Cause and some positive causal impact

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 401-432

  Kvart, Igal ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

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EID: 15244359043     PISSN: 15208583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. David Lewis, Counterfactuals, Harvard University Press, 1973
2. David Lewis, "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow", Nous 13 (1979), 418-46
3. see Philosophical Papers, vol II, pp. 52-3
4. David Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol II, p. 181
5. For my approach regarding backtracking, compare my "Counterfactual Ambiguities, True Premises and Knowledge", Synthese 100 (1994), 133-164
6. See Lewis 1986, p. 176-7
7. I limit my discussion here to Salmon's book. Salmon recently changed his position by abandoning the counterfactual component of his process theory and adopting a conserved quantities account; see his "Causality Without Counterfactuals", Philosophy of Science 61 (1994) 297-312
8. Salmon was responding to a constructive (as well as critical) rejoinder by Dowe (and earlier critiques). Dowe's account replaces Salmon's definitions of MT and CI by concise definitions which appeal to the notion of a conserved quantity and do not invoke counterfactuals. See Phil Dowe, "Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory", Philosophy of Science 59 (1992), 195-216
9. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, ibid, p. 171
10. For my analysis of the Bizet-Verdi example, see ATC, p. 237
11. Cf. also J. Fetzer, "Critical Notice: Wesley Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World", Philosophy of Science, 54: 597-610, 1987
12. c is: the ball was hit in the direction of the branch. Given ∼c, with high probability the ball would be hit in the direction of the hole
13. B
14. Similarly, F has purely negative causal impact on E just in case F has some negative causal impact on E but no positive causal impact at all
15. Cf. ATC, ch. 2, sec. VIII
16. I. Hacking, The Logic of Statistical Inference, Cambridge University Press, 1965
17. H. Mellor, The Matter of Chance, Cambridge University Press, 1971
18. B. Skyrms, Causal Necessity, Yale University Press, 1980
19. We need to require causal relevance for the relation of some positive causal impact since otherwise, even if there is a strict increaser for A and C (see below), there may still be a causal cutter, i.e., an event that cuts off the would-be causal connection between A and C and renders A causally irrelevant to C. Here I rely on the probabilistic analysis I offered for the notion of causal irrelevance; see my "Transitivity and Preemption of Causal Impact", Philosophical Studies, 64 (1991), pp. 125-160
20. and my "Causal Independence", Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), pp 96-114.)
21. A,C
22. A)
23. A
24. The extension of the definition of strict increaser here (and of strict decreaser as per the previous note) constitutes a change in the terminology I used in earlier writings, where I suggested the notion of a clincher (increaser-clincher and decreaser-clincher, respectively). Though the current usage is simpler for my purposes here, the difference is merely terminological. Cf. my "Overall Positive Causal Impact", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994), pp. 205-228, especially p. 220
25. See, for instance, Lewis, op. cit., p. 179
26. Cf. Lewis's related observation, Philosophical Papers, vol. II, p. 176
27. The reasoning underlying this comment was expanded on in my "Counterfactuals and Causal Relevance", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72, 4 (1991), 314-337 (featuring in particular the possibility of causal breakers)
28. E.g., aipi or aipd, on my approach