Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 508-543

  Maggs, Gregory E ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 1542740162     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (352)

1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). The title page of this work identifies it as the "Restatement of the Law of Contracts Second." Id. at 1. By convention and Bluebook form, however, most writers call it the "Restatement (Second) of Contracts." See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 84-85 (16th ed. 1996).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). The title page of this work identifies it as the "Restatement of the Law of Contracts Second." Id. at 1. By convention and Bluebook form, however, most writers call it the "Restatement (Second) of Contracts." See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 84-85 (16th ed. 1996).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). The title page of this work identifies it as the "Restatement of the Law of Contracts Second." Id. at 1. By convention and Bluebook form, however, most writers call it the "Restatement (Second) of Contracts." See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 84-85 (16th ed. 1996).
4. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995).
5. 149 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 355-56.
6. See id. at 39-40.
7. See id. at 40.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 357-61.
11. See id. at 591.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 591, 594.
14. See id. at 594.
15. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 353, 356.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
17. Id. § 89 reporter's note.
18. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 130-34 (6th ed. 1996); ARTHUR ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 240-65 (5th ed. 1994).
19. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 130-34 (6th ed. 1996); ARTHUR ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 240-65 (5th ed. 1994).
20. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 67.
21. See id. at 207.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 212.
24. See id. at 211.
25. See id. The court noted that the law traditionally had recognized exceptions for promises reaffirming debts discharged in bankruptcy, barred by the statute of frauds, or incurred as an infant. See id. at 209.
26. See id. The court noted that the law traditionally had recognized exceptions for promises reaffirming debts discharged in bankruptcy, barred by the statute of frauds, or incurred as an infant. See id. at 209.
27. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 68-72.
28. See id. at 196-97.
29. See id. at 197.
30. See id. at 198.
31. See id.
32. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 73.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981).
34. Id. § 86 reporter's note.
35. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
36. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
37. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
38. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
39. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
40. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
41. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
42. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
43. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
44. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
45. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
46. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 688-98 (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 191-99 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 204-15 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 233-47 (6th ed. 1993); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 170-79; ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); JAMES F. HOGO & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 180-97 (1997); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-76 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 139-50 (5th ed. 1997); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 229-37; ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 144-56 (3d ed. 1997).
47. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150 (1969).
48. E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
49. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 7.
50. BURTON, supra note 31, at 11.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b) (1981) (";A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect . . . (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.").
52. See id. § 86(1) ("A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.").
53. See id. § 87(2) ("An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.").
54. See id. § 89(a) ("A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made . . . .").
55. See id. § 139(1) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.").
56. See id. § 153 ("Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and (a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.").
57. Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules In their casebook. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 73, 257-58, 307, 333, 356-57, 801. Other contracts casebooks cite many of them. See, e.g., FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 130, 178-79, 409, 699 (citing sections 86, 87(2), 89, and 153); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).
58. Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules In their casebook. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 73, 257-58, 307, 333, 356-57, 801. Other contracts casebooks cite many of them. See, e.g., FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 130, 178-79, 409, 699 (citing sections 86, 87(2), 89, and 153); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).
59. Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules In their casebook. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 73, 257-58, 307, 333, 356-57, 801. Other contracts casebooks cite many of them. See, e.g., FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 130, 178-79, 409, 699 (citing sections 86, 87(2), 89, and 153); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).
60. Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules In their casebook. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 73, 257-58, 307, 333, 356-57, 801. Other contracts casebooks cite many of them. See, e.g., FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 130, 178-79, 409, 699 (citing sections 86, 87(2), 89, and 153); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).
61. Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules In their casebook. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 73, 257-58, 307, 333, 356-57, 801. Other contracts casebooks cite many of them. See, e.g., FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 130, 178-79, 409, 699 (citing sections 86, 87(2), 89, and 153); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139); ROSETT, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).
62. The American Law Institute adopted and promulgated the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at its annual meeting on May 17, 1979. Final publication of the work, however, did not occur until 1981. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
63. See infra Appendix (listing cases).
64. For a comparable study of how courts have responded to section 90, see Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904, 907 (1985).
65. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).
66. See infra Part III.B.
67. See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
68. See infra Part V.
69. See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, reprinted in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - 50TH ANNIVERSARY 5, 12 (1973) [hereinafter Report].
70. See id. at 15-19.
71. See id. at 20-25 (discussing, specifically, the need for a restatement of the law).
72. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at vii (1932);
73. American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute (visited Sept. 1, 1997) .
74. The ALI has two kinds of members. The "official members" include Supreme Court Justices, Chief Justices of state courts of last resort, and various bar association figures. The "elected members" include respected attorneys, judges, and law professors. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at vii-viii; American Law Institute, supra note 53.
75. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at xi-xii.
76. See id. at ix.
77. See id. at ix, xi. For additional history on the creation of the Restatement, see Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 516-22 (1990).
78. See id. at ix, xi. For additional history on the creation of the Restatement, see Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 516-22 (1990).
79. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at xvii-xli (listing the sections).
80. See, e.g., id. § 492 & cmt. (defining duress, explaining the definition, and providing illustrations).
81. Id. at xi-xii.
82. See G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 23 (1997).
83. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at xi.
84. Id. at xiv.
85. See id. § 90 ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."). The Restatement gives the following example: "A promises B not to foreclose for a specified time, a mortgage which A holds on B's land. B thereafter makes improvements on the land. A's promise is binding." Id. § 90 illus. 1.
86. See id. § 90 ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."). The Restatement gives the following example: "A promises B not to foreclose for a specified time, a mortgage which A holds on B's land. B thereafter makes improvements on the land. A's promise is binding." Id. § 90 illus. 1.
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884) (Holmes, J.) ("It would cut up the doctrine of consideration by the roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting on reliance on it.").
88. See James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547, 566-68 (1995) (discussing the history of the decision to include section 90).
89. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 281 (1952).
90. For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); George W. Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1933); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 910 (1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1930).
91. For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); George W. Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1933); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 910 (1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1930).
92. For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); George W. Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1933); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 910 (1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1930).
93. For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); George W. Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1933); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 910 (1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1930).
94. For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); George W. Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1933); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 910 (1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1930).
95. For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933); George W. Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1933); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 910 (1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1930).
96. See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 1 (summarizing early reaction to the Restatement).
97. See White, supra note 61, at 36 ("In review after review of the early Restatements critics demonstrated their disaffinity with the jurisprudential assumptions guiding the project.").
98. See id.
99. See 1979 Annual Report, 56 A.L.I. PROC. 560 (1980) (noting that 12,580 cases had cited the Restatement by 1979, the year in which the ALI adopted and promulgated its successor, the Restatement (Second)).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS at vii (1981).
101. See id.
102. See id.; see also supra note 43 (discussing the completion date of the Restatement (Second)).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS at ix-xxii (listing the sections).
104. See, e.g., id. § 175 & cmt. & illus. (stating when duress by threat makes a contract voidable); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing an example of this organization in the Restatement).
105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 reporter's note.
106. See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 4 (discussing the creation of the "reporter's notes").
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS at vii.
108. See White, supra note 61, at 46; supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
110. Wechsler, supra note 32, at 150.
111. See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 5-7.
112. See infra Part III.B. (discussing each of these provisions in depth).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (1981); id. § 87 reporter's note; id. § 89 reporter's note; id. § 139 reporter's note; id. § 153 reporter's note.
114. See, e.g., id. § 15 reporter's note (relying on numerous law review articles and other legal publications).
115. See 74 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 25 (1997).
116. See infra Part III.B.
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS at app. 6 (1982), app. 7 (1986), app. 8 (1990), app. 9 (1993), & app. 10 (1997).
118. SHEPARD'S RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CITATIONS (3d ed. 1994 & app. Mar. 1997).
119. See, e.g., Quigley v. Wilson, 474 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (citing section 89); Bragdon v. Drew, 658 A.2d 666, 668-69 (Me. 1995) (citing section 15).
120. See, e.g., Quigley v. Wilson, 474 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (citing section 89); Bragdon v. Drew, 658 A.2d 666, 668-69 (Me. 1995) (citing section 15).
121. See, e.g., Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. 1996) (citing section 87); Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Sandler, J., concurring) (citing section 15).
122. See, e.g., Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. 1996) (citing section 87); Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Sandler, J., concurring) (citing section 15).
123. This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few cases in which only a concurring or dissenting opinion cited one of the sections. See, e.g., In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles out most of these cases for special treatment. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed more than one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. For example, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759 (N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139. Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986), and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), were counted as two cases. Fourth, this figure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when the court apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981) (citing section 139, but apparently referring to some other provision).
124. This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few cases in which only a concurring or dissenting opinion cited one of the sections. See, e.g., In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles out most of these cases for special treatment. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed more than one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. For example, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759 (N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139. Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986), and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), were counted as two cases. Fourth, this figure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when the court apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981) (citing section 139, but apparently referring to some other provision).
