Equal treatment of cultures and the limits of postmodern liberalism

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-28

  Habermas, Jürgen ^a  

^a GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

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EID: 15244355588     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2005.00211.x     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Jürgen Habermas, "On the internal relation between the rule of law and democracy," in Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciarin Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 253-64. Jürgen Habermas, "Constitutional democracy: a paradoxical union of contradictory principles?" Political Theory, 29 (2001), 766-81; reprinted in Habermas, Time of Transitions, trans. Max Pensky (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004).
2. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Jürgen Habermas, "On the internal relation between the rule of law and democracy," in Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciarin Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 253-64. Jürgen Habermas, "Constitutional democracy: a paradoxical union of contradictory principles?" Political Theory, 29 (2001), 766-81; reprinted in Habermas, Time of Transitions, trans. Max Pensky (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004).
3. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Jürgen Habermas, "On the internal relation between the rule of law and democracy," in Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciarin Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 253-64. Jürgen Habermas, "Constitutional democracy: a paradoxical union of contradictory principles?" Political Theory, 29 (2001), 766-81; reprinted in Habermas, Time of Transitions, trans. Max Pensky (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004).
4. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Jürgen Habermas, "On the internal relation between the rule of law and democracy," in Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciarin Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 253-64. Jürgen Habermas, "Constitutional democracy: a paradoxical union of contradictory principles?" Political Theory, 29 (2001), 766-81; reprinted in Habermas, Time of Transitions, trans. Max Pensky (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004).
5. Jürgen Habermas, "Conceptions of modernity," The Postnational Constellation, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
6. Such a connection is also continued in the "theory of communicative action"; on the corresponding "reconstructive" procedure, see B. Peters, Integration moderner Gesellschaften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), pp. 471 ff.
7. Jacques Derrida, "Force of law: the 'mystical foundation of authority,' " Cardozo Law Review, 11 (1990), 919-1045 and Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso, 1997). On the internal relation between law and power, see Habermas, Between facts and Norms, pp. 133-51.
8. Jacques Derrida, "Force of law: the 'mystical foundation of authority,' " Cardozo Law Review, 11 (1990), 919-1045 and Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso, 1997). On the internal relation between law and power, see Habermas, Between facts and Norms, pp. 133-51.
9. Jacques Derrida, "Force of law: the 'mystical foundation of authority,' " Cardozo Law Review, 11 (1990), 919-1045 and Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso, 1997). On the internal relation between law and power, see Habermas, Between facts and Norms, pp. 133-51.
10. For example, in Jacques Derrida, "The university without condition," Without Alibi (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002).
11. Christoph Menke, Spiegelungen der Gleichheit (Berlin: Akademie, 2000), p. ix; an English translation is forthcoming from Stanford University Press.
12. Ibid., p. 41.
13. Ibid., p. 33.
14. I am skeptical and leave it open whether the interpretation that Menke gives of the method of so-called "deconstruction" applies to the practice or self-understanding of Jacques Derrida.
15. See the editors' introduction in A. Kern and Ch. Menke, eds, Philosophie der Dekonstruktion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002), p. 9.
16. Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice, trans. John M. M. Farrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 94-100; Jürgen Habermas, "'Reasonable' versus 'true,' or the morality of worldviews," The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 75-101 at p. 100.
17. Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice, trans. John M. M. Farrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 94-100; Jürgen Habermas, "'Reasonable' versus 'true,' or the morality of worldviews," The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 75-101 at p. 100.
18. Christoph Menke, "Können und Glauben," Philosophie der Dekonstruktion, ed. Kern and Menke (Frankfurt: 2002), p. 250.
19. See Rawls's critique of my procedural view in John Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995), pp. 132-80 at pp. 170 ff., and my reply, Habermas, "'Reasonable' versus 'true,' or the morality of worldviews," pp. 98 ff.
