 157-59. Acheson, PAC, 81-84; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. III. Years of War, 1941-1945 (Boston, 1967), 260-62, 274-75; Alfred K. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin, 1975), 157, 161. Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980), 128; Elbridge Durbrow, oral history interview, Washington, DC, 31 May 1973 (Harry S. Truman Library, April 1978), 54-56.
4. George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973), 157-59. Acheson, PAC, 81-84; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. III. Years of War, 1941-1945 (Boston, 1967), 260-62, 274-75; Alfred K. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin, 1975), 157, 161. Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980), 128; Elbridge Durbrow, oral history interview, Washington, DC, 31 May 1973 (Harry S. Truman Library, April 1978), 54-56.
5. George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973), 157-59. Acheson, PAC, 81-84; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. III. Years of War, 1941-1945 (Boston, 1967), 260-62, 274-75; Alfred K. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin, 1975), 157, 161. Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980), 128; Elbridge Durbrow, oral history interview, Washington, DC, 31 May 1973 (Harry S. Truman Library, April 1978), 54-56.
6. George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973), 157-59. Acheson, PAC, 81-84; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. III. Years of War, 1941-1945 (Boston, 1967), 260-62, 274-75; Alfred K. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin, 1975), 157, 161. Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980), 128; Elbridge Durbrow, oral history interview, Washington, DC, 31 May 1973 (Harry S. Truman Library, April 1978), 54-56.
7. George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973), 157-59. Acheson, PAC, 81-84; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries. III. Years of War, 1941-1945 (Boston, 1967), 260-62, 274-75; Alfred K. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin, 1975), 157, 161. Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980), 128; Elbridge Durbrow, oral history interview, Washington, DC, 31 May 1973 (Harry S. Truman Library, April 1978), 54-56.
8. Quoted in John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," Journal of Modern History 64 (September 1992): 502. U.S. House Committee on Banking and Currency, Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 33-36, 48, 51. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 216. New York Times, 25 February 1945. Of course, as both Democratic internationalists and Republican critics would soon learn, Roosevelt had in some cases shared the results of his confidential talks with Churchill and (especially) Stalin with virtually no one else, particularly not in the State Department.
9. Quoted in John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," Journal of Modern History 64 (September 1992): 502. U.S. House Committee on Banking and Currency, Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 33-36, 48, 51. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 216. New York Times, 25 February 1945. Of course, as both Democratic internationalists and Republican critics would soon learn, Roosevelt had in some cases shared the results of his confidential talks with Churchill and (especially) Stalin with virtually no one else, particularly not in the State Department.
10. Quoted in John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," Journal of Modern History 64 (September 1992): 502. U.S. House Committee on Banking and Currency, Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 33-36, 48, 51. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 216. New York Times, 25 February 1945. Of course, as both Democratic internationalists and Republican critics would soon learn, Roosevelt had in some cases shared the results of his confidential talks with Churchill and (especially) Stalin with virtually no one else, particularly not in the State Department.
11. Quoted in John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," Journal of Modern History 64 (September 1992): 502. U.S. House Committee on Banking and Currency, Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 33-36, 48, 51. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 216. New York Times, 25 February 1945. Of course, as both Democratic internationalists and Republican critics would soon learn, Roosevelt had in some cases shared the results of his confidential talks with Churchill and (especially) Stalin with virtually no one else, particularly not in the State Department.
12. "John S. Service, State Department Duty in China, the McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977: An Interview Conducted by Rosemary Levenson, 1977-1978, with an introduction by John K. Fairbank" (Berkeley: University of California Regional Oral History Office, China Series: John S. and Caroline Service Oral History Project, 1981), 311. Herring, Aid to Russia, 99, 135. Acheson to Mary Bundy, 12 May 1945, Acheson Papers, box 4, folder 52, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
13. "John S. Service, State Department Duty in China, the McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977: An Interview Conducted by Rosemary Levenson, 1977-1978, with an introduction by John K. Fairbank" (Berkeley: University of California Regional Oral History Office, China Series: John S. and Caroline Service Oral History Project, 1981), 311. Herring, Aid to Russia, 99, 135. Acheson to Mary Bundy, 12 May 1945, Acheson Papers, box 4, folder 52, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
14. New York Times, 17 August 1945. Herring, Aid to Russia, 246 (emphasis in the original). See also Gregory A. Fossedal, Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy (Stanford, 1993), 179.