125. This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few cases in which only a concurring or dissenting opinion cited one of the sections. See, e.g., In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles out most of these cases for special treatment. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed more than one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. For example, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759 (N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139. Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986), and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), were counted as two cases. Fourth, this figure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when the court apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981) (citing section 139, but apparently referring to some other provision).
126. This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few cases in which only a concurring or dissenting opinion cited one of the sections. See, e.g., In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles out most of these cases for special treatment. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed more than one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. For example, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759 (N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139. Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986), and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), were counted as two cases. Fourth, this figure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when the court apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981) (citing section 139, but apparently referring to some other provision).
127. This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few cases in which only a concurring or dissenting opinion cited one of the sections. See, e.g., In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles out most of these cases for special treatment. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed more than one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. For example, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759 (N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139. Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986), and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), were counted as two cases. Fourth, this figure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when the court apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981) (citing section 139, but apparently referring to some other provision).
128. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.6, at 240 (2d ed. 1990); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 256, at 500 (1929).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a) (1981).
130. Id. § 15(1)(b).
131. 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969).
132. See id. at 461-62.
133. Id. at 464.
134. See id. at 465 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1964)). In a somewhat circular manner, the reporter's note to the final version of section 15(1)(b) cites Ortelere for support. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note.
135. See Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 464 ("Once it is understood that, accepting plaintiff's proof, Mrs. Ortelere was psychotic and because of that psychosis could have been incapable of making a voluntary selection of her retirement system benefits, there is an issue that a modern jurisprudence should not exclude, merely because her mind could pass a 'cognition' test based on nineteenth century psychology.").
136. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and from local courts in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Some of these cases cited section 15 generally, without singling out subsection(1)(b). Two cases, both from New York, cited section 15 only in dissent. See In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting); Tomasino v. New York State Emp. Ret. Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff'd, 440 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1982). The majority opinions in these two cases, however, did not reject the rule in section 15(1)(b), which the New York courts have followed since Ortelere. See, e.g., Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (implicitly adopting section 15(1)(b) by holding that contracts are voidable if one party suffers from psychosis about which the other party knew or should have known).
137. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and from local courts in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Some of these cases cited section 15 generally, without singling out subsection(1)(b). Two cases, both from New York, cited section 15 only in dissent. See In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting); Tomasino v. New York State Emp. Ret. Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff'd, 440 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1982). The majority opinions in these two cases, however, did not reject the rule in section 15(1)(b), which the New York courts have followed since Ortelere. See, e.g., Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (implicitly adopting section 15(1)(b) by holding that contracts are voidable if one party suffers from psychosis about which the other party knew or should have known).
138. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and from local courts in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Some of these cases cited section 15 generally, without singling out subsection(1)(b). Two cases, both from New York, cited section 15 only in dissent. See In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting); Tomasino v. New York State Emp. Ret. Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff'd, 440 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1982). The majority opinions in these two cases, however, did not reject the rule in section 15(1)(b), which the New York courts have followed since Ortelere. See, e.g., Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (implicitly adopting section 15(1)(b) by holding that contracts are voidable if one party suffers from psychosis about which the other party knew or should have known).
139. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and from local courts in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Some of these cases cited section 15 generally, without singling out subsection(1)(b). Two cases, both from New York, cited section 15 only in dissent. See In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J., dissenting); Tomasino v. New York State Emp. Ret. Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff'd, 440 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1982). The majority opinions in these two cases, however, did not reject the rule in section 15(1)(b), which the New York courts have followed since Ortelere. See, e.g., Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (implicitly adopting section 15(1)(b) by holding that contracts are voidable if one party suffers from psychosis about which the other party knew or should have known).
140. 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), rev'd, 517 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1986).
141. 517 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1986) ("This Court has never adopted Section 15 of the Restatement, which requires a post - hoc determination of reasonableness, and we decline to do so now.").
142. See id. at 530 (Larsen, J., dissenting) ("I would adopt the principles set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Contract Second, § 15, apply those principles to this case, and affirm the Commonwealth Court.").
143. See CORBIN, supra note 67, § 230, at 321; FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 2.8, at 54, 57-58; 1 WILLISTON, supra note 95, §§ 142, 148, at 317-19, 329-31. For categories that traditionally were excluded from this rule, see supra note 22.
144. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 cmt. b (1932) (stating the traditional rule that "[c]onsideration must actually be bargained for as the exchange for the promise").
145. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (1981). For further discussion of section 86, see Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1058-67 (1992) (describing the development of section 86). See also Gordley, supra note 66, at 597-98 (presenting an interesting theory of the nature of the injustice suffered in a case covered by section 86).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (1981). For further discussion of section 86, see Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1058-67 (1992) (describing the development of section 86). See also Gordley, supra note 66, at 597-98 (presenting an interesting theory of the nature of the injustice suffered in a case covered by section 86).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (1981). For further discussion of section 86, see Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1058-67 (1992) (describing the development of section 86). See also Gordley, supra note 66, at 597-98 (presenting an interesting theory of the nature of the injustice suffered in a case covered by section 86).
150. See infra Appendix. These cases came from a federal district court in Kansas, and from state courts in Arizona, California, and Missouri. See infra Appendix; see also Graves v. Sawyer, 588 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tenn. 1979) (citing section 86 but apparently intending to refer to some other provision).
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 47 (stating the rule for "Revocation of Divisible Offer").
152. See CORBIN, supra note 67, § 31, at 50; FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 3.25, at 199; 1 WILLISTON, supra note 95, § 55, at 94.
153. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (in banc).
154. See id. at 758.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 758-59.
157. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 3.25, at 199 (noting that, under "traditional contract doctrine," a subcontractor could revoke an offer "in spite of reliance by the general contractor," and explaining that the California Supreme Court "made a dramatic departure from this traditional analysis" in Drennan).
158. See id. § 4.21, at 287 (explaining but questioning this logic).
159. See Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 reporter's note (1981) (citing Drennan). For further discussion of section 87(2), see Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing the development of section 87(2)), and Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 62-67 (1981) (same).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 reporter's note (1981) (citing Drennan). For further discussion of section 87(2), see Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing the development of section 87(2)), and Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 62-67 (1981) (same).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 reporter's note (1981) (citing Drennan). For further discussion of section 87(2), see Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing the development of section 87(2)), and Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 62-67 (1981) (same).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2).
164. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D.C., Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, and from state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87 generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1) or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 836 (Idaho 1980) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hous. Auth., 375 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Mass. 1978) (same). One New York case cited section 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting), but the majority opinion did not reject the rule. See id. at 1246-48. The New York Court of Appeals has cited the rule favorably. See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. 1987).
165. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D.C., Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, and from state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87 generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1) or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 836 (Idaho 1980) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hous. Auth., 375 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Mass. 1978) (same). One New York case cited section 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes
166. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D.C., Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, and from state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87 generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1) or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 836 (Idaho 1980) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hous. Auth., 375 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Mass. 1978) (same). One New York case cited section 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting), but the majority opinion did not reject the rule. See id. at 1246-48. The New York Court of Appeals has cited the rule favorably. See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. 1987).
167. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D.C., Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, and from state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87 generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1) or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 836 (Idaho 1980) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hous. Auth., 375 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Mass. 1978) (same). One New York case cited section 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting), but the majority opinion did not reject the rule. See id. at 1246-48. The New York Court of Appeals has cited the rule favorably. See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. 1987).
168. See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D.C., Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, and from state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87 generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1) or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 836 (Idaho 1980) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hous. Auth., 375 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Mass. 1978) (same). One New York case cited section 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting), but the majority opinion did not reject the rule. See id. at 1246-48. The New York Court of Appeals has cited the rule favorably. See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. 1987).
169. 400 N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
170. Id. at 1315.
171. 674 A.2d 521 (Md. 1996).
172. See id. at 529-30.
173. See id. at 531-32.
174. See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
175. See CORBIN, supra note 67, § 184, at 265-66; FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 4.21, at 287; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 95, § 130, at 275-76.
176. See CORBIN, supra note 67, § 184, at 265-66; FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 4.21 at 287; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 95, § 130, at 276.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981).
178. Id. § 89. For further discussion of the development of section 89, see Knapp, supra note 122, at 71-76 (discussing the history of the inclusion of the provision), and Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1184-87 (1986) (same). See also Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 692-702 (1982) (criticizing section 89 for lack of clarity and underinclusiveness).
179. Id. § 89. For further discussion of the development of section 89, see Knapp, supra note 122, at 71-76 (discussing the history of the inclusion of the provision), and Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1184-87 (1986) (same). See also Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 692-702 (1982) (criticizing section 89 for lack of clarity and underinclusiveness).
180. Id. § 89. For further discussion of the development of section 89, see Knapp, supra note 122, at 71-76 (discussing the history of the inclusion of the provision), and Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1184-87 (1986) (same). See also Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 692-702 (1982) (criticizing section 89 for lack of clarity and underinclusiveness).
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89.
