The Rhetorical Constitution of "Civil Society" at the Founding: One Lawyer's Anxious Vision

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 1997, Pages

  Conrad, Stephen A ^a,b,c  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 1542498740     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (191)

1. JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 230 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WORKS]; cf. id. at 236, 238, 239, 241 (on the naturalness of human "sociability" and "society").
2. JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 230 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WORKS]; cf. id. at 236, 238, 239, 241 (on the naturalness of human "sociability" and "society").
3. E.g., MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197-98 (1913).
4. See the numerous testimonials I have collected for citation in Stephen A. Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 9 n.8 (1988).
5. ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 12, 61 (1992) [hereinafter SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY]. Compare his complementary study, focusing on seventeenth-century America, found in ADAM B. SELIGMAN, INNERWORLDLY INDIVIDUALISM: CHARISMATIC COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONALIZATION at ix (1994) [hereinafter SELIGMAN, INNERWORLDLY INDIVIDUALISM] ("[W]hat I have attempted in this study is precisely to analyze the emergence of modern ideas of individual and collective identity in and through the concrete process of institutionalization that characterized ascetic-Protestantism in one seventeenth-century community - that of New England Congregational Puritanism.").
6. ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 12, 61 (1992) [hereinafter SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY]. Compare his complementary study, focusing on seventeenth-century America, found in ADAM B. SELIGMAN, INNERWORLDLY INDIVIDUALISM: CHARISMATIC COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONALIZATION at ix (1994) [hereinafter SELIGMAN, INNERWORLDLY INDIVIDUALISM] ("[W]hat I have attempted in this study is precisely to analyze the emergence of modern ideas of individual and collective identity in and through the concrete process of institutionalization that characterized ascetic-Protestantism in one seventeenth-century community - that of New England Congregational Puritanism.").
7. See generally MARVIN B. BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A PRIVILEGED MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND FRANCE (1994).
8. Although each is very different in its argument, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-83 (1985); Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987), see also the encyclopedic brief for the "creation" of American constitutionalism during both the American Revolutionary experience and its aftermath found in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Additionally, contrast the classic argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 215-81 (1963), and others, from J. Allen Smith, in 1907, onwards to Charles Beard and beyond, with that of Richard Matthews in 1995 - as conveniently reviewed in Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 170-72 (1996).
9. Although each is very different in its argument, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-83 (1985); Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987), see also the encyclopedic brief for the "creation" of American constitutionalism during both the American Revolutionary experience and its aftermath found in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Additionally, contrast the classic argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 215-81 (1963), and others, from J. Allen Smith, in 1907, onwards to Charles Beard and beyond, with that of Richard Matthews in 1995 - as conveniently reviewed in Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 170-72 (1996).
10. Although each is very different in its argument, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-83 (1985); Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987), see also the encyclopedic brief for the "creation" of American constitutionalism during both the American Revolutionary experience and its aftermath found in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Additionally, contrast the classic argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 215-81 (1963), and others, from J. Allen Smith, in 1907, onwards to Charles Beard and beyond, with that of Richard Matthews in 1995 - as conveniently reviewed in Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 170-72 (1996).
11. Although each is very different in its argument, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-83 (1985); Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987), see also the encyclopedic brief for the "creation" of American constitutionalism during both the American Revolutionary experience and its aftermath found in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Additionally, contrast the classic argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 215-81 (1963), and others, from J. Allen Smith, in 1907, onwards to Charles Beard and beyond, with that of Richard Matthews in 1995 - as conveniently reviewed in Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 170-72 (1996).
12. Although each is very different in its argument, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-83 (1985); Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987), see also the encyclopedic brief for the "creation" of American constitutionalism during both the American Revolutionary experience and its aftermath found in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Additionally, contrast the classic argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 215-81 (1963), and others, from J. Allen Smith, in 1907, onwards to Charles Beard and beyond, with that of Richard Matthews in 1995 - as conveniently reviewed in Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 170-72 (1996).
13. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1992) [hereinafter RADICALISM]. do not mean to challenge Wood's central claim that the American Revolution in many ways "fundamentally altered the character of American society." Id. "To be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution: it was the Revolution, and only the Revolution, that made them one people." Id. at 336. For a contrasting remark, see WOOD, supra note 6, at 606 ("Americans had begun the Revolution assuming that the people were a homogeneous entity in society set against the rulers. But such an assumption belied American experience, and it took only a few years of independence to convince the best minds that distinctions in the society were 'various and unavoidable'. . . ."). To be fair, Wood defines the Revolution broadly: "[T]he American Revolution and the social transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened 'in any case,' but we will never know. It was in fact linked to the Revolution; they occurred together." RADICALISM, supra, at 7. My complementary not contradictory emphasis is, more than Wood's, on social theory rather than social reality.
14. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1992) [hereinafter RADICALISM]. I do not mean to challenge Wood's central claim that the American Revolution in many ways "fundamentally altered the character of American society." Id. "To be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution: it was the Revolution, and only the Revolution, that made them one people." Id. at 336. For a contrasting remark, see WOOD, supra note 6, at 606 ("Americans had begun the Revolution assuming that the people were a homogeneous entity in society set against the rulers. But such an assumption belied American experience, and it took only a few years of independence to convince the best minds that distinctions in the society were 'various and unavoidable'. . . ."). To be fair, Wood defines the Revolution broadly: "[T]he American Revolution and the social transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened 'in any case,' but we will never know. It was in fact linked to the Revolution; they occurred together." RADICALISM, supra, at 7. My complementary not contradictory emphasis is, more than Wood's, on social theory rather than social reality.
15. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1992) [hereinafter RADICALISM]. do not mean to challenge Wood's central claim that the American Revolution in many ways "fundamentally altered the character of American society." Id. "To be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution: it was the Revolution, and only the Revolution, that made them one people." Id. at 336. For a contrasting remark, see WOOD, supra note 6, at 606 ("Americans had begun the Revolution assuming that the people were a homogeneous entity in society set against the rulers. But such an assumption belied American experience, and it took only a few years of independence to convince the best minds that distinctions in the society were 'various and unavoidable'. . . ."). To be fair, Wood defines the Revolution broadly: "[T]he American Revolution and the social transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened 'in any case,' but we will never know. It was in fact linked to the Revolution; they occurred together." RADICALISM, supra, at 7. My complementary not contradictory emphasis is, more than Wood's, on social theory rather than social reality.
16. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1992) [hereinafter RADICALISM]. do not mean to challenge Wood's central claim that the American Revolution in many ways "fundamentally altered the character of American society." Id. "To be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution: it was the Revolution, and only the Revolution, that made them one people." Id. at 336. For a contrasting remark, see WOOD, supra note 6, at 606 ("Americans had begun the Revolution assuming that the people were a homogeneous entity in society set against the rulers. But such an assumption belied American experience, and it took only a few years of independence to convince the best minds that distinctions in the society were 'various and unavoidable'. . . ."). To be fair, Wood defines the Revolution broadly: "[T]he American Revolution and the social transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened 'in any case,' but we will never know. It was in fact linked to the Revolution; they occurred together." RADICALISM, supra, at 7. My complementary not contradictory emphasis is, more than Wood's, on social theory rather than social reality.
17. See Jack P. Greene, Civil Society and the American Foundings, 72 IND. L.J. 375, 381 (1997); cf. id. at 376-77.
18. See Jack P. Greene, Civil Society and the American Foundings, 72 IND. L.J. 375, 381 (1997); cf. id. at 376-77.
19. Cf. id. at 380 (quoting Samuel Williams to the effect that political writers like Thomas Paine and Wilson merely placed in "a very clear and striking light" principles that were commonplaces of the day in colonial British America).
20. George M. Dennison, The "Revolution Principle": Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of James Wilson, 39 REV. POL. 157, 190 (1977).
21. For a review of some of the most compelling "hard" data indicative of "the emerging society of late colonial British America," see JACK P. GREENE, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS: THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MODERN BRITISH COLONIES AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 170-71, 193, passim (1988).
22. RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 1-16 (1987). For a discussion of "the need to come to terms" with the better minds among the founders "in the act of thinking clearly, forcefully, and deliberately," see id. at 16. On Wilson specifically, see id at 100 n.15, 103, 106-07, 111, 115, 132.
23. RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 1-16 (1987). For a discussion of "the need to come to terms" with the better minds among the founders "in the act of thinking clearly, forcefully, and deliberately," see id. at 16. On Wilson specifically, see id at 100 n.15, 103, 106-07, 111, 115, 132.
24. RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 1-16 (1987). For a discussion of "the need to come to terms" with the better minds among the founders "in the act of thinking clearly, forcefully, and deliberately," see id. at 16. On Wilson specifically, see id at 100 n.15, 103, 106-07, 111, 115, 132.
25. WORKS, supra note 1, at 227.
26. On Wilson's anti-reductive aspirations to be comprehensive, see, for example, id. at 200.
27. The best general sustained accounts of the lectures are GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 150-59 (1978); CHARLES P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 308-41 (1956); Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to WORKS, supra note 1, at 37-40.
28. The best general sustained accounts of the lectures are GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 150-59 (1978); CHARLES P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 308-41 (1956); Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to WORKS, supra note 1, at 37-40.
29. The best general sustained accounts of the lectures are GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 150-59 (1978); CHARLES P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 308-41 (1956); Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to WORKS, supra note 1, at 37-40.
30. A convenient exposition and commentary on the ideas of a number of representative leading twentieth-century critics of the idea of "civil society" is provided in JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 177-341 (1992) (Section II: The Discontents of Civil Society).