15. New York Times, 17 August 1945. Herring, Aid to Russia, 246 (emphasis in the original). See also Gregory A. Fossedal, Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy (Stanford, 1993), 179.
16. New York Times, 17 August 1945. Herring, Aid to Russia, 246 (emphasis in the original). See also Gregory A. Fossedal, Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy (Stanford, 1993), 179.
17. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1985), 52, 278n. The ITO never came into existence after failure to gain support in the U.S. Congress. Larson, Origins of Containment, 331. "Summary of Mr. Acheson's Remarks to the American Platform Guild Conference, State Department, January 3, 1946," Acheson Papers: Files as Assistant Secretary of State, 1941-1945, and as Under Secretary of State, 1945-1947, Truman Library. My thanks to Walter LaFeber for making this document available to me on microfilm.
18. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1985), 52, 278n. The ITO never came into existence after failure to gain support in the U.S. Congress. Larson, Origins of Containment, 331. "Summary of Mr. Acheson's Remarks to the American Platform Guild Conference, State Department, January 3, 1946," Acheson Papers: Files as Assistant Secretary of State, 1941-1945, and as Under Secretary of State, 1945-1947, Truman Library. My thanks to Walter LaFeber for making this document available to me on microfilm.
19. Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945 (Boston, 1988), 55-56; Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War (London, 1980), 180. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 52-53. Larson, Origins of Containment, 278-79.
20. Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945 (Boston, 1988), 55-56; Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War (London, 1980), 180. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 52-53. Larson, Origins of Containment, 278-79.
21. Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945 (Boston, 1988), 55-56; Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War (London, 1980), 180. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 52-53. Larson, Origins of Containment, 278-79.
22. Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945 (Boston, 1988), 55-56; Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War (London, 1980), 180. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 52-53. Larson, Origins of Containment, 278-79.
23. Acheson, PAC, 194. Acheson to Truman, 5 February 1954, Acheson Papers, box 30, folder 392, Yale University Library. There was nothing ex post facto about Acheson's disapproval of the demobilization. At a cabinet meeting of 11 January 1946 he described demobilization as "a matter of great embarrassment and concern to his own Department in their conduct of our foreign affairs." Walter Millis, ed., with the collaboration of E. S. Duffield, The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 129.
24. Acheson, PAC, 194. Acheson to Truman, 5 February 1954, Acheson Papers, box 30, folder 392, Yale University Library. There was nothing ex post facto about Acheson's disapproval of the demobilization. At a cabinet meeting of 11 January 1946 he described demobilization as "a matter of great embarrassment and concern to his own Department in their conduct of our foreign affairs." Walter Millis, ed., with the collaboration of E. S. Duffield, The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 129.
25. Acheson to Mary Bundy, 6 August 1945, Acheson Papers, box 4, folder 52, Yale University Library; Acheson to John Cowles, 8 October 1957, Acheson Papers, box 6, folder 82, Yale University Library.
26. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," Journal of American History 60 (March 1974): 1017. Stimson wrote in his diary on 13 September 1945 that Acheson was "evidently on our side in the treatment of Russia." Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston, 1970), 143. Acheson, PAC, 123-24.
27. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," Journal of American History 60 (March 1974): 1017. Stimson wrote in his diary on 13 September 1945 that Acheson was "evidently on our side in the treatment of Russia." Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston, 1970), 143. Acheson, PAC, 123-24.
28. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," Journal of American History 60 (March 1974): 1017. Stimson wrote in his diary on 13 September 1945 that Acheson was "evidently on our side in the treatment of Russia." Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston, 1970), 143. Acheson, PAC, 123-24.
29. Acheson, PAC, 123-24; "Atomic Bomb," 21 September 1945, Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, box 199, Truman Library; Bernstein, "Quest for Security," 1018-19; Forrestal Diaries, 94-96.