182. See infra Appendix. These cases came from federal courts within the D.C., First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and state courts in Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming. Two cases cited section 89 only in dissent, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
183. See infra Appendix. These cases came from federal courts within the D.C., First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and state courts in Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming. Two cases cited section 89 only in dissent, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
184. See infra Appendix. These cases came from federal courts within the D.C., First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and state courts in Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming. Two cases cited section 89 only in dissent, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
185. 293 S.E.2d 749 (N.C. 1982).
186. Id. at 755 (emphasis omitted).
187. Id.
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
189. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 2.19, at 92, 95-96.
190. Courts previously had allowed parties to use equitable (as opposed to promissory) estoppel to preclude defendants from denying that they had signed a sufficient writing. See id. § 6.12, at 454-55 (contrasting equitable and promissory estoppel); 1 WILLISTON, supra note 95, § 98, at 187 (discussing estoppel in general).
191. 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950) (in banc).
192. See id. at 740-41.
193. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 19-48, at 842 & n.61 (3d ed. 1987); see also Knapp, supra note 122, at 67-71 (describing the development of section 139 and the change that it made in the law).
194. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 19-48, at 842 & n.61 (3d ed. 1987); see also Knapp, supra note 122, at 67-71 (describing the development of section 139 and the change that it made in the law).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981).
196. See infra Appendix. The cases came from federal courts within the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits, and from state courts in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The count does not include one case that cited section 139, but apparently meant to refer to another section. See Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981). One case from Michigan cited section 139 only in dissent. See Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 465 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., dissenting). The following discussion describes the Michigan case in detail. See infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
197. See infra Appendix. The cases came from federal courts within the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits, and from state courts in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The count does not include one case that cited section 139, but apparently meant to refer to another section. See Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981). One case from Michigan cited section 139 only in dissent. See Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 465 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., dissenting). The following discussion describes the Michigan case in detail. See infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
198. See infra Appendix. The cases came from federal courts within the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits, and from state courts in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The count does not include one case that cited section 139, but apparently meant to refer to another section. See Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981). One case from Michigan cited section 139 only in dissent. See Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 465 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., dissenting). The following discussion describes the Michigan case in detail. See infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
199. See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955)), aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139); Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generally rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
200. See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955)), aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139); Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generally rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
201. See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955)), aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139); Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generally rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
202. See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955)), aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139); Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generally rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
203. See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955)), aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139); Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generally rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
204. See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955)), aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139); Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generally rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
205. See Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74-75 (Me. 1991) ("[W]e decline [plaintiff's] invitation to accept promissory estoppel as permitting avoidance of the statute in employment contracts that require longer than one year to perform. Although section 139 of the Restatement may promote justice in other situations, in the employment context it contravenes the policy of the Statute to prevent fraud. It is too easy for a disgruntled former employee to allege reliance on a promise, but difficult factually to distinguish such reliance from the ordinary preparations that attend any new employment." (emphasis omitted)).
206. See McCoy v. Spelman Mem'l Hosp., 845 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (distinguishing the employment relationship from other contractual relationships).
207. See infra Part IV.A.1.
208. See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthal v. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
209. See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthal v. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
210. See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthal v. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
211. See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthal v. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
212. See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthal v. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
213. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
214. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
215. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
216. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
217. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
218. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
219. See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v. Ting, 886 P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section 139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving part performance), rev. granted, 936 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1997).
220. See Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 455 N.W.2d 371, 373-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
221. Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 465 N.W.2d 566, 566 (Mich. 1991).
222. See id. at 566 (Levin, J., dissenting from denial of leave to appeal).
223. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 9.4, at 693; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 95, § 1578, at 2792.
224. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 503 (1932).
225. Id. § 472(1)(b).
226. Id. § 472(2).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 reporter's note (1981).
228. Id. § 153.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
232. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
233. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
234. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
235. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
236. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
237. See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these cases did not reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff'd, 398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting); Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 534 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988).
238. See In re Conservatorship of Estate of O'Connor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 398-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Da Silva v. Musso, 428 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (N.Y. 1981); Erickson by Wightman v. Gundersen, 515 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that no Wisconsin case had adopted the rule but finding elements unsatisfied).
239. See In re Conservatorship of Estate of O'Connor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 398-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Da Silva v. Musso, 428 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (N.Y. 1981); Erickson by Wightman v. Gundersen, 515 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that no Wisconsin case had adopted the rule but finding elements unsatisfied).
240. See In re Conservatorship of Estate of O'Connor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 398-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Da Silva v. Musso, 428 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (N.Y. 1981); Erickson by Wightman v. Gundersen, 515 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that no Wisconsin case had adopted the rule but finding elements unsatisfied).