31. See McCloskey, supra note 15, at 24; cf. Jan Lewis, "Of Every Age Sex & Condition": The Representation of Women in the Constitution, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 359, 375 n.49 (1995).
32. See McCloskey, supra note 15, at 24; cf. Jan Lewis, "Of Every Age Sex & Condition": The Representation of Women in the Constitution, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 359, 375 n.49 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Judith N. Shklar, Alexander Hamilton and the Language of Political Science, in THE LANGUAGES OF POLITICAL THEORY IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE 339 (Anthony Pagden ed., 1987).
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
35. James Farr, Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 13, 29 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988). This is not the utilitarian empiricist, provocatively skeptical Hume of the Treatise, but Hume the practical "common sense" social and moral theorist notably interpreted in DAVID F. NORTON, DAVID HUME: COMMON-SENSE MORALIST, SCEPTICAL METAPHYSICIAN (1982), and DONALD W. LIVINGSTON, HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON LIFE (1984).
36. James Farr, Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 13, 29 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988). This is not the utilitarian empiricist, provocatively skeptical Hume of the Treatise, but Hume the practical "common sense" social and moral theorist notably interpreted in DAVID F. NORTON, DAVID HUME: COMMON-SENSE MORALIST, SCEPTICAL METAPHYSICIAN (1982), and DONALD W. LIVINGSTON, HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON LIFE (1984).
37. James Farr, Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 13, 29 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988). This is not the utilitarian empiricist, provocatively skeptical Hume of the Treatise, but Hume the practical "common sense" social and moral theorist notably interpreted in DAVID F. NORTON, DAVID HUME: COMMON-SENSE MORALIST, SCEPTICAL METAPHYSICIAN (1982), and DONALD W. LIVINGSTON, HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON LIFE (1984).
38. Robert G. McCloskey, James Wilson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 79, 90 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); cf. Lewis, supra note 17, at 370 ("In their subject matter, the Lectures invite comparison with John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and as such, they are a key text in the history of liberal thought in America. . . . Furthermore, because the lectures attempted to discuss systematically the relationship between society and government, they illuminate connections that others left unstated.").
39. Robert G. McCloskey, James Wilson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 79, 90 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); cf. Lewis, supra note 17, at 370 ("In their subject matter, the Lectures invite comparison with John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and as such, they are a key text in the history of liberal thought in America. . . . Furthermore, because the lectures attempted to discuss systematically the relationship between society and government, they illuminate connections that others left unstated.").
40. Robert G. McCloskey, James Wilson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 79, 90 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); cf. Lewis, supra note 17, at 370 ("In their subject matter, the Lectures invite comparison with John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and as such, they are a key text in the history of liberal thought in America. . . . Furthermore, because the lectures attempted to discuss systematically the relationship between society and government, they illuminate connections that others left unstated.").
41. For analysis of The Federalist that posits an interplay there between "Lockean rationalism" and "Humean empiricism," see MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 13-22 (1987).
42. WORKS, supra note 1, at 185.
43. See generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984).
44. For another reading of The Federalist that also stresses "the supremacy of reason," for Publius, but within a framework of intellectual history more closely identified with the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment than with Locke, see Daniel W. Howe, The Language of Faculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 107, 119 (discussing "the rationalistic and elitist appeal of The Federalist"); see id. at 129 (emphasizing the "supremacy of reason"); cf. id. at 122.
45. For another reading of The Federalist that also stresses "the supremacy of reason," for Publius, but within a framework of intellectual history more closely identified with the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment than with Locke, see Daniel W. Howe, The Language of Faculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 107, 119 (discussing "the rationalistic and elitist appeal of The Federalist"); see id. at 129 (emphasizing the "supremacy of reason"); cf. id. at 122.
46. For another reading of The Federalist that also stresses "the supremacy of reason," for Publius, but within a framework of intellectual history more closely identified with the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment than with Locke, see Daniel W. Howe, The Language of Faculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 107, 119 (discussing "the rationalistic and elitist appeal of The Federalist"); see id. at 129 (emphasizing the "supremacy of reason"); cf. id. at 122.
47. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 48, 58, 78-79, 92, 144, 163; see also Greene, supra note 8, at 380 (quoting Adam Smith's characterization of "the whole system of American Republicanism"); cf. id. at 378 ("[T]hey quickly established laws and governments, the principal purposes of which were little more than to protect their settlements against Indians or rival Europeans and to secure the property they were creating and accumulating . . . .").
48. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 48, 58, 78-79, 92, 144, 163; see also Greene, supra note 8, at 380 (quoting Adam Smith's characterization of "the whole system of American Republicanism"); cf. id. at 378 ("[T]hey quickly established laws and governments, the principal purposes of which were little more than to protect their settlements against Indians or rival Europeans and to secure the property they were creating and accumulating . . . .").
49. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 210 n.60.
