On the aggregation of preferences in engineering design

Proceedings of the ASME Design Engineering Technical Conference

Volumn 2, Issue , 2001, Pages 57-67

  Allen, Beth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Arrow Impossibility Theorem; Decision based design; Engineering design; Von Neumann Morgenstern (cardinal) utilities

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; FUNCTION EVALUATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS); THEOREM PROVING; COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN;

ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM; DECISION-BASED DESIGN; ENGINEERING DESIGN; VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN (CARDINAL) UTILITIES; AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES; ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS; AXIOMATIC FRAMEWORK; COLLABORATIVE DESIGN; DECISION MAKERS; DESIGN SPACES; FINITE NUMBER;

DECISION THEORY; DECISION MAKING;

EID: 1542541100     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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