American kingship? Monarchical origins of modern presidentialism

Polity

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 24-53

  Scheuerman, William E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Alexander Hamilton; Executive power; Liberalism; Monarchy; Prerogative

Indexed keywords

EID: 14644397358     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300001     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. Weber defined charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. Economy and Society, Vol. 1, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 241.
2. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of Nazi Germany, see Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 83-97. For various attempts to clarify the (oftentimes murky) concept of charisma, as well as demonstrate its utility across political and historical contexts, see Dankwart Rustow, ed., Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: George Braziller, 1970). Specially useful at both explicating and elaborating on Weber's understanding of charisma is Robert Tuckers "The Theory of Charismatic Authority" 69-94.
3. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of Nazi Germany, see Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 83-97. For various attempts to clarify the (oftentimes murky) concept of charisma, as well as demonstrate its utility across political and historical contexts, see Dankwart Rustow, ed., Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: George Braziller, 1970). Specially useful at both explicating and elaborating on Weber's understanding of charisma is Robert Tuckers "The Theory of Charismatic Authority" 69-94.
4. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of Nazi Germany, see Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 83-97. For various attempts to clarify the (oftentimes murky) concept of charisma, as well as demonstrate its utility across political and historical contexts, see Dankwart Rustow, ed., Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: George Braziller, 1970). Specially useful at both explicating and elaborating on Weber's understanding of charisma is Robert Tuckers "The Theory of Charismatic Authority" 69-94.
5. Marc Landy and Sidney M. Milkis, Presidential Greatness (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 2. The authors suggest that the perennial quest for presidential greatness may be "far more compatible with monarchy" than with liberal democracy.
6. Landy and Milkis, Presidential Greatness, 1-11.
7. This facet of Weber's thought is critically analyzed in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
8. Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Matter?" in The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. I, ed. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 6-8, 24-25; Bruce Ackerman, "The New Separation of Powers," Harvard Law Review 113 (2000): 658-61. I revisit this literature later in the essay
9. Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Matter?" in The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. I, ed. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 6-8, 24-25; Bruce Ackerman, "The New Separation of Powers," Harvard Law Review 113 (2000): 658-61. I revisit this literature later in the essay
10. My emphasis on the monarchical origins of the presidential executive is hardly novel; it is a familiar theme in the history of political thinking about the American presidency. See Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas S. Engeman, The Presidency and Political Science: Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). For reasons I cannot explore here, my version of this old argument remains distinct. It is certainly more systematic than two recent polemical discussions of our "monarchical" presidency: Michael Novak, Choosing Our King (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1974); Kevin Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush (New York: Viking, 2003). Please note that I rely on the term "king" because the overwhelming majority of monarchs has, of course, been male, chiefly because of sexist rules governing succession.
11. My emphasis on the monarchical origins of the presidential executive is hardly novel; it is a familiar theme in the history of political thinking about the American presidency. See Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas S. Engeman, The Presidency and Political Science: Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). For reasons I cannot explore here, my version of this old argument remains distinct. It is certainly more systematic than two recent polemical discussions of our "monarchical" presidency: Michael Novak, Choosing Our King (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1974); Kevin Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush (New York: Viking, 2003). Please note that I rely on the term "king" because the overwhelming majority of monarchs has, of course, been male, chiefly because of sexist rules governing succession.
12. My emphasis on the monarchical origins of the presidential executive is hardly novel; it is a familiar theme in the history of political thinking about the American presidency. See Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas S. Engeman, The Presidency and Political Science: Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). For reasons I cannot explore here, my version of this old argument remains distinct. It is certainly more systematic than two recent polemical discussions of our "monarchical" presidency: Michael Novak, Choosing Our King (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1974); Kevin Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush (New York: Viking, 2003). Please note that I rely on the term "king" because the overwhelming majority of monarchs has, of course, been male, chiefly because of sexist rules governing succession.
13. Kingship has taken many different forms and relied on different modes of justification, thus making it difficult to define easily. For an important recent attempt, inspired by Weber, to capture its core elements, see Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 1978), 21-60.
14. Bendix, Kings or People, 3-4.
15. Bendix, Kings or People, 7.
16. W. M. Spellman, Monarchies, 1000-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 7.
17. Marc Bloch, The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France (London: Routledge, 1973).
18. Donald W Hanson, From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 71-72.