241. See Warren v. Greenfield, 595 A.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). The court said that "unilateral mistakes will not void a contract." Id. at 1313. It then cited comment (a) to section 153, which explains that "[courts are] reluctant to allow a party to avoid a contract on the ground of mistake, even as to a basic assumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party." Id. at 1313 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. a) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. See Warren v. Greenfield, 595 A.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). The court said that "unilateral mistakes will not void a contract." Id. at 1313. It then cited comment (a) to section 153, which explains that "[courts are] reluctant to allow a party to avoid a contract on the ground of mistake, even as to a basic assumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party." Id. at 1313 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. a) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. See Warren v. Greenfield, 595 A.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). The court said that "unilateral mistakes will not void a contract." Id. at 1313. It then cited comment (a) to section 153, which explains that "[courts are] reluctant to allow a party to avoid a contract on the ground of mistake, even as to a basic assumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party." Id. at 1313 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. a) (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
246. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
247. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
248. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note (citing Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. § 86 reporter's note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other cases); id. § 87 reporter's note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter's note (citing Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter's note (citing McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153 reporter's note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).
256. See id. § 139.
257. 220 P.2d 737, 740-41 (Cal. 1950) (in banc). See Paul T. Wagerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 77 n.220 (1986) ("The substantive principle of Monarco is now enshrined in § 139 . . . .").
258. 220 P.2d 737, 740-41 (Cal. 1950) (in banc). See Paul T. Wagerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 77 n.220 (1986) ("The substantive principle of Monarco is now enshrined in § 139 . . . .").
259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 reporter's note; id. § 86 reporter's note; id. § 87 reporter's note; id. § 89 reporter's note; id. § 139 reporter's note; id. § 153 reporter's note.
260. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
261. See Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 465.
262. See infra Appendix (organizing cases by jurisdiction).
263. 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
264. See id. at 767-70.
265. Id. at 770.
266. See id. at 769.
267. The New York Court of Appeals carefully considered the policy arguments for the new rule in section 15(1)(b) in Ortelere. See 250 N.E.2d at 465.
268. See, e.g., McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir.) (describing section 89 as an "appropriate exception to the preexisting duty rule"), opinioncorrected on denial of reh'g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1983) (identifying section 153 as the "mainstream of judicial decisions").
269. See, e.g., McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir.) (describing section 89 as an "appropriate exception to the preexisting duty rule"), opinioncorrected on denial of reh'g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1983) (identifying section 153 as the "mainstream of judicial decisions").
270. See, e.g., McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir.) (describing section 89 as an "appropriate exception to the preexisting duty rule"), opinioncorrected on denial of reh'g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1983) (identifying section 153 as the "mainstream of judicial decisions").
271. The comments to sections 15, 86, 89, and 153 briefly state the rationales behind the rules in a single paragraph. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (1981); id. § 86 cmt. b; id. § 89 cmt. a; id. § 153 cmt. a. The comments to sections 87 and 139 explain the elements of the rules, but do not state their rationale. See id. § 87 cmts. a-e; id. § 139 cmts. b-d.
272. The comments to sections 15, 86, 89, and 153 briefly state the rationales behind the rules in a single paragraph. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (1981); id. § 86 cmt. b; id. § 89 cmt. a; id. § 153 cmt. a. The comments to sections 87 and 139 explain the elements of the rules, but do not state their rationale. See id. § 87 cmts. a-e; id. § 139 cmts. b-d.
273. The comments to sections 15, 86, 89, and 153 briefly state the rationales behind the rules in a single paragraph. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (1981); id. § 86 cmt. b; id. § 89 cmt. a; id. § 153 cmt. a. The comments to sections 87 and 139 explain the elements of the rules, but do not state their rationale. See id. § 87 cmts. a-e; id. § 139 cmts. b-d.
274. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (1996).
275. See Billman v. V. I. Equities Corp., 743 F.2d 1021, 1024 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (following section 89).
276. See Bank of Am. v. J. & S. Auto Repairs, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (Ariz. 1985) ("In the absence of contrary authority Arizona courts follow the Restatement of the Law.").
277. See, e.g., L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 880 F.2d 219, 223 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (following Restatement (Second) based on Arizona precedent requiring courts to defer to it).
278. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
279. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
280. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
281. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
282. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
283. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
284. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citing section 153 with approval), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1380,1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill - Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated, 799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 153 with approval).
285. 911 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Neb. 1995), aff'd, 105 F.3d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1997).
