Rationality, ethnicity and institutions: A survey of issues and results

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 23-42

  Kyriacou, Andreas P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Ethnocentrism; Institutions; Rational choice

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ETHNICITY; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; PROPERTY RIGHTS;

EID: 14644440782     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00237.x     Document Type: Review

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