50. See, e.g., The Visitant [No. 1], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) ("Our happiness, which is the final end of our existence, and the mark at which we aim, though sometimes injudiciously, in all our conduct, cannot be obtained without being acquainted with those sentiments and affections, which are to enjoy that happiness."); Greene, supra note 8, at 380 (quoting Wilson from a 1774 pamphlet, in which Wilson invokes the authority of Burlamaqui for the proposition that "the happiness of the society" is "the first law of every government") (emphasis in original); cf. MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 132, 134-36, 227-28, 268 (1978) (discussing Burlamaqui's influence on Wilson).
51. See, e.g., The Visitant [No. 1], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) ("Our happiness, which is the final end of our existence, and the mark at which we aim, though sometimes injudiciously, in all our conduct, cannot be obtained without being acquainted with those sentiments and affections, which are to enjoy that happiness."); Greene, supra note 8, at 380 (quoting Wilson from a 1774 pamphlet, in which Wilson invokes the authority of Burlamaqui for the proposition that "the happiness of the society" is "the first law of every government") (emphasis in original); cf. MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 132, 134-36, 227-28, 268 (1978) (discussing Burlamaqui's influence on Wilson).
52. See, e.g., The Visitant [No. 1], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) ("Our happiness, which is the final end of our existence, and the mark at which we aim, though sometimes injudiciously, in all our conduct, cannot be obtained without being acquainted with those sentiments and affections, which are to enjoy that happiness."); Greene, supra note 8, at 380 (quoting Wilson from a 1774 pamphlet, in which Wilson invokes the authority of Burlamaqui for the proposition that "the happiness of the society" is "the first law of every government") (emphasis in original); cf. MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 132, 134-36, 227-28, 268 (1978) (discussing Burlamaqui's influence on Wilson).
53. WORKS, supra note 1, at 159.
54. Id. at 241-42 (punctuation modernized for clarity). But see infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text for Wilson's vision of an expanded happiness realized beyond affective family life.
55. Id. at 241-42 (punctuation modernized for clarity). But see infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text for Wilson's vision of an expanded happiness realized beyond affective family life.
56. WORKS, supra note 1, at 236 (emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity).
57. Id. at 236-38.
58. Id. at 234. The classic treatment of this central theme of the Scottish Enlightenment remains GLADYS BRYSON, MAN AND SOCIETY: THE SCOTTISH INQUIRY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 148-72 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., Princeton University Press 1968) (1945); cf. Rüdiger Schreyer, "Pray What Language Did Your Wild Couple Speak, When First They Met?" - Language and the Science of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment, in THE "SCIENCE OF MAN" IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: HUME, REID AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES 149, 159 (Peter Jones ed., 1989).
59. Id. at 234. The classic treatment of this central theme of the Scottish Enlightenment remains GLADYS BRYSON, MAN AND SOCIETY: THE SCOTTISH INQUIRY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 148-72 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., Princeton University Press 1968) (1945); cf. Rüdiger Schreyer, "Pray What Language Did Your Wild Couple Speak, When First They Met?" - Language and the Science of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment, in THE "SCIENCE OF MAN" IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: HUME, REID AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES 149, 159 (Peter Jones ed., 1989).
60. Id. at 234. The classic treatment of this central theme of the Scottish Enlightenment remains GLADYS BRYSON, MAN AND SOCIETY: THE SCOTTISH INQUIRY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 148-72 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., Princeton University Press 1968) (1945); cf. Rüdiger Schreyer, "Pray What Language Did Your Wild Couple Speak, When First They Met?" - Language and the Science of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment, in THE "SCIENCE OF MAN" IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: HUME, REID AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES 149, 159 (Peter Jones ed., 1989).
61. WORKS, supra note 1, at 235-36.
62. No single remark by Wilson at the Philadelphia Convention or afterwards is as often quoted by modern scholars as is his astonishing insistence that, orthodox republican theory notwithstanding, "he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of Governt. & Society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble object." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). For a list of some modern scholars' quotation of this passage, see Conrad, supra note 3, at 35 nn.140-41. Compare more recently JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 96-97 (1990) and Lewis, supra note 17, at 367.
63. No single remark by Wilson at the Philadelphia Convention or afterwards is as often quoted by modern scholars as is his astonishing insistence that, orthodox republican theory notwithstanding, "he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of Governt. & Society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble object." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). For a list of some modern scholars' quotation of this passage, see Conrad, supra note 3, at 35 nn.140-41. Compare more recently JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 96-97 (1990) and Lewis, supra note 17, at 367.
64. No single remark by Wilson at the Philadelphia Convention or afterwards is as often quoted by modern scholars as is his astonishing insistence that, orthodox republican theory notwithstanding, "he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of Governt. & Society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble object." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). For a list of some modern scholars' quotation of this passage, see Conrad, supra note 3, at 35 nn.140-41. Compare more recently JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 96-97 (1990) and Lewis, supra note 17, at 367.
