Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 207-226

  Wallace, J J A ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542421171     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399608437658     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, Future Warfare Series, Vol.1. (London/Washington DC: Brassey's 1985, 1988) p. 133.
2. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy - The Indirect Approach, 3rd ed. (London: Cassell 1954) p.288.
3. Simpkin (note 1) p.225.
4. Liddell Hart (note 2) pp.205-6.
5. Ibid. p. 184.
6. Ibid. p.25.
7. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview 1985) pp.4-6.
8. Liddell Hart (note 2) p.337.
9. The term is used here in its accepted military meaning. Note that Simpkin (note 1, p.148) states that 'The Russians regard two actions as simultaneous if one follows the other within the enemy's response time at the level affected.'
10. Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM-100 Series, Dept. of the Army/Dept. of the Air Force, Dec. 1989 (Final Draft) p. vi; The Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (Revised ed. 1996) pp.3-43.
11. Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM-100 Series, Dept. of the Army/Dept. of the Air Force, Dec. 1989 (Final Draft) p. vi; The Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (Revised ed. 1996) pp.3-43.
12. Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (note 10) p.vi.
13. Grant T. Hammond, 'Low Intensity Conflict: War By Another Name', Small Wars and Insurgencies 1/3 (Dec. 1990) p.270.
14. Arthur V. Grant, 'Strategic Decisions: The Mire of Low Intensity Conflict', Comparative Strategy 10 (1991) pp.167-8.
15. Simpkin (note 1) p.311.
16. Ibid. p. 182.
17. Liddell Hart (note 2) p.337.
18. The Foco Theory is based on the presumption that if a government lacks legitimacy, action by even small armed groups will of themselves lead to mass rebellion.
19. Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (US Army and General Staff College 1992) pp.31-4.
20. Liddell Hart (note 2) p. 186.
21. Sir Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills (London: Leo Cooper 1989) p.151.
22. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NY Free Press 1991) p.174.
23. Thompson (note 20) p. 153.
24. R. Cohen-Almagor, The Intifada Causes, Consequences and Future Trends', Small Wars and Insurgencies 21 (April 1991) p.24.
25. Simpkin (note 1) p.289.
26. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, Studies in International Security 10 (London/NY: Chatto/Praeger 1966) p.56.
27. Stuart A. Cohen and Efraim Inbar, 'Varieties of Counter-insurgency Activities: Israel's Military Operations Against the Palestinians, 1948-90', Small Wars and Insurgencies 2/1 (April 1991) p.43.
28. Ibid. p.43.
29. Thompson (note 25) p.50.
30. Pseudo teams are teams of security force personnel who adopt the guise of the enemy and are introduced as guerrilla teams within guerrilla controlled areas. They were used successfully in Kenya and Malaya.
31. J.R. Paget, 'Revolutionary Warfare and Manoeuvre Warfare: Its Relevance and Relationship', Central Region vs Out-of-Area: Future Commitments (eds) Maj.-Gen. J.J.G. Mackenzie and Brian Holden Reid (London: Tri-Service Press 1990) p. 152.
32. Report of the Sec.-Gen. on the Work of the Organization, 'An Agenda For Peace' (UN June 1992) pp.10-13.
33. The codename for the abortive 1980 attempt to rescue US hostages in Tehran.
34. Despite the fact that ensuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada was the first of three strategic objectives, the last group of students was not secured until day four of the operation. See Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War 1975-86 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1988) pp.295 and 349.
35. As examples, the tactical deployments and even use of fire support by 24th MAU in Beirut were referred to the White House. (See Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence - Why the American Military Doesn't Win [NY: Hill & Wang 1985] p. 134.) The bombing runs against the Kompong Song port facilities, originally conceived to support the raid on Tang Is, were alternatively switched on and off by direct intervention of the White House. (See Christopher Jon Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis [U. of Florida Press 1989] pp.107-20.)
36. As examples, the tactical deployments and even use of fire support by 24th MAU in Beirut were referred to the White House. (See Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence - Why the American Military Doesn't Win [NY: Hill & Wang 1985] p. 134.) The bombing runs against the Kompong Song port facilities, originally conceived to support the raid on Tang Is, were alternatively switched on and off by direct intervention of the White House. (See Christopher Jon Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis [U. of Florida Press 1989] pp.107-20.)
37. The Longmore Commission into the Beirut intervention reported that 'perceptions of the basic mission varied at different levels of the chain of command.' Gabriel (note 34), p. 135.
38. Richard Szafranski, Thinking About Small Wars', Parameters 20/3 (Sept. 1990) p.43.
39. The appearance of tanks at the Governor's residence in Grenada allowed the siege of its SEAL defenders to be raised with little more than a demonstration. (See Gabriel [note 34] p.168.)
40. Ibid. p.147.
41. Lind (note 7) p. 14.