Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive?

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 239-258

  Persson, Lars ^a  

^a RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Failing firm defense; Merger law; Mergers; Predation

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE STRATEGY; LEGISLATION; MERGER;

EID: 1542427211     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00051-5     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Appelbaum E. Weber S. A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly Economics Letters 40 4 1992 473-480
2. Bartel A.P. Thomas L.G. Predation through regulation: The wage and profit effects of the occupational safety and health administration and the environmental protection agency Journal of Law and Economics 30 1 1987 239-264
3. Bernheim D. Strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry Rand Journal of Economics 15 1 1984 1-11
4. Bolton P. Scharfstein D.S. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting American Economic Review 80 1 1990 93-106
5. Deneckere R. Davidson C. Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition Rand Journal of Economics 16 1985 473-486
6. Dixit A.K. Comparative statics for oligopoly International Economic Review 27 1 1986 107-122
7. Gilbert R. Vives X. Entry deterrence and the free-rider problem Review of Economic Studies 53 1 1986 71-83
8. Hovenkamp H. Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice 1994 West Publishing Co. St. Paul, MN
9. Kamien M.I. Zang I. The limits of monopolization through acquisition Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 2 1990 465-499
10. Kovenock, D., Roy, S., 1995. Free riding in non-cooperative entry deterrence with differentiated products. Mimeo., Purdue University.
11. McGee J.S. Predatory pricing cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case Journal of Law and Economics 1 1958 137-169
12. Neumann G. Nelson J. Safety regulation and firm size: Effects of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 1969 Journal of Law and Economics 25 1982 183-200
13. Nolan, D., 1998. Predatory pricing in an oligopolistic framework. Mimeo., Royal Holloway College, University of London.
14. Ordover, J.A., Saloner, G., 1989. Predation, monopolization, and antitrust. In: Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, Chapter 9. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
15. Perry M.K. Porter R.H. Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger American Economic Review 75 1985 219-227
16. Persson, L., 1998a. The auctioning of a failing firm? In: Ph.D. Thesis, Stockholm University. IIES Monograph Series, No. 35.
17. Persson, L., 1998b. Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive? In: Ph.D. Thesis, Stockholm University. IIES Monograph Series, No. 35.
18. Salant S.W. Switzer S. Reynolds R.J. Losses due to merger: The effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium Quarterly Journal of Economics 185-199 1983
19. Saloner G. Predation, mergers, and incomplete information RAND Journal of Economics 18 1987 165-186
20. Stigler G.J. Monopoly and oligopoly by merger American Economic Review 40 1 1950 23-34
21. Tirole J. The Theory of Industrial Organization 1990 The MIT Press Cambridge, MA
22. Waldman M. Non-cooperative entry deterrence, uncertainty and the free rider problem The Review of Economic Studies 54 2 1987 301-310
23. Yamey B.S. Predatory price cutting: Notes and comments The Journal of Law and Economics 15 1972 129-142