30. Acheson, PAC, 123-24; "Atomic Bomb," 21 September 1945, Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, box 199, Truman Library; Bernstein, "Quest for Security," 1018-19; Forrestal Diaries, 94-96.
31. Acheson, PAC, 123-24; "Atomic Bomb," 21 September 1945, Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, box 199, Truman Library; Bernstein, "Quest for Security," 1018-19; Forrestal Diaries, 94-96.
32. Acheson, PAC, 124.
33. "Memorandum Requested by the President. Subject: U.S. Policy Regarding Secrecy of Scientific Knowledge about Atomic Bomb and Atomic Energy," Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, box 199.
34. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 268. Acheson, PAC, 125, 743-44; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 35; Robert L. Messer, "Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War," in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York, 1993), 59; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 26-27. It is probably a mistake, however, to think of Truman as having a fixed position on the subject at this time. His remarks at a country fair in Missouri on 7 October 1945 were far from aggressive: "We can't ever have another war, unless it is a total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that." Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, 1993), 249.
35. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 268. Acheson, PAC, 125, 743-44; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 35; Robert L. Messer, "Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War," in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York, 1993), 59; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 26-27. It is probably a mistake, however, to think of Truman as having a fixed position on the subject at this time. His remarks at a country fair in Missouri on 7 October 1945 were far from aggressive: "We can't ever have another war, unless it is a total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that." Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, 1993), 249.
36. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 268. Acheson, PAC, 125, 743-44; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 35; Robert L. Messer, "Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War," in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York, 1993), 59; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 26-27. It is probably a mistake, however, to think of Truman as having a fixed position on the subject at this time. His remarks at a country fair in Missouri on 7 October 1945 were far from aggressive: "We can't ever have another war, unless it is a total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that." Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, 1993), 249.
37. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 268. Acheson, PAC, 125, 743-44; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 35; Robert L. Messer, "Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War," in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York, 1993), 59; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 26-27. It is probably a mistake, however, to think of Truman as having a fixed position on the subject at this time. His remarks at a country fair in Missouri on 7 October 1945 were far from aggressive: "We can't ever have another war, unless it is a total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that." Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, 1993), 249.
38. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 268. Acheson, PAC, 125, 743-44; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 35; Robert L. Messer, "Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War," in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York, 1993), 59; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 26-27. It is probably a mistake, however, to think of Truman as having a fixed position on the subject at this time. His remarks at a country fair in Missouri on 7 October 1945 were far from aggressive: "We can't ever have another war, unless it is a total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that." Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, 1993), 249.
39. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 268. Acheson, PAC, 125, 743-44; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 35; Robert L. Messer, "Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War," in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York, 1993), 59; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 26-27. It is probably a mistake, however, to think of Truman as having a fixed position on the subject at this time. His remarks at a country fair in Missouri on 7 October 1945 were far from aggressive: "We can't ever have another war, unless it is a total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that." Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, 1993), 249.
40. Byrnes had earlier reversed the position Acheson took in the cabinet the day of Stimson's swan song, believing Washington should "see whether we can work out a decent peace" with Moscow before offering any inducements or concessions on nuclear weapons. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 (New York, 1993), 39. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1, The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, PA, 1962), 541. Acheson quoted in James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), 269.
41. Byrnes had earlier reversed the position Acheson took in the cabinet the day of Stimson's swan song, believing Washington should "see whether we can work out a decent peace" with Moscow before offering any inducements or concessions on nuclear weapons. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 (New York, 1993), 39. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1, The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, PA, 1962), 541. Acheson quoted in James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), 269.
42. Byrnes had earlier reversed the position Acheson took in the cabinet the day of Stimson's swan song, believing Washington should "see whether we can work out a decent peace" with Moscow before offering any inducements or concessions on nuclear weapons. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 (New York, 1993), 39. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1, The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, PA, 1962), 541. Acheson quoted in James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), 269.
43. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 558. Bernstein, "Quest for Security," 1031.
44. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 558. Bernstein, "Quest for Security," 1031.
45. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York, 1964), 41. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 565, 570, 572-74. Baruch believed that Acheson was pro-Soviet and "soft on communism." Wittner, One World or None, 253. By this time, Stimson had abandoned his position of September 1945, writing Baruch that "The time has passed for handling the bomb in the way I suggested to the President last summer." Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 335.
46. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York, 1964), 41. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 565, 570, 572-74. Baruch believed that Acheson was pro-Soviet and "soft on communism." Wittner, One World or None, 253. By this time, Stimson had abandoned his position of September 1945, writing Baruch that "The time has passed for handling the bomb in the way I suggested to the President last summer." Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 335.
47. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York, 1964), 41. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 565, 570, 572-74. Baruch believed that Acheson was pro-Soviet and "soft on communism." Wittner, One World or None, 253. By this time, Stimson had abandoned his position of September 1945, writing Baruch that "The time has passed for handling the bomb in the way I suggested to the President last summer." Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 335.
48. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York, 1964), 41. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 565, 570, 572-74. Baruch believed that Acheson was pro-Soviet and "soft on communism." Wittner, One World or None, 253. By this time, Stimson had abandoned his position of September 1945, writing Baruch that "The time has passed for handling the bomb in the way I suggested to the President last summer." Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 335.
49. Acheson, PAC, 155. None of the United States's allies supported Baruch's arguments on the veto when he presented the plan in the UN.
50. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington, 1968), 4:493 (henceforth FRUS); Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, Vol. 16, American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed., Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York, 1972), 29.
51. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington, 1968), 4:493 (henceforth FRUS); Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, Vol. 16, American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed., Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York, 1972), 29.
52. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), 285; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 148. For the Iranians' skill in making the Soviets appear especially culpable see Stephen L. McFarland, "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 333-51. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, England, 1992), 125-26; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 548.
53. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), 285; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 148. For the Iranians' skill in making the Soviets appear especially culpable see Stephen L. McFarland, "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 333-51. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, England, 1992), 125-26; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 548.
54. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), 285; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 148. For the Iranians' skill in making the Soviets appear especially culpable see Stephen L. McFarland, "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 333-51. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, England, 1992), 125-26; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 548.
55. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), 285; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 148. For the Iranians' skill in making the Soviets appear especially culpable see Stephen L. McFarland, "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 333-51. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, England, 1992), 125-26; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 548.
56. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), 285; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 148. For the Iranians' skill in making the Soviets appear especially culpable see Stephen L. McFarland, "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 333-51. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, England, 1992), 125-26; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 548.
57. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), 285; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 148. For the Iranians' skill in making the Soviets appear especially culpable see Stephen L. McFarland, "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 333-51. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, England, 1992), 125-26; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 548.
58. Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, 106-7, 135, 138; David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York, 1976), 110-11. The dinner story is in Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, 394n.
59. Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, 106-7, 135, 138; David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York, 1976), 110-11. The dinner story is in Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, 394n.
60. Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, 106-7, 135, 138; David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York, 1976), 110-11. The dinner story is in Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, 394n.
61. War College Speech, 16 September 1948, 26-27, Acheson Papers, box 69, Truman Library. In April 1947, he said, off the record, that "The Russians put on a supremely poor show in Persia through stupidity, avarice, and the basic unsoundness of their purpose." "Address Made off the Record before the American Society of Newspaper Editors by the Honorable Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., April 18, 1947," 11, Acheson Papers, box 69, Truman Library.
62. John D. Hickerson, oral history interview, Washington, DC, 10 November 1972, 26 January and 5 June 1973 (Harry S. Truman Library, September 1976), 12, 29.
63. Acheson, PAC, 196.
64. Apparently Soviet leaders were "appalled" by the Western reaction to Stalin's speech and made attempts, unsuccessfully, to allay the tears prompted by the speech. See Albert Resis, Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946 (Pittsburgh, 1988), 16-17, 21-23, 25. Relying on Acheson's memoirs, Resis mistakenly lumps him with Walter Lippmann in considering the speech "belligerent." "Address by The Honorable Dean Acheson before the State Bar of Michigan, Lansing, Michigan, September 30, 1948," Princeton Seminars, p. 2, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992), 486. Forrestal Diaries, 134.