20. Forst, Contexts of Justice, pp. 47 f.
21. Christoph Menke, "Grenzen der Gleichheit," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 50 (2002), p. 901.
22. Menke nonetheless dismisses a fallibilist understanding of his thesis. But there is no plausible reason for this. The fact that the consequences of practical misjudgments are more serious, in general, than the consequences of theoretical misjudgments does not take away from moral judgments and legal decisions the epistemic status of being statements that can be right or wrong. See Jürgen Habermas, "Rightness versus truth: on the sense of normative validity in moral judgments and norms," Truth and Justification, trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).
23. Menke, "Grenzen der Gleichheit," p. 902. Note that Menke does not say at this point, "could be criticized."
24. Thomas McCarthy, "Die Politische Philosophie und das Problem der Rasse," Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunf der Öffentlichkeit, ed. Lutz Wingert and Klaus Günther (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), pp. 627-54 at p. 633; translated as "Political philosophy and racial injustice: from normative to critical theory," Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 147-68.
25. Thomas McCarthy, "Die Politische Philosophie und das Problem der Rasse," Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunf der Öffentlichkeit, ed. Lutz Wingert and Klaus Günther (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), pp. 627-54 at p. 633; translated as "Political philosophy and racial injustice: from normative to critical theory," Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 147-68.
26. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 196-7.
27. Menke wants to place the idea of equality in a relation "with the obligations of individuality, ... which does not already decide from the start in favor of the priority of equality" (Spiegelungen der Gleichheit, p. 7).
28. Ibid., p. 122.
29. Martin Seel, Versuch über die Form des Glücks (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999), pp. 191 ff.
30. Klaus Günther, "Ein normativer Begriff der Kohärenz," Rechtstheorie, 20 (1989); Klaus G̈nther, "Warum es Anwendungsdiskurse gibt," Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 1 (1993).
31. Klaus Günther, "Ein normativer Begriff der Kohärenz," Rechtstheorie, 20 (1989); Klaus G̈nther, "Warum es Anwendungsdiskurse gibt," Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 1 (1993).
32. Menke, "Grenzen der Gleichheit," p. 905.
33. Ibid., p. 903.
34. Ibid., p. 898.
35. Ibid., p. 906.
36. As, among others, the impressive study by Charles W. Mills testifies; see his The Racial Contract (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
37. Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over needs," Unruly Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 114-22.
38. Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over needs," Unruly Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 114-22.
39. It is not clear to me what is meant by the thesis, "that a politics of equality must develop in itself the attitude or the virtue to do justice to the suffering experience and lamentations of the individual," if this politics is supposed to be allowed "[to go] to the extreme, that equality limits itself in view of these limitations" (Menke, "Grenzen der Gleichheit," p. 905).
40. P. Pauer-Studer, Autonom leben (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000).
41. Nancy Fraser, "From redistribution to recognition?" Theorizing Multiculturalism, ed. C. Willett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); in the revisions that she has made in the meantime, I do not see any improvements over the original formulation. See Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking recognition," New Left Review, #3 (May/June 2000), 107-20;
42. Nancy Fraser, "From redistribution to recognition?" Theorizing Multiculturalism, ed. C. Willett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); in the revisions that she has made in the meantime, I do not see any improvements over the original formulation. See Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking recognition," New Left Review, #3 (May/June 2000), 107-20;
43. see also Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, trans. J. Golb, J. Ingram, and C. Wilke (London: Verso, 2003).
44. See Brian Barry, who reduces the claim to recognition by discriminated groups to a lack of "means and options" because he measures civic equality according to distributive justice, thus according to "opportunities and resources" that are required for each citizen to have the same chances to make actual use of equally distributed rights. Such an assimilation of missing recognition to materially balanced underprivileging leads, for example, to the counter-intuitive assimilation of religious convictions to preferences: "The position regarding preferences and beliefs is similar," says Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 36. Therefore, the Sikhs would be permitted to wear turbans while riding motorcycles because otherwise their range of opportunities for choosing one or another religious community would be unduly restricted.
45. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective," Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
46. A general idea of the new discussion is found in St. Kirste, "Dezentrierung, Überforderung, und dialektische Konstruktion der Rechtsperson," Verfassung - Philosophie - Kirche (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001).
47. A. Margalit and M. Halbertal, "Liberalism and the right to culture," Social Research, 61 (1994), 491-510.
48. Chaim Gans speaks of an "identity based argument" in The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 43 ff.
49. With this qualification, I would like to preclude the restriction of cultural rights to access to cultures of origin. We must not reify cultural heritage - which is always a hybrid resulting from the fusion of different traditions - into closed totalities. We must also not assume that person's identities remain dependent, throughout the course of their lives, upon a defined culture or even the rootedness in their culture of origin. See Jeremy Waldron, "Minority cultures and the cosmopolitan alternative," University of Michigan Journal for Law Reform, 25 (1992), 751-93.
50. A. Schachar, "On citizenship and multicultural vulnerability," Political Theory, 28 (2000), 64-89. Given the "special power relations" within the family, even the secular rights held by parents in Western countries can lead to similar conflicts (for example, when Turkish fathers keep their daughters out of coeducational physical education in public schools).
51. See the discussion of the pertinent legal cases in Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 169 ff.
52. Ibid., p. 165 f.
53. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 34-48.
54. Ibid., p. 38.
55. Charles Taylor, "The politics of recognition," Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 246.
56. On the theory of hyper-goods, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pt. I; on that, see Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application; Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1993), pp. 69 ff.
57. On the theory of hyper-goods, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pt. I; on that, see Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application; Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1993), pp. 69 ff.
58. Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 67.
59. See my debate with K. O. Apel in Jürgen Habermas, "Zur Architektonik der Diskursdifferenzierung," Reflexion und Verantwortung, ed. D. Böhler (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003).
60. William Galston counts the following as "realistic" conditions for exit: "knowledge conditions - the awareness of alternative to the life one is in fact living; capacity conditions - the ability to assess these alternative if it comes to seem desirable to do so; psychological conditions - in particular, freedom from the kinds of brainwashing that give rise to heart-rending deprogramming efforts of parents on behalf of their children, and more broadly, forms of coercion other than the purely physical that may give rise to warranted state interferences on behalf of affected individuals; and finally, fitness conditions - the ability of exit-desiring individuals to participate effectively in at least some of life other than the ones they wish to leave." See William Galston, "Two concepts of liberalism," Ethics, 105 (1995), 516-34 at p. 533; from a feminist perspective, see Susan Moller Okin, " 'Mistresses of their own destiny': group rights, gender, and realistic rights to exit," Ethics, 112 (2002), 205-30.
61. William Galston counts the following as "realistic" conditions for exit: "knowledge conditions - the awareness of alternative to the life one is in fact living; capacity conditions - the ability to assess these alternative if it comes to seem desirable to do so; psychological conditions - in particular, freedom from the kinds of brainwashing that give rise to heart-rending deprogramming efforts of parents on behalf of their children, and more broadly, forms of coercion other than the purely physical that may give rise to warranted state interferences on behalf of affected individuals; and finally, fitness conditions - the ability of exit-desiring individuals to participate effectively in at least some of life other than the ones they wish to leave." See William Galston, "Two concepts of liberalism," Ethics, 105 (1995), 516-34 at p. 533; from a feminist perspective, see Susan Moller Okin, " 'Mistresses of their own destiny': group rights, gender, and realistic rights to exit," Ethics, 112 (2002), 205-30.
62. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 38 f.
63. In another way, law and morality conflict with one another in cases of reparations for descendents of the victims of a criminal policy by a past government, for which its legal successor is made responsible.
64. See Rainer Forst, "Toleration, justice and reason," The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies, ed. Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
65. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 58 ff.
66. See Jürgen Habermas, "Faith and knowledge," The Future of Human Nature, Irans. Hella Beister and William Rehg (Oxford; Polity Press, 2003).
67. Charles Taylor, "Two theories of modernity," Public Culture, 1 (1999), 153-74.