65. No single remark by Wilson at the Philadelphia Convention or afterwards is as often quoted by modern scholars as is his astonishing insistence that, orthodox republican theory notwithstanding, "he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of Governt. & Society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble object." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). For a list of some modern scholars' quotation of this passage, see Conrad, supra note 3, at 35 nn.140-41. Compare more recently JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 96-97 (1990) and Lewis, supra note 17, at 367.
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 19, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 583 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that 'States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations by a change in the form of their civil government."') (emphasis in original) (quoting the eighteenth-century English jurisprude Thomas Rutherforth). For Wilson, see WORKS, supra note 1, at 238.
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 19, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 583 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that 'States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations by a change in the form of their civil government."') (emphasis in original) (quoting the eighteenth-century English jurisprude Thomas Rutherforth). For Wilson, see WORKS, supra note 1, at 238.
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 19, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 583 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that 'States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations by a change in the form of their civil government."') (emphasis in original) (quoting the eighteenth-century English jurisprude Thomas Rutherforth). For Wilson, see WORKS, supra note 1, at 238.
69. I use this word in the sense found in SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 64, 99.
70. For a different, indeed significantly although but partially Lockean, reading of Wilson in this very respect, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 372-74. In differing with Lewis's Lockean reading, I do so for reasons indicated in my text and well-summarized in the following recent study, which I consider thus far unmatched on its topic in the depth of its research and cogency of its argument: KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 326 (1996).
71. For a different, indeed significantly although but partially Lockean, reading of Wilson in this very respect, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 372-74. In differing with Lewis's Lockean reading, I do so for reasons indicated in my text and well-summarized in the following recent study, which I consider thus far unmatched on its topic in the depth of its research and cogency of its argument: KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 326 (1996).
72. WORKS, supra note 1, at 228-29.
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id. at 139; cf. id. at 87, 164-65, 200.
75. Id. at 239 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
76. See generally GREENE, supra note 11.
77. JACK P. GREENE, IMPERATIVES, BEHAVIORS, AND IDENTITIES: ESSAYS IN EARLY AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY 143-73, 290-317 (1992).
78. Jack P. Greene, Book Review, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 181, 185 (1996); cf. John Brewer, "The Most Polite Age and the Most Vicious." Attitudes Towards Culture as a Commodity, 1660-1800, in THE CONSUMPTION OF CULTURE, 1600-1800: IMAGE, OBJECT, TEXT 341 (Ann Bermingham & John Brewer eds., 1995).
79. Jack P. Greene, Book Review, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 181, 185 (1996); cf. John Brewer, "The Most Polite Age and the Most Vicious." Attitudes Towards Culture as a Commodity, 1660-1800, in THE CONSUMPTION OF CULTURE, 1600-1800: IMAGE, OBJECT, TEXT 341 (Ann Bermingham & John Brewer eds., 1995).
80. SMITH, supra note 15, at 35.
81. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15, at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
82. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15, at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
83. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15, at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
84. The Visitant [No. 11], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 4-11, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
85. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. The Visitant [No. 2], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1-8, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) (punctuation modernized for clarity); see also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 65 (1993) ("Being sociable and polite was not only the mark of civilized man but the essence of the civilizing process. 'Personality' was against order.") (endnote omitted); compare BECKER, supra note 5,
88. The Visitant [No. 2], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1-8, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) (punctuation modernized for clarity); see also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 65 (1993) ("Being sociable and polite was not only the mark of civilized man but the essence of the civilizing process. 'Personality' was against order.") (endnote omitted); compare BECKER, supra note 5,
89. The Visitant [No. 2], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1-8, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) (punctuation modernized for clarity); see also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 65 (1993) ("Being sociable and polite was not only the mark of civilized man but the essence of the civilizing process. 'Personality' was against order.") (endnote omitted); compare BECKER, supra note 5,
90. I use this word in the sense found in SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 64, 99.
91. For a different, indeed significantly although but partially Lockean, reading of Wilson in this very respect, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 372-74. In differing with Lewis's Lockean reading, I do so for reasons indicated in my text and well-summarized in the following recent study, which I consider thus far unmatched on its topic in the depth of its research and cogency of its argument: KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 326 (1996).
92. For a different, indeed significantly although but partially Lockean, reading of Wilson in this very respect, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 372-74. In differing with Lewis's Lockean reading, I do so for reasons indicated in my text and well-summarized in the following recent study, which I consider thus far unmatched on its topic in the depth of its research and cogency of its argument: KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 326 (1996).
93. WORKS, supra note 1, at 228-29.
94. Id. at 238.
95. Id. at 139; cf. id. at 87, 164-65, 200.
96. Id. at 239 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
97. See generally GREENE, supra note 11.
98. JACK P. GREENE, IMPERATIVES, BEHAVIORS, AND IDENTITIES: ESSAYS IN EARLY AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY 143-73, 290-317 (1992).