65. Apparently Soviet leaders were "appalled" by the Western reaction to Stalin's speech and made attempts, unsuccessfully, to allay the tears prompted by the speech. See Albert Resis, Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946 (Pittsburgh, 1988), 16-17, 21-23, 25. Relying on Acheson's memoirs, Resis mistakenly lumps him with Walter Lippmann in considering the speech "belligerent." "Address by The Honorable Dean Acheson before the State Bar of Michigan, Lansing, Michigan, September 30, 1948," Princeton Seminars, p. 2, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992), 486. Forrestal Diaries, 134.
66. Apparently Soviet leaders were "appalled" by the Western reaction to Stalin's speech and made attempts, unsuccessfully, to allay the tears prompted by the speech. See Albert Resis, Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946 (Pittsburgh, 1988), 16-17, 21-23, 25. Relying on Acheson's memoirs, Resis mistakenly lumps him with Walter Lippmann in considering the speech "belligerent." "Address by The Honorable Dean Acheson before the State Bar of Michigan, Lansing, Michigan, September 30, 1948," Princeton Seminars, p. 2, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992), 486. Forrestal Diaries, 134.
67. Larson, Origins of Containment, 253-54; Charles R. Morris, Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 1945-1987(New York, 1988), 25. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York, 1988), 43. Talbott's account comes from a Nitze oral history (395n.); see Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York, 1989), 78.
68. Larson, Origins of Containment, 253-54; Charles R. Morris, Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 1945-1987(New York, 1988), 25. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York, 1988), 43. Talbott's account comes from a Nitze oral history (395n.); see Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York, 1989), 78.
69. Larson, Origins of Containment, 253-54; Charles R. Morris, Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 1945-1987(New York, 1988), 25. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York, 1988), 43. Talbott's account comes from a Nitze oral history (395n.); see Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York, 1989), 78.
70. Larson, Origins of Containment, 253-54; Charles R. Morris, Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 1945-1987(New York, 1988), 25. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York, 1988), 43. Talbott's account comes from a Nitze oral history (395n.); see Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York, 1989), 78.
71. Nitze gave another, almost identical, account to Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, which appears in their book The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy (New York, 1986), 350-51. For yet another account - "I went to Dean's office and explained my concerns to him. He was unsympathetic" -
72. see Paul H. Nitze, Tension between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics (New York, 1993), 102.
73. Larson, Origins of Containment, 255.
74. "Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, 'The Long Telegram,'" 22 February 1946, in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York, 1978), 50-63. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 26; Acheson, PAC, 151.
75. "Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, 'The Long Telegram,'" 22 February 1946, in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York, 1978), 50-63. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 26; Acheson, PAC, 151.
76. "Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, 'The Long Telegram,'" 22 February 1946, in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York, 1978), 50-63. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 26; Acheson, PAC, 151.
77. McCullough, Truman, 488.
78. In Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, Since 1914, 3d ed. (Lexington, MA., 1989), 288-92.
79. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 296; McCullough, Truman, 490; Harbutt, Iron Curtain, 197, 218, 227.
80. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 296; McCullough, Truman, 490; Harbutt, Iron Curtain, 197, 218, 227.
81. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 296; McCullough, Truman, 490; Harbutt, Iron Curtain, 197, 218, 227.
82. Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York, 1978), 256; Randall Bennett Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill, 1990), 299.
83. Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York, 1978), 256; Randall Bennett Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill, 1990), 299.
84. W. W. Rostow, The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin, 1981), 3-5, 127; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 156. See also Michael M. Boll, Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943-1947 (Lexington, KY, 1984), 175. John Gillingham, in Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, England, 1991), states that Byrnes did get the plan on the formal agenda, but that his lack of enthusiasm for it reflected widespread opposition in the State Department by those agreeing with "most Americans [who] would have gagged on the idea of rebuilding Europe with Soviet cooperation" (109).
85. W. W. Rostow, The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin, 1981), 3-5, 127; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 156. See also Michael M. Boll, Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943-1947 (Lexington, KY, 1984), 175. John Gillingham, in Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, England, 1991), states that Byrnes did get the plan on the formal agenda, but that his lack of enthusiasm for it reflected widespread opposition in the State Department by those agreeing with "most Americans [who] would have gagged on the idea of rebuilding Europe with Soviet cooperation" (109).