19. Michael Walzer, "Regicide and Revolution," in Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 1-92.
20. Leonard Krieger, Kings and Philosophers, 1689-1789 (New York: Norton, 1970), 1.
21. Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994), 98-159; Louise B. Dunbar, A Study of Monarchical Tendencies in the United States, From 1776 to 1801 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1920). 1 say more about Hamilton in just a moment. McDonald's study on the American presidency is rich and informative but also insufficiently critical.
22. Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994), 98-159; Louise B. Dunbar, A Study of Monarchical Tendencies in the United States, From 1776 to 1801 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1920). 1 say more about Hamilton in just a moment. McDonald's study on the American presidency is rich and informative but also insufficiently critical.
23. See the classic German-language study by Robert Redslob, Die Staatstheorien der franzoesischen Nationalversammlung von 1789 (Leipzig: Veit, 1912), 221-83.
24. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 12, Chapter 14 [1681]. For a discussion, see John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 148-64.
25. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 12, Chapter 14 [1681]. For a discussion, see John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 148-64.
26. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, ed. Anne Cohler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 [1748]), 156-68.
27. According to McDonald (The American Presidency: An Intellectual History, 38-66), Locke, Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, De Lolme, Hume, and Blackstone constitute the most significant influences on early American thinking about the executive.
28. Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 296-301.
29. Henry St. John Bolingbroke, "The Idea of a Patriot King," in The Works of Lord Bolingbroke, Vol. 11 (London: Frank Cass, 1967 [1738]), 372. On Bolingbroke, see Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
30. Henry St. John Bolingbroke, "The Idea of a Patriot King," in The Works of Lord Bolingbroke, Vol. 11 (London: Frank Cass, 1967 [1738]), 372. On Bolingbroke, see Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
31. Bolingbroke, "Idea of a Patriot King," 401.
32. J. L. De Lolme, The Constitution of England (London: Henry Bohn, 1853 [1784]), 194; on the dangers of legislative supremacy, see 69, 317-24. Although exerting an enormous influence on Hamilton, De Lolme has been neglected by scholarship on the U.S. presidency
33. For example, see Bolingbroke, "Idea of a Patriot King," 378-79.
34. Hume, Political Essays, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 [1772]), 31.
35. Hume, Political Essays, 69.
36. De Lolme, Constitution of England, 147.
37. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979 [1765]), 234.
38. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I, 235.
39. The great exception to the general embrace of monarchy was Tom Paine.
40. See Federalist 69. The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: NAL Penguin, 1961), 419-20, where Hamilton notes that "it has been [falsely] insinuated" that the king's treaty-making authority is "subject to the revision, and stands in need of the ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of until it was broached upon the present occasion." Hamilton cites (the rather conservative) Blackstone as support. Also, in Federalist 73 (444), Hamilton concedes that the British crown had not used its "negative" for a lengthy period of time, yet seems to see this as a strategic choice on the crown's part rather than as evidence of significant institutional shifts.
41. See Federalist 69. The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: NAL Penguin, 1961), 419-20, where Hamilton notes that "it has been [falsely] insinuated" that the king's treaty-making authority is "subject to the revision, and stands in need of the ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of until it was broached upon the present occasion." Hamilton cites (the rather conservative) Blackstone as support. Also, in Federalist 73 (444), Hamilton concedes that the British crown had not used its "negative" for a lengthy period of time, yet seems to see this as a strategic choice on the crown's part rather than as evidence of significant institutional shifts.
42. The inauguration ceremony and state of the union address, for example, were modeled on British practice. McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History, 214-18.
43. Hamilton, "Speech in the Constitutional Convention on a Plan of Government," version recorded by James Madison, in Hamilton, Writings, 157. Madison's notes on Hamilton's address correspond to Robert Yates's (Hamilton, Writings, 159-66). Hamilton was not alone among the framers in harboring deep respect for monarchy; think, for example, of John Adams. However, his ideas exercised enormous influence on the U.S. presidency, and thus are examined in detail here. For an excellent concise survey of the intellectual backdrop to the framers' ideas about the presidency, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of The Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1996), 244-87. Rakove neglects the extent to which the framers' ideas built on longstanding ideas about monarchy.
44. Hamilton, "Speech in the Constitutional Convention on a Plan of Government," version recorded by James Madison, in Hamilton, Writings, 157. Madison's notes on Hamilton's address correspond to Robert Yates's (Hamilton, Writings, 159-66). Hamilton was not alone among the framers in harboring deep respect for monarchy; think, for example, of John Adams. However, his ideas exercised enormous influence on the U.S. presidency, and thus are examined in detail here. For an excellent concise survey of the intellectual backdrop to the framers' ideas about the presidency, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of The Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1996), 244-87. Rakove neglects the extent to which the framers' ideas built on longstanding ideas about monarchy.