99. Jack P. Greene, Book Review, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 181, 185 (1996); cf. John Brewer, "The Most Polite Age and the Most Vicious." Attitudes Towards Culture as a Commodity, 1660-1800, in THE CONSUMPTION OF CULTURE, 1600-1800: IMAGE, OBJECT, TEXT 341 (Ann Bermingham & John Brewer eds., 1995).
100. Jack P. Greene, Book Review, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 181, 185 (1996); cf. John Brewer, "The Most Polite Age and the Most Vicious." Attitudes Towards Culture as a Commodity, 1660-1800, in THE CONSUMPTION OF CULTURE, 1600-1800: IMAGE, OBJECT, TEXT 341 (Ann Bermingham & John Brewer eds., 1995).
101. SMITH, supra note 15, at 35.
102. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15, at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
103. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15, at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
104. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, White, William in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 121 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); SMITH, supra note 15, at 28, 32, 35; BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, C.H. Kay & Co. 1839).
105. The Visitant [No. 11], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 4-11, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
106. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. The Visitant [No. 2], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1-8, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) (punctuation modernized for clarity); see also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 65 (1993) ("Being sociable and polite was not only the mark of civilized man but the essence of the civilizing process. 'Personality' was against order.") (endnote omitted); compare BECKER, supra note 5, at 56, on the "regulation" of the "matter and manner of conversation": "The periodical essay in Samuel Johnson's view presented general knowledge appropriate for circulation in common talk . . . introducing 'subjects to which faction had produced no diversity of sentiment such as literature, morality and familiar life.'" Id.
109. The Visitant [No. 2], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 1-8, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) (punctuation modernized for clarity); see also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 65 (1993) ("Being sociable and polite was not only the mark of civilized man but the essence of the civilizing process. 'Personality' was against order.") (endnote omitted); compare BECKER, supra note 5, at 56, on the "regulation" of the "matter and manner of conversation": "The periodical essay in Samuel Johnson's view presented general knowledge appropriate for circulation in common talk . . . introducing 'subjects to which faction had produced no diversity of sentiment such as literature, morality and familiar life.'" Id.
110. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28; The Visitant [No. 3], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 8-15, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
111. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28; The Visitant [No. 3], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 8-15, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
112. The Visitant [No. 14], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 25-May 2, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
113. The Visitant [No. 4], 2 PA. CHRON., Feb. 15-22, 1768 (James Wilson & William White) (emphasis in original).
114. Cf. BECKER, supra note 5, at 57 ("The 'severe virtues' were rivaled by those virtues measured by the yardstick of culture and taste. Instead of more demanding criteria for measuring truth, the English vocabulary favored the looser usage derived from 'common sense' and 'good sense,' both of which became hardy staples in literary and philosophical discourse.").
115. The Visitant [No. 13], 2 PA. CHRON., Apr. 18-25, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
116. Id. (emphasis in original); cf. WORKS, supra note 1, at 133.
117. Id. (emphasis in original); cf. WORKS, supra note 1, at 133.
118. The Visitant, [No. 13], supra note 56; cf. BECKER, supra note 5, at 56; FLIEGELMAN, supra note 51, at 74 (stating the belief that Jefferson and Wilson and others shared in "a natural rhetoric of consensus").
119. The Visitant, [No. 13], supra note 56; cf. BECKER, supra note 5, at 56; FLIEGELMAN, supra note 51, at 74 (stating the belief that Jefferson and Wilson and others shared in "a natural rhetoric of consensus").
120. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
121. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
122. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
123. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
124. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
125. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
126. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
127. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
128. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and
129. The literature on this topic is as significant in scope and provocativeness as it is in its refinement See WILLIAM P. JONES, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS AND IMAGERY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POETRY passim (1966); DOUGLAS BUSH, Newtonianism, Rationalism, and Sentimentalism, in SCIENCE AND ENGLISH POETRY: A HISTORICAL SKETCH, 1590-1950, at 51, 51-87 (1950); J.H. Randall, Jr., The Newtonian World Machine, in SCIENCE & IDEAS: SELECTED READINGS 138, 158-64 (Arnold B. Arons & Alfred M. Bork eds., 1964). Of special interest for my present purposes: L.L. Laudan, Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought, in THE METHODOLOGICAL HERITAGE OF NEWTON 103 (Robert E. Butts & John W. Davis eds., 1970); LOUISE MARCIL-LACOSTE, Reid's Understanding of Newton's Methodological Rules, in CLAUSE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID: Two COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHERS 124, 124-31 (1982); David F. Norton, George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 701 (1975); and I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 36-38, 121, 133 (1995). By the point in Wilson's law lectures in which he addresses, as Bird Wilson put it, Man, as an Individual - that is, when Wilson turned to his basic theory of human nature, Wilson praised Reid above all other philosophers of the age. See WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-16; cf. id. at 193-94; McCloskey, supra note 15, at 15. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793).