86. W. W. Rostow, The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin, 1981), 3-5, 127; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 156. See also Michael M. Boll, Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943-1947 (Lexington, KY, 1984), 175. John Gillingham, in Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, England, 1991), states that Byrnes did get the plan on the formal agenda, but that his lack of enthusiasm for it reflected widespread opposition in the State Department by those agreeing with "most Americans [who] would have gagged on the idea of rebuilding Europe with Soviet cooperation" (109).
87. W. W. Rostow, The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin, 1981), 3-5, 127; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 156. See also Michael M. Boll, Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943-1947 (Lexington, KY, 1984), 175. John Gillingham, in Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, England, 1991), states that Byrnes did get the plan on the formal agenda, but that his lack of enthusiasm for it reflected widespread opposition in the State Department by those agreeing with "most Americans [who] would have gagged on the idea of rebuilding Europe with Soviet cooperation" (109).
88. McCullough, Truman, 508.
89. McGeorge Bundy, ed., The Pattern of Responsibility, intro. Douglas Southall Freeman (Boston, 1952), 18; Dean Acheson, Grapes from Thorns (New York, 1972), 102.
90. McGeorge Bundy, ed., The Pattern of Responsibility, intro. Douglas Southall Freeman (Boston, 1952), 18; Dean Acheson, Grapes from Thorns (New York, 1972), 102.
91. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280-81; Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306. Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), 73-74. I want to thank Melvyn Leffler for draw ing this document to my attention.
92. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280-81; Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306. Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), 73-74. I want to thank Melvyn Leffler for draw ing this document to my attention.
93. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280-81; Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306. Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), 73-74. I want to thank Melvyn Leffler for draw ing this document to my attention.
94. Larson, Origins of Containment, 282 (emphasis in original).
95. Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 137; FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7:840-43, 847-48; Larson, Origins of Containment, 282-83; Forrestal Diaries, 192. On the denouement see Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine," in Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, 93.
96. Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 137; FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7:840-43, 847-48; Larson, Origins of Containment, 282-83; Forrestal Diaries, 192. On the denouement see Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine," in Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, 93.
97. Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 137; FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7:840-43, 847-48; Larson, Origins of Containment, 282-83; Forrestal Diaries, 192. On the denouement see Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine," in Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, 93.
98. Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 137; FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7:840-43, 847-48; Larson, Origins of Containment, 282-83; Forrestal Diaries, 192. On the denouement see Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine," in Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, 93.
99. Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 137; FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7:840-43, 847-48; Larson, Origins of Containment, 282-83; Forrestal Diaries, 192. On the denouement see Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine," in Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, 93.
100. Larson, Origins of Containment, 283-84;
101. Chester J. Pach, Jr., Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950 (Chapel Hill, 1991), 99.
102. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War." In "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 366, Leffler notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1946 had already declared that Moscow's goal was that of "world domination." Acheson, PAC, 195. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280, 283-84. By November in a dispatch to the U.S. ambassador he was describing Turkey as "the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." Pach, Arming the Free World, 100.
103. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War." In "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 366, Leffler notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1946 had already declared that Moscow's goal was that of "world domination." Acheson, PAC, 195. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280, 283-84. By November in a dispatch to the U.S. ambassador he was describing Turkey as "the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." Pach, Arming the Free World, 100.
104. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War." In "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 366, Leffler notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1946 had already declared that Moscow's goal was that of "world domination." Acheson, PAC, 195. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280, 283-84. By November in a dispatch to the U.S. ambassador he was describing Turkey as "the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." Pach, Arming the Free World, 100.
105. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War." In "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 366, Leffler notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1946 had already declared that Moscow's goal was that of "world domination." Acheson, PAC, 195. Larson, Origins of Containment, 280, 283-84. By November in a dispatch to the U.S. ambassador he was describing Turkey as "the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." Pach, Arming the Free World, 100.
106. Acheson, PAC, 196 (emphasis added). In 1949 he told Turkey's foreign minister that Truman considered the U.S. intervention on Turkey in August 1946 "the most important decision he had made subsequent to the bombing of Hiroshima." Kuniholm, "Loy Henderson," 92.