286. See id. at 1268.
287. See, e.g., Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1209-10 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) (noting that Pennsylvania courts frequently follow the Restatement).
288. 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942).
289. See id. at 809.
290. See id. at 808.
291. See id. at 809.
292. Id. at 808-09.
293. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
294. See id. § 161 reporter's note cmt. d.
295. 504 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
296. See id. at 667.
297. See Torrao v. Cox, 525 N.E.2d 1349, 1352 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Covich v. Chambers, 397 N.E.2d 1115, 1121 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
298. See Torrao v. Cox, 525 N.E.2d 1349, 1352 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Covich v. Chambers, 397 N.E.2d 1115, 1121 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
299. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
300. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283-94 (1989) (discussing the topic of legislative supremacy in depth). The general principle that statutes take precedence over the common law has exceptions. For example, prior common law decisions may continue to influence the interpretation of statutes hi a variety of ways. See Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 386-87 (1988); Honorable Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1968).
301. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283-94 (1989) (discussing the topic of legislative supremacy in depth). The general principle that statutes take precedence over the common law has exceptions. For example, prior common law decisions may continue to influence the interpretation of statutes hi a variety of ways. See Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 386-87 (1988); Honorable Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1968).
302. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. a (noting that the common law age of majority was 21, but that nearly all states have lowered the age to 18 by legislation).
303. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1995); see also id. § 2A-208(1) (implementing the same rule for leases of goods).
304. See id. § 2-102 (defining the scope of the Article).
305. An official comment suggests that courts should not enforce modifications made in bad faith. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. A person who requests a modification when circumstances have not changed may be acting in bad faith. See id. In such a case, section 89 and section 2-209 might provide the same result.
306. 635 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1981) (en banc).
307. See id. at 103.
308. See id. at 107.
309. See Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 770 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). In adopting section 139, the court relied on section 1-103 of the U.C.C., which provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
310. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, § 6.1, at 395 (explaining how the statute of frauds "has been the subject of constant erosion" by the courts).
311. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 101 (1982).
312. See Paul A. Simmons, Government by an Unaccountable Private Non Profit Corporation, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 67, 71-72 (1992).
313. Id. at 89.
314. See id. at 71.
315. See id. at 89-90.
316. The Arizona Supreme Court, as noted, has directed lower courts to follow the rule in the Restatement (Second) absent contrary authority. See supra Part II.C.2. The court, however, did not commit itself always to follow the rules. See supra Part II.C.2.
317. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa. 1985) (Hutchinson, J., concurring) (citing section 87).
318. See Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986) (rejecting section 15(1 )(b)).
319. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 4.7, at 104 (3d ed. 1986) ("Economic analysis reveals no grounds other than fraud, incapacity, and duress . . . for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made in entering into the contract.").
320. See RESTATEMEMT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
321. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
322. See Simmons, supra note 211, at 86-88. Judge Simmons objects to deference to the ALI partly because he believes that the ALI has biases that will prevent it from choosing appropriate rules. He notes that most of its members have affiliations with elite Ivy League law schools, and thus may not see issues in the same light as the general public. See id. at 86-87. He also notes that "[t]here are no sociologists, economists, accountants, political scientists, bankers, stockbrokers, insurance executives, corporate chief executive officers, engineers, or penologists represented on the ALI Council." Id. at 88 (citation omitted). Judge Simmons, however, fails to recognize the possibility of making the same observations about many state supreme court justices. These justices might choose the same rules as those in the Restatement (Second) even if the ALI did not exist.
323. See Simmons, supra note 211, at 86-88. Judge Simmons objects to deference to the ALI partly because he believes that the ALI has biases that will prevent it from choosing appropriate rules. He notes that most of its members have affiliations with elite Ivy League law schools, and thus may not see issues in the same light as the general public. See id. at 86-87. He also notes that "[t]here are no sociologists, economists, accountants, political scientists, bankers, stockbrokers, insurance executives, corporate chief executive officers, engineers, or penologists represented on the ALI Council." Id. at 88 (citation omitted). Judge Simmons, however, fails to recognize the possibility of making the same observations about many state supreme court justices. These justices might choose the same rules as those in the Restatement (Second) even if the ALI did not exist.
324. See Simmons, supra note 211, at 86-88. Judge Simmons objects to deference to the ALI partly because he believes that the ALI has biases that will prevent it from choosing appropriate rules. He notes that most of its members have affiliations with elite Ivy League law schools, and thus may not see issues in the same light as the general public. See id. at 86-87. He also notes that "[t]here are no sociologists, economists, accountants, political scientists, bankers, stockbrokers, insurance executives, corporate chief executive officers, engineers, or penologists represented on the ALI Council." Id. at 88 (citation omitted). Judge Simmons, however, fails to recognize the possibility of making the same observations about many state supreme court justices. These justices might choose the same rules as those in the Restatement (Second) even if the ALI did not exist.