130. WORKS, supra note 1, at 225 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
131. Id. at 226 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
132. Id. at 147 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
133. The Visitant [No. 13], supra note 56; see also WILLIAM L. ROWE, THOMAS REID ON FREEDOM AND MORALITY 129-30 (1991); cf. D. DAICHES RAPHAEL, THE MORAL SENSE 23, passim (1947).
134. The Visitant [No. 13], supra note 56; see also WILLIAM L. ROWE, THOMAS REID ON FREEDOM AND MORALITY 129-30 (1991); cf. D. DAICHES RAPHAEL, THE MORAL SENSE 23, passim (1947).
135. The Visitant [No. 13], supra note 56; see also WILLIAM L. ROWE, THOMAS REID ON FREEDOM AND MORALITY 129-30 (1991); cf. D. DAICHES RAPHAEL, THE MORAL SENSE 23, passim (1947).
136. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
137. The Visitant [No. 3], supra note 52 (emphasis added).
138. Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 37 (1987).
139. The Visitant [No. 1], supra note 28.
140. Bloch, supra note 66, at 55.
141. On the liberal conception of social citizenship, especially in the context of the Founding, see Lewis, supra note 17, at 384, passim. For both a convenient exposition and challenging critique of T.H. Marshall's classic liberal welfare state conception of social citizenship, see Eric Gorham, Social Citizenship and Its Fetters, 28 POLITY 25 (1995).
142. BECKER, supra note 5, at 56.
143. Id. at xiii-xiv, 55-58.
144. PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 69-70 (1993) (emphasis added).
145. Stephen A. Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 359, 383.
146. Id.
147. WORKS, supra note 1, at 404-05 (from a passage in the 1790-1791 law lectures); id. at 787-89 (from Wilson's speech of December 31, 1789, to the Pennsylvania state ratifying convention).
148. WORKS, supra note 1, at 404-05 (from a passage in the 1790-1791 law lectures); id. at 787-89 (from Wilson's speech of December 31, 1789, to the Pennsylvania state ratifying convention).
149. See generally Conrad, supra note 3.
150. See id.; see also text accompanying notes 124-26.
151. For the best and most recent development of essentially this same point with respect to Wilson and Madison - as a matter of fundamental principle to them both - see Lewis, supra note 17, at 368-69 & n.30.
152. SMITH, supra note 15, at 32-33.
153. See The Visitant [No. 7], 2 PA. CHRON., Mar. 7-14, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
154. SMITH, supra note 15, at 310.
155. For an expert assessment of Wilson's rhetorical virtuosity and versatility, considered in the context of late eighteenth-century Atlantic culture, see David Daiches, John Witherspoon, James Wilson and the Influence of Scottish Rhetoric on America, 15 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 163, 173 (1991) (describing Wilson's "somewhat grandiloquent and exhibitionist opening public [law] lecture").
156. SELIGMAN, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 172.
157. WORKS, supra note 1, at 69 (punctuation modernized for clarity).
158. See id. at 232, for further, more general remarks from Wilson on "trust."
159. See SELIGMAN, ClVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 120-21 (discussing "'precontractural' trust"); see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (forthcoming June 1997); cf. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 188-89 (1994). See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995).
160. See SELIGMAN, ClVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 120-21 (discussing "'precontractural' trust"); see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (forthcoming June 1997); cf. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 188-89 (1994). See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995).
161. See SELIGMAN, ClVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 120-21 (discussing "'precontractural' trust"); see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (forthcoming June 1997); cf. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 188-89 (1994). See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995).
162. See SELIGMAN, ClVIL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 120-21 (discussing "'precontractural' trust"); see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (forthcoming June 1997); cf. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 188-89 (1994). See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995).
163. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793); WORKS, supra note 1, at 238-39; cf. WORKS, supra note 1, at 109, 270, 401; J.G.A. Pocock, States, Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 55, 60-61.
164. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239 (first emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity). Nothing in the passage quoted in the text, however, gainsays Wilson's earlier remark in his law lectures that "[g]overnment is, indeed, highly necessary; but it is highly necessary to a fallen state. Had man continued innocent, society, without the aids of government, would have shed its benign influence even over the bowers of Paradise." Id. at 87. Moreover, as I indicate infra, at 360-61, especially at note 145, Wilson considered law and legal institution to be necessary, essential elements of "civil society" per se, before and without the institution of "civil government."
165. See, e.g., ROWE, supra note 63, at 129-30; Timothy Duggan, Active Power and the Liberty of Moral Agents, in PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS - THOMAS REID: CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS 103, 103-12 (Stephen F. Barker & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 1976); see also FLIEGELMAN, supra note 51, at 153 (discussing the "dominance" in American culture of Reid's strong position on human agency).
166. On the conception of "the state" as "a moral person" - and also as a "legal person" - generally shared by Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Vattel, but not shared by Hume, see Frederick G. Whelan, Hume and Contractarianism, 27 POLITY 201, 223 (1994).
167. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239.