107. Late in life, in a television interview with Eric Sevareid, he asked: "What are the facts? Nobody knows what the facts are. The facts are really a matter of interpretation of a very limited segment of data that one gets. If you add more data the interpretation would be ditterent. But what the true data are nobody knows. The poet says things are not what they seem. The great trouble is sometimes they are what they seem. The question is are they or aren't they what they seem? This is inherent in the problem. This is what makes government, especially foreign affairs, an art and nor a science." Conversations with Eric Sevareid (Washington, 1976), 72. An example of the kind of "facts" produced through "intelligence" gathering that might possibly have influenced him was the American journalist Richard C. Hottelet's account of an 18 June 1946 conversation with Soviet deputy foreign minister Maxim Litvinov, who told him that growing Soviet-American tensions stemmed from his own government's "false conception of security, prompted by the belief that war with the West was inevitable." Resis, Molotov Remembers, 6, 67-68. The staff of the Harry S. Truman Library can find no record in either Truman's or Acheson's papers indicating that either man was briefed on Hottelet's information. Raymond H. Geselbrecht to the author, 2 February 1994. Even it Acheson had been briefed on Litvinov's utterances, it seems unlikely that they would have profoundly altered his views: His own observation of a nation's behavior was always more important to him, as were the views of intelligent "general practitioners" of diplomacy or politics, than information from "intelligence" sources.
108. Late in life, in a television interview with Eric Sevareid, he asked: "What are the facts? Nobody knows what the facts are. The facts are really a matter of interpretation of a very limited segment of data that one gets. If you add more data the interpretation would be ditterent. But what the true data are nobody knows. The poet says things are not what they seem. The great trouble is sometimes they are what they seem. The question is are they or aren't they what they seem? This is inherent in the problem. This is what makes government, especially foreign affairs, an art and nor a science." Conversations with Eric Sevareid (Washington, 1976), 72. An example of the kind of "facts" produced through "intelligence" gathering that might possibly have influenced him was the American journalist Richard C. Hottelet's account of an 18 June 1946 conversation with Soviet deputy foreign minister Maxim Litvinov, who told him that growing Soviet-American tensions stemmed from his own government's "false conception of security, prompted by the belief that war with the West was inevitable." Resis, Molotov Remembers, 6, 67-68. The staff of the Harry S. Truman Library can find no record in either Truman's or Acheson's papers indicating that either man was briefed on Hottelet's information. Raymond H. Geselbrecht to the author, 2 February 1994. Even it Acheson had been briefed on Litvinov's utterances, it seems unlikely that they would have profoundly altered his views: His own observation of a nation's behavior was always more important to him, as were the views of intelligent "general practitioners" of diplomacy or politics, than information from "intelligence" sources.
109. Reston, "The No. 1 No. 2 Man in Washington," New York Times Magazine, 25 August 1946, 8, 44.
110. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 215. Jonathan Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," Political Science Quarterly 90 (Fall 1975): 470-73.
111. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 215. Jonathan Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," Political Science Quarterly 90 (Fall 1975): 470-73.
112. Quoted in Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 258. The allusion to 1933 concerns the fight between FDR and Acheson, then undersecretary of the treasury, over U.S. currency policy, a conflict resulting in the latter's resignation.
113. Acheson, PAC, 360, 191-92.
114. "Address by the Honorable Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, at a Rally Sponsored by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, at Madison Square Garden, New York City, November 14, 1945, at 9:00 P.M., E.S.T.," Acheson Papers, box 89, Truman Library; Acheson, PAC, 130-31. Other details are in the New York Times, 15 November 1945, which does not mention any boos or catcalls. During his 1949 confirmation hearings as secretary of state, Acheson cited the speech in support of his anti-Soviet credentials but complained that he was "continually criticized" for even appearing at such a gathering.
115. "Address by the Honorable Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, at a Rally Sponsored by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, at Madison Square Garden, New York City, November 14, 1945, at 9:00 P.M., E.S.T.," Acheson Papers, box 89, Truman Library; Acheson, PAC, 130-31. Other details are in the New York Times, 15 November 1945, which does not mention any boos or catcalls. During his 1949 confirmation hearings as secretary of state, Acheson cited the speech in support of his anti-Soviet credentials but complained that he was "continually criticized" for even appearing at such a gathering.