325. But see James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 140, 156 (1981) (arguing that "[i]t would be better to allow courts to settle on rules as they feel it necessary in the interests of certainty"). Professor Gordley contends that developing a coherent set of rules all at once involves greater difficulty than creating an individual rule in a single case. See id. The ALI, however, has put in the effort to create a comprehensive set of rules to govern contracts.
326. This statement requires some qualification. Although parties may contract around rules that they do not like in most instances, they may incur additional transaction costs. In addition, the choice of the default rule may have distributional consequences; it may favor one party, and thus affect what the other party has to pay to get around it. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1992); see also Katz, supra note 122, at 1265 (questioning whether parties actually will have the knowledge and skill to contract around legal rules such as section 87(2)).
327. This statement requires some qualification. Although parties may contract around rules that they do not like in most instances, they may incur additional transaction costs. In addition, the choice of the default rule may have distributional consequences; it may favor one party, and thus affect what the other party has to pay to get around it. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1992); see also Katz, supra note 122, at 1265 (questioning whether parties actually will have the knowledge and skill to contract around legal rules such as section 87(2)).
328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89.
329. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa. 1985) (citing section 87); Lanci v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 564 A.2d 972, 974-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citing section 153).
330. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa. 1985) (citing section 87); Lanci v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 564 A.2d 972, 974-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citing section 153).
331. See Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986) (rejecting section 15).
332. See supra Part I.A.
333. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126-30 (1992) (discussing the costs of ambiguity in legal rules).
334. See id. at 127-28.
335. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b) (1981) ("reasonable"); id. § 86 ("injustice"); id. § 87(2) ("reasonably" and "injustice"); id. § 89 ("fair and equitable"); id. § 139 ("reasonably" and "injustice"); id. § 153 ("unconscionable").
336. M. D. Chalmers, Codification of Mercantile Law, 19 LAW Q. REV. 10, 17-18 (1903) (expressing the need for codification, and hence, unification of commercial law in the United States).
337. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 1-5 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing adoption of the U.C.C. and the Uniform Sales Act).
338. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1996).
339. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM chs. 3-5 (1985) (explaining the extent and consequences of the case load expansion and suggesting "institutional proposals" to deal with the problem); Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither out Far Nor in Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 715-18, 741 (1995) (discussing the prominent role state courts, in comparison to federal courts, will play in preparing for the influx in cases and appeals filed); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1487-91 (1995) (describing the problem of an increased case load at the appellate level).
340. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM chs. 3-5 (1985) (explaining the extent and consequences of the case load expansion and suggesting "institutional proposals" to deal with the problem); Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither out Far Nor in Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 715-18, 741 (1995) (discussing the prominent role state courts, in comparison to federal courts, will play in preparing for the influx in cases and appeals filed); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1487-91 (1995) (describing the problem of an increased case load at the appellate level).
341. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM chs. 3-5 (1985) (explaining the extent and consequences of the case load expansion and suggesting "institutional proposals" to deal with the problem); Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither out Far Nor in Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 715-18, 741 (1995) (discussing the prominent role state courts, in comparison to federal courts, will play in preparing for the influx in cases and appeals filed); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1487-91 (1995) (describing the problem of an increased case load at the appellate level).
342. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
343. Some commentators have argued, however, that some rules or doctrines cannot fit comfortably with others. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61-65, 72 (1973) (arguing that the promissory estoppel doctrine fundamentally conflicts with the consideration doctrine).
344. Whether courts should exercise comparable deference to other ALI publications, such as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, remains an open question because the answer involves different considerations. Tort law differs from contracts law in many ways. For example, although contracts law often merely establishes procedures and default rules for people who want to make contracts, tort law governs the conduct of everyone, whether or not they want to be tortfeasors or tort victims. As a result, the substance of tort law may matter more than the substance of contracts law, and courts may not wish to turn over their authority so easily.
345. See infra Appendix.
346. See infra Appendix.
347. See infra Appendix.
348. See GILMORE, supra note 236, at 87.
349. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 221-22 (1990); Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 132, 135-42 (1995).
350. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 221-22 (1990); Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 132, 135-42 (1995).
351. See infra Appendix.
352. Cf. Holmes, supra note 48, at 457 (describing law as the study of "the prediction of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts").