Endangered species and the right to die

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 23-41

  Chessa, Frank ^a,b,c  

^a BATES COLLEGE   (United States)

^b MAINE MEDICAL CENTER   (United States)

^c Maine Philosophical Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

XYRAUCHEN TEXANUS;

EID: 15044355049     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200527139     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. The razorback sucker (Xyrauchen texanus) was listed as endangered in 1991 under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. The largest population of razorbacks is in Lake Mojave, estimated at 2,500 individuals. Only remnant populations exist elsewhere in the Colorado River Basin. The population in Lake Mead is currently being studied by BIO/WEST, Inc., under the sponsorship of the Southern Nevada Water Authority. So far, only a few individuals have been found in Lake Mead.
2. Southern Nevada Water Authority: www.snwa.com/html/env_razorback, 18 June 2003.
3. Would this intensive human manipulation count as saving an endangered species? Fish in the facility and the Colorado would be living carriers of the genetic make-up of the species, but the genetic make-up could be just as well preserved in a laboratory deep freeze or (for that matter) as data in a computer. Preserving the genetic code of a species does not seem sufficient for saving an endangered species. But what else is there? Mere biological life (e.g., fish in aquariums) does not seem sufficient either. Instead, it seems plausible to suppose that in order to survive, a species would need to continue to exist in some relationship to its natural habitat. Lawrence Johnson reaches a similar conclusion. Lawrence E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 180.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 48-51; Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, 126, no. 5 (1979): 256-81 .
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 48-51; Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, 126, no. 5 (1979): 256-81 .
6. Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, ed. William Blackstone (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. 43-63; Tom Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," Environmental Ethics 2(1980): 99-120; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 55-82.
7. Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, ed. William Blackstone (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. 43-63; Tom Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," Environmental Ethics 2(1980): 99-120; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 55-82.
8. Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, ed. William Blackstone (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. 43-63; Tom Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," Environmental Ethics 2(1980): 99-120; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 55-82.
9. For example, this is the strategy adopted by Paul Taylor in Respect for Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
10. Using principles from human health care ethics to answer questions in environmental ethics is not new. See David H. Bennet, "Triage as a Species Preservation Strategy," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 47-56. More recently, David DeGrazia has used nonmaleficence, beneficence, and respect for autonomy (familiar from health care ethics) to analyze animal ethics. David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 258-81.
11. Using principles from human health care ethics to answer questions in environmental ethics is not new. See David H. Bennet, "Triage as a Species Preservation Strategy," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 47-56. More recently, David DeGrazia has used nonmaleficence, beneficence, and respect for autonomy (familiar from health care ethics) to analyze animal ethics. David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 258-81.
12. Regan, "Animal Rights," pp. 99-120. Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 55-82; Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Joseph R. Des Jardins (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 317-22; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics 2 (1980): 311-28; Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 101-12.
13. Regan, "Animal Rights," pp. 99-120. Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 55-82; Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Joseph R. Des Jardins (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 317-22; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics 2 (1980): 311-28; Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 101-12.
14. Regan, "Animal Rights," pp. 99-120. Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 55-82; Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Joseph R. Des Jardins (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 317-22; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics 2 (1980): 311-28; Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 101-12.
15. Regan, "Animal Rights," pp. 99-120. Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 55-82; Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Joseph R. Des Jardins (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 317-22; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics 2 (1980): 311-28; Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 101-12.
16. Regan, "Animal Rights," pp. 99-120. Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 55-82; Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Joseph R. Des Jardins (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 317-22; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics 2 (1980): 311-28; Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 101-12.
17. M. T. Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; M. T. Ghiselin, "Can Aristotle Be Reconciled with Darwin?" Systematic Zoology 34 (1985): 457-59; D. L. Hull, The Metaphysics of Evolution (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
18. M. T. Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; M. T. Ghiselin, "Can Aristotle Be Reconciled with Darwin?" Systematic Zoology 34 (1985): 457-59; D. L. Hull, The Metaphysics of Evolution (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
19. M. T. Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; M. T. Ghiselin, "Can Aristotle Be Reconciled with Darwin?" Systematic Zoology 34 (1985): 457-59; D. L. Hull, The Metaphysics of Evolution (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
20. John Dupre, The Disorder of Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
21. The right of a competent, informed person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment was recognized by the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. United States Supreme Court Reports 497 (1990), pp. 261-357.
22. Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life" (24 November 1957), in The Pope Speaks 4 (1958): 393-98; The Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980); Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2278 (1984); Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (1995).
23. Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life" (24 November 1957), in The Pope Speaks 4 (1958): 393-98; The Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980); Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2278 (1984); Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (1995).
24. Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life" (24 November 1957), in The Pope Speaks 4 (1958): 393-98; The Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980); Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2278 (1984); Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (1995).
25. Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life" (24 November 1957), in The Pope Speaks 4 (1958): 393-98; The Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980); Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2278 (1984); Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (1995).
26. The Hastings Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care of the Dying (Briarcliff Manor, N.Y.: The Hastings Center, 1987), pp. 26-31.
27. Dan W. Brock, "The Non-Identity Problem and the Genetic Harms," in John Arras and Bonnie Steinbock, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed. (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 397-401.
28. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 381-90.
29. Bonnie Steinbock and Ron McClamrock, "When is Birth Unfair to the Child?" in Arras and Steinbock, Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, pp. 388-96. Typically, wrongful life suits are not brought by children against parents, but rather are malpractice suits brought by parents against physicians.
30. I do not want to hide from the controversial nature of this claim. One criticism might be that the anencephalic human organism is not a person, and thus that he or she is incapable of performing distinctively human functions is irrelevant to its interests. The anencephalic infant is, of course, a living organism, and an assumption of this essay is that all living organisms have interests. Perhaps the anencephalic's interest is that he or she performs the functions distinctive to other, "lower" organisms, e.g., the function of respiration. Or, perhaps it is a good for him or her that he or she performs the functions distinctive to anencephalic infants. To guard against such proposals, I would argue that the distinctive functions of an individual organism, and hence its interests, are partially determined by reference to the species to which it belongs. A second worry comes from a theological perspective: if one believes that the soul of a person could learn or be improved by an anencephalic existence, then one might think that it is good for this individual that he or she existed as an embodied person. Even assuming a theistic perspective, however, the claim that a soul could be improved by such an existence is dubitable.
31. Feinberg says that in order to have interests an entity must have "conscious wishes, desires, hopes; or urges or impulses; or unconscious drives, aims, or goals; or latent tendencies, direction of growth, and natural fulfillments." This list of necessary conditions is actually more expansive than one would have thought, since, for example, plants and arguably species have "directions of growth" and yet Feinberg is clear that these entities do not have interests. Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals," p. 45.
32. Taylor, Respect for Nature.
33. Nicholas Agar, Life's Intrinsic Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
34. The following quote provides an overview of Johnson's position. "Like a wave moving over the water, a species is an ongoing process that is sequentially embodied in different bits of matter. Unlike a wave, however, a species has a cohesive self-identity that defines what is good for it. Some things contribute to the coherence, unity, and viability of a species, and some things detract. Unlike a wave, a species, when healthy, is a process that proceeds in a way serving to maintain its coherence, unity, and viability. As a species flows through the generations, it maintains a form of homeostasis that serves to facilitate its wellbeing needs, and which also in part serves to define itself and its needs." Johnson, Morally Deep World, p. 209. See also Lawrence E. Johnson, "Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Organisms," Environmental Ethics 14 (1992): 145-57.
35. The following quote provides an overview of Johnson's position. "Like a wave moving over the water, a species is an ongoing process that is sequentially embodied in different bits of matter. Unlike a wave, however, a species has a cohesive self-identity that defines what is good for it. Some things contribute to the coherence, unity, and viability of a species, and some things detract. Unlike a wave, a species, when healthy, is a process that proceeds in a way serving to maintain its coherence, unity, and viability. As a species flows through the generations, it maintains a form of homeostasis that serves to facilitate its wellbeing needs, and which also in part serves to define itself and its needs." Johnson, Morally Deep World, p. 209. See also Lawrence E. Johnson, "Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Organisms," Environmental Ethics 14 (1992): 145-57.
36. Holmes Rolston, III, "Challenges to Environmental Ethics," in Michael E. Zimmerman et al., eds., Environmental Philosophy, 2d ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 134. See also Holmes Rolston, III, Conserving Natural Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
37. Holmes Rolston, III, "Challenges to Environmental Ethics," in Michael E. Zimmerman et al., eds., Environmental Philosophy, 2d ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 134. See also Holmes Rolston, III, Conserving Natural Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
38. Some readers may think that I am committed to the claim that if humans are removed from evolutionary pressure, then the human species would cease to have intrinsic value. This is not so. I hold that being subject to evolutionary pressure is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a species to have intrinsic value. However, in the case of the razorback sucker it is plausible to hold that the only reason the razorback sucker species has intrinsic value is that it is subject to evolutionary pressure - no other feature of the species would seem relevant to the fish having intrinsic value under Rolston's criterion. The human species, on the other hand, might have intrinsic value just because it had the capability to remove itself from evolutionary pressure - Rolston might take this capability to be distinctive of the human species.
39. Johnson makes this point explicitly. Johnson, Morally Deep World, p. 163.
40. Readers will note a rough analogy between my argument and Eric Katz's and John Elliot's positions in the debate on the restoration of nature. Katz and Elliot argue that, once destroyed, the value in wild nature cannot be reestablished by human restoration of the environment. William Jordan and others argue that human restoration of environments can recreate natural value. See Paul Gobster and Bruce Hull, eds., Restoring Nature (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000) for recent positions in the debate. See also Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration (London: Routledge, 1997). Despite a rough analogy between my argument and the Katz-Elliot position, there is an important distinction. My argument turns on the potential frustration of interests of living organisms. In contrast, Katz and Elliot's argument turns on the impossibility of recreating intrinsic value (where this value is not understood in terms of interests). My general position on the restoration debate, which does not do justice to its nuances, is that I agree with the Katz-Elliot position insofar as restorations of nature are always a "second-best" solution, but I agree with Jordan that sometimes a second-best solution is better than a total loss of natural value.
41. Readers will note a rough analogy between my argument and Eric Katz's and John Elliot's positions in the debate on the restoration of nature. Katz and Elliot argue that, once destroyed, the value in wild nature cannot be reestablished by human restoration of the environment. William Jordan and others argue that human restoration of environments can recreate natural value. See Paul Gobster and Bruce Hull, eds., Restoring Nature (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000) for recent positions in the debate. See also Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration (London: Routledge, 1997). Despite a rough analogy between my argument and the Katz-Elliot position, there is an important distinction. My argument turns on the potential frustration of interests of living organisms. In contrast, Katz and Elliot's argument turns on the impossibility of recreating intrinsic value (where this value is not understood in terms of interests). My general position on the restoration debate, which does not do justice to its nuances, is that I agree with the Katz-Elliot position insofar as restorations of nature are always a "second-best" solution, but I agree with Jordan that sometimes a second-best solution is better than a total loss of natural value.
42. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this journal, Scott Lehmann, for pointing out that the assumptions that imply the conclusion that we are not obligated to continue the breeding program are significantly weaker than the assumptions that imply the conclusion that we are obligated to discontinue the breeding program. Thus, the conclusion that we are not obligated to continue the breeding program is less controversial.