116. Nomination of Dean G. Acheson: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 13 January 1949, 22-13, Acheson Papers, box 61, Truman Library.
117. Acheson quoted in Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York, 1993), 116. New York Times, 18 May 1946. Truman quoted in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948 (New York, 1977), 249.
118. Acheson quoted in Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York, 1993), 116. New York Times, 18 May 1946. Truman quoted in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948 (New York, 1977), 249.
119. Acheson quoted in Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York, 1993), 116. New York Times, 18 May 1946. Truman quoted in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948 (New York, 1977), 249.
120. FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1971), 8:66-69, 77.
121. Walter L. Hixson, George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast (New York 1989), 34. Paul H. Nitze, oral history interview, 11 and 17 June, 4-6 August 1975 (Harry S. Truman Library, July 1990), 225-26.
122. Nitze gives a slightly different but compatible version in his memoirs. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 49.
123. I am grateful for John Lewis Gaddis's interesting discussion in a spring 1994 seminar at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York of the difference between interpreting someone's behavior as "situational" and viewing it as "dispositional." In effect, Acheson in August and September 1946 shifted from a situational to a dispositional interpretation of negative Soviet behavior.
124. Robert L. Messer, "Roosevelt, Truman, and China: An Overview," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE, 1989), 73. New York Times, 3 September 1946; ibid., 17 October 1946. FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 1:985. Acheson quoted in Sheldon R. Anderson, A Dollar to Poland Is a Dollar to Russia: U.S. Economic Policy toward Poland, 1945-1952 (New York, 1993), 73.
125. Robert L. Messer, "Roosevelt, Truman, and China: An Overview," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE, 1989), 73. New York Times, 3 September 1946; ibid., 17 October 1946. FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 1:985. Acheson quoted in Sheldon R. Anderson, A Dollar to Poland Is a Dollar to Russia: U.S. Economic Policy toward Poland, 1945-1952 (New York, 1993), 73.
126. Robert L. Messer, "Roosevelt, Truman, and China: An Overview," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE, 1989), 73. New York Times, 3 September 1946; ibid., 17 October 1946. FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 1:985. Acheson quoted in Sheldon R. Anderson, A Dollar to Poland Is a Dollar to Russia: U.S. Economic Policy toward Poland, 1945-1952 (New York, 1993), 73.
127. Robert L. Messer, "Roosevelt, Truman, and China: An Overview," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE, 1989), 73. New York Times, 3 September 1946; ibid., 17 October 1946. FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 1:985. Acheson quoted in Sheldon R. Anderson, A Dollar to Poland Is a Dollar to Russia: U.S. Economic Policy toward Poland, 1945-1952 (New York, 1993), 73.
128. Robert L. Messer, "Roosevelt, Truman, and China: An Overview," in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE, 1989), 73. New York Times, 3 September 1946; ibid., 17 October 1946. FRUS, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 1:985. Acheson quoted in Sheldon R. Anderson, A Dollar to Poland Is a Dollar to Russia: U.S. Economic Policy toward Poland, 1945-1952 (New York, 1993), 73.
129. Larson, Origins of Containment, 306. That Acheson had dropped his view of the Soviet Union as something of a "normal" power does not mean he had become blinded to generic social and economic sources of economic instability independent of either the existence or conduct of the USSR. Talking to the State Department's mission at the United Nations in June 1947, for example, he averred that the most important problems facing the United States in the postwar era were "social disintegration, political disintegration, the loss of faith by people in leaders who have led them in the past, and a great deal of economic disintegration." Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 13.
130. Larson, Origins of Containment, 306. That Acheson had dropped his view of the Soviet Union as something of a "normal" power does not mean he had become blinded to generic social and economic sources of economic instability independent of either the existence or conduct of the USSR. Talking to the State Department's mission at the United Nations in June 1947, for example, he averred that the most important problems facing the United States in the postwar era were "social disintegration, political disintegration, the loss of faith by people in leaders who have led them in the past, and a great deal of economic disintegration." Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 13.