45. Hamilton, "Speech in the Constitutional Convention on a Plan of Government," version recorded by James Madison, in Hamilton, Writings, 157. Madison's notes on Hamilton's address correspond to Robert Yates's (Hamilton, Writings, 159-66). Hamilton was not alone among the framers in harboring deep respect for monarchy; think, for example, of John Adams. However, his ideas exercised enormous influence on the U.S. presidency, and thus are examined in detail here. For an excellent concise survey of the intellectual backdrop to the framers' ideas about the presidency, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of The Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1996), 244-87. Rakove neglects the extent to which the framers' ideas built on longstanding ideas about monarchy.
46. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 156.
47. Karl-Friedrich Walling, Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999).
48. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 156.
49. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 156-57. See also "Letter to George Washington, July 3, 1787," Writings, 166-67.
50. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 156-57. See also "Letter to George Washington, July 3, 1787," Writings, 166-67.
51. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157; Federalist 22, 149. Thomas Hobbes, for example, made a similar point in his defense of monarchy (Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 19).
52. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157; Federalist 22, 149. Thomas Hobbes, for example, made a similar point in his defense of monarchy (Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 19).
53. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157; Federalist 22, 149. Thomas Hobbes, for example, made a similar point in his defense of monarchy (Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 19).
54. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157.
55. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157.
56. Hamilton, "Plan of Government," in Writings, 149.
57. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 158.
58. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157.
59. Traditional republican ideals of participation, for example, or a robust conception of the "common good," are missing here.
60. Some form of election may have characterized "Germanic" kingship, an influence on early English monarchy. See Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages (New York: Harper, 1956), xix, 7, 47-49. Medieval thinkers such as Marsilius of Padua also defended the election of kings as a way of guaranteeing their preeminence and virtue.
61. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 158. Many of Hamilton's subsequent reflections in Federalist 68, accordingly, are devoted to defending the electoral college.
62. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 158. Many of Hamilton's subsequent reflections in Federalist 68, accordingly, are devoted to defending the electoral college.
63. On September 6th, as the Convention's deliberations were coming to a close, Madison reports that "Mr. Hamilton said that he had been restrained [after making his ill-fated proposals in mid-June] from entering into discussions by his dislike of the scheme of government in general [its republican structure?]; but. . . he meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better than nothing" (589). On September 17th, Hamilton called for every member of the Convention to endorse the document, pointing out to his colleagues that "no man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his were known to be [!]; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other" (656) (Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966).
64. Hamilton, "Speech in Convention," 157.
65. Federalist 67, 407.
66. For Hamilton's responses to this accusation, see Writings, 749-50, 781-94. The accusation is too crude, since Hamilton ultimately accepts the necessity of some form of republican government for the United States. The more interesting question is whether his ideas about the executive smuggle monarchical elements into the U.S. constitutional system. Revealingly, even when replying to such critics (for example in a letter written on May 26, 1792), Hamilton insists that "it is yet to be determined by experience whether it [republican government] be consistent with that stability and order in Government which are essential to public strength & private security and happiness" (Writings, 750). For Hamilton, as for countless defenders of monarchy before him, stability and order were monarchy's greatest strengths.
67. For Hamilton's responses to this accusation, see Writings, 749-50, 781-94. The accusation is too crude, since Hamilton ultimately accepts the necessity of some form of republican government for the United States. The more interesting question is whether his ideas about the executive smuggle monarchical elements into the U.S. constitutional system. Revealingly, even when replying to such critics (for example in a letter written on May 26, 1792), Hamilton insists that "it is yet to be determined by experience whether it [republican government] be consistent with that stability and order in Government which are essential to public strength & private security and happiness" (Writings, 750). For Hamilton, as for countless defenders of monarchy before him, stability and order were monarchy's greatest strengths.
68. For an exception, see Landy and Milkis, Presidential Greatness, 15.
69. At first glance, this represents a significant break with the British monarchy, as Hamilton repeatedly claims in The Federalist Papers, at least if we accept conservative idealizations of the English monarchy (for example, in Montesquieu) at face value. However, if we recall the growing power of the British parliament in foreign policy even in the eighteenth century the comparison becomes more complicated.
70. See Robert J. Spitzer, "The President's Veto Power," 156-60; David Gray Adler, "The President's Pardon Power," 212-18, both in Inventing the American Presidency, ed. Tomas Cronin (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).
71. See Robert J. Spitzer, "The President's Veto Power," 156-60; David Gray Adler, "The President's Pardon Power," 212-18, both in Inventing the American Presidency, ed. Tomas Cronin (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).
72. See Robert J. Spitzer, "The President's Veto Power," 156-60; David Gray Adler, "The President's Pardon Power," 212-18, both in Inventing the American Presidency, ed. Tomas Cronin (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).
73. Harvey C. Mansfield, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 247-78, esp. 255-56. For reasons that should become clear later in this essay, I believe that