168. Cf. Garry Wills, James Wilson's New Meaning for Sovereignty, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 99-106. But see my reservations of the volume in question expressed in Stephen A. Conrad, Conceptual Change and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 197, 202 (1990) (book review).
169. Cf. Garry Wills, James Wilson's New Meaning for Sovereignty, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 99-106. But see my reservations of the volume in question expressed in Stephen A. Conrad, Conceptual Change and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 197, 202 (1990) (book review).
170. WORKS, supra note 1, at 239 (emphasis added) (punctuation modernized for clarity).
171. Id. at 240.
172. Id. at 239 (punctuation modernized for clarity); cf. id. at 242 ("[S]ociety is constituted for a certain purpose."); Greene, supra note 8, at 379 ("The products of necessity and volition, the free segments of the new societies of colonial British America were, preeminently, societies of independent freeholding families composed of 'free and independent m[e]n' and women deeply engaged, as I have argued elsewhere, in their pursuits of individual happiness.") (footnotes omitted).
173. See McCloskey, supra note 15, at 14-17. The most convenient collection of documentary evidence for this point is GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 42-69, 122-40 (1978).
174. See, e.g. The Visitant [No. 9], 2 PA. CHRON., Mar. 21, 1768 (James Wilson & William White).
175. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 51, at 130. Contra Lewis, supra note 17, at 367 ("In some clear, if unspecified way, women were members of political society . . . .").
176. WORKS, supra note 1, at 71-72.
177. Linda Kerber, "History Can Do It No Justice ": Women and the Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, in WOMEN IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3, 35 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1989); cf. Lewis, supra note 17, at 381; id. at 360 (quoting Richard B. Morris).
178. Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 54 n.4 (1986); cf. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 247 (1980) ("In the introduction to his course of law lectures, delivered to a sexually mixed audience in 1790, the distinguished attorney James Wilson even felt compelled to discuss the maternal role, under circumstances that had never before seemed to call for commentary on women."). On Adams, see, for example, Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 59, 63-64 (1987), no. 1, 59-77, at 63-64, and ELLEN C. DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 45 (1978). On Jefferson, a number of relevant citations are conveniently collected in Rogers M. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 244 n.42 (1989).
179. Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 54 n.4 (1986); cf. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 247 (1980) ("In the introduction to his course of law lectures, delivered to a sexually mixed audience in 1790, the distinguished attorney James Wilson even felt compelled to discuss the maternal role, under circumstances that had never before seemed to call for commentary on women."). On Adams, see, for example, Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 59, 63-64 (1987), no. 1, 59-77, at 63-64, and ELLEN C. DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 45 (1978). On Jefferson, a number of relevant citations are conveniently collected in Rogers M. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 244 n.42 (1989).
180. Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 54 n.4 (1986); cf. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 247 (1980) ("In the introduction to his course of law lectures, delivered to a sexually mixed audience in 1790, the distinguished attorney James Wilson even felt compelled to discuss the maternal role, under circumstances that had never before seemed to call for commentary on women."). On Adams, see, for example, Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 59, 63-64 (1987), no. 1, 59-77, at 63-64, and ELLEN C. DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 45 (1978). On Jefferson, a number of relevant citations are conveniently collected in Rogers M. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 244 n.42 (1989).
181. Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 54 n.4 (1986); cf. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 247 (1980) ("In the introduction to his course of law lectures, delivered to a sexually mixed audience in 1790, the distinguished attorney James Wilson even felt compelled to discuss the maternal role, under circumstances that had never before seemed to call for commentary on women."). On Adams, see, for example, Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 59, 63-64 (1987), no. 1, 59-77, at 63-64, and ELLEN C. DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 45 (1978). On Jefferson, a number of relevant citations are conveniently collected in Rogers M. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 244 n.42 (1989).
182. Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 54 n.4 (1986); cf. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 247 (1980) ("In the introduction to his course of law lectures, delivered to a sexually mixed audience in 1790, the distinguished attorney James Wilson even felt compelled to discuss the maternal role, under circumstances that had never before seemed to call for commentary on women."). On Adams, see, for example, Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 59, 63-64 (1987), no. 1, 59-77, at 63-64, and ELLEN C. DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 45 (1978). On Jefferson, a number of relevant citations are conveniently collected in Rogers M. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 244 n.42 (1989).
183. WORKS, supra note 1, at 241.
184. See generally CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994).
185. WORKS, supra note 1, at 85.
186. Id. at 86.
187. Id. (punctuation modernized for clarity).
188. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1980).
189. On the views in this matter of an American woman of the time who achieved exceptional civic distinction, even prominence, see ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, A WOMAN'S DILEMMA: MERCY OTIS WARREN AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72-77 (1995).
190. In addition to the article already cited, see Ruth H. Bloch, American Feminine Ideals in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785-1815, 4 FEMINIST STUD., June 1978, at 101.
191. In addition to the book cited above, see Mary Beth Norton, The Evolution of White Women's Experience in Early America, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 593 (1984).