The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 227-251

  Irwin, Alistair ^a  

^a Roual Military College of Science   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542630736     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399608437659     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (London: Warner 1994).
2. H.G. Wells, War of the Worlds [1898] (London: Everyman 1993).
3. B.H. Liddell Hart, Paris, or The Future of War (London: Kegan Paul 1925).
4. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NY: Free Press 1991).
5. Quoted in Brian Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (London: Macmillan 1987) p.82.
6. Design for Operations: The British Military Doctrine (Army Code 7145) (BMD). This is the capstone British Army doctrinal publication, revised and reissued in 1996.
7. The Tofflers (note 1) and others refer to these as 'Third Wave' forces.
8. See 'Defence Technology Survey', The Economist, 10 June 1995, which prints a table derived from figures supplied by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Int. Inst. for Strategic Studies. This shows the top ten defence spenders in 1993 (by implication actual or candidate information age nations). These include the UK and the US. Of these only one (Saudi Arabia) features in the top ten list of highest defence spenders as a percentage of GDP. Only two (US and China) feature amongst the ten largest armed forces, and none appear amongst the top ten under the heading of Armed Forces per 1000 Population.
9. Liddell Hart's 'Man in the Dark' concept postulated two boxers facing each other in the dark; the requirement was to find the enemy by reconnoitre, to fix him in position, smash him with a decisive blow and then to exploit. See B.H. Liddell Hart/The Essential Principles of War', United Services Magazine (April 1920) p.35.
10. Creveld (note 4) p.20.
11. Tofflers (note 1) p.62
12. Holden Reid (note 5) p.63.
13. I have chosen for simplicity's sake to refer to all these groups as terrorists.
14. 'Information Warfare Special Report', Jane's Defence Weekly 25/15 (April 1996).
15. John Colvin, Volcano Under Snow (London: Quartet 1996) p. 102.
16. For a recent examination of this issue, see Barrie Dunsmore, The Next War: Live? (Harvard U.: Discussion Paper D-22, March 1996).
17. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Pimlico 1994) p. 134.
18. Alvin H. Bernstein, 'Conflict and Technology: The Next Generation'. A paper given at the Conference on 'British Security 2010' at Church House, London (Dec. 1995).
19. Bernard Fergusson, Wavell: Portrait of a Soldier (London: Collins 1961) p.37.
20. Tempo at the tactical level is defined as the rate of activity, relative to the enemy, within engagements. At the operational level it is the rate of activity, relative to the enemy, between engagements. For a fuller explanation see ADP-1 Operations (Army Code 71565 Pt 1, June 1994) p.3-19.
21. Quoted in Holden Reid (note 5) p.57.
22. E.g. J.F.C. Fuller: 'To think in separate terms of sea, land and air is, I feel, entirely wrong.' Quoted in Holden Reid (note 5) p.59.
23. See also Montgomery's principles relating to air power, articulated in 1943. Quoted in John Terraine, Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945 (London: Sceptre 1988, orig. Hodder 1985) p.380. These remain highly appropriate.
24. Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle [1969] (London: Papermac 1990) p.371.
25. Tofflers (note 1) p.240.
26. Put in another way, in 1815 battle was fought by as many as 1,000 men per sq km; in the late 1980s the average would have been about 30 men per sq km.
27. For two particularly good descriptions of this phenomenon, see Hugh Dundas, Flying Start (London: Penguin 1990) pp.61-2, and 'Johnnie' Johnson, Wing Leader (London: Chatto 1956) Ch.3.
28. For two particularly good descriptions of this phenomenon, see Hugh Dundas, Flying Start (London: Penguin 1990) pp.61-2, and 'Johnnie' Johnson, Wing Leader (London: Chatto 1956) Ch.3.
29. ADP-1 Operations, pp.5-11 to 5-16.
30. Quoted in Tofflers (note 1) p.88 from The Conduct of Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Dept. of Defense April 1992) (COW Report).
31. The notorious disagreements between Montgomery and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham during the Normandy operations are a dismal case in point. That Montgomery seemed unable to adhere to the principles he laid down in regard to air power merely demonstrates how difficult it can be to do what is recognised to be 'the right thing'.
32. Liddell Hart (note 9) p.35.
33. B.H. Liddell Hart, Decisive Wars of History (London: Bell 1929) pp.153-4 . See also A.S.H. Irwin 'Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach to Strategy', in B. Holden Reid (ed.) The Science of War (London: Routledge 1993) pp.63-81.
34. B.H. Liddell Hart, Decisive Wars of History (London: Bell 1929) pp.153-4 . See also A.S.H. Irwin 'Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach to Strategy', in B. Holden Reid (ed.) The Science of War (London: Routledge 1993) pp.63-81.
35. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (eds.) Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1976) p.76.
36. Colvin (note 15) p.5.
37. Military Aid to the Civil Community (e.g. fulfilling essential services in times of strikes or natural disaster) profits from the organisational qualities of the forces and is possible simply because the troops are available. The requirement to be prepared to do this sort of work does not in any way influence decisions about force structures and is not considered further in this essay.
38. In the context of British security and defence policy, the extent of the requirement is expressed in terms of the three Defence Roles. See Statement on Defence Estimates 1994 Cm 2550 pp.26/27.
39. Quoted in Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938 (Lawrence KS: UP of Kansas 1988) p.vi.
40. See Design for Operations (note 6) for the Moral, Physical and Conceptual components of fighting power.
41. This is by no means a novel proposal for the British Army. In 1929 the CIGS, Field-Marshal Sir George Milne, instructed a study group to examine how four armoured brigades might be formed within three years. The group proposed the disbanding of four infantry battalions so as to provide the manpower necessary to create more tank battalions. The proposal received short shrift. See Winton (note 37) pp.114-5.
42. A.P. Wavell, The Good Soldier (London: Macmillan 1948) p.71. I make this point with a heavy heart. The Black Watch (Wavell's Regiment and my own) is itself an infantry regiment.
43. E.g. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War (Cambridge: CUP 1977) and Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War (London: Brassey's [UK] 1991).
44. E.g. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War (Cambridge: CUP 1977) and Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War (London: Brassey's [UK] 1991).
45. Montgomery: 'TRIPOLI' Tactical Talks 15-17 Feb. 1943, Stephen Brooks (ed.), Montgomery and the Eighth Army (London: Army Records Society 1991) p.144.
46. I have here referred to 'men'. The place of women on the future battlefield is as difficult to predict as everything else. Even today it is widely debated. However much it may intrude on deep-seated instincts to protect women from danger, it is my own view that, by 2025, women will fight their nations' battles alongside the men. See also Richard Holmes, Nuclear Warriors (London: Jonathan Cape 1991) pp.219-26.
47. Quoted in Holden Reid (note 5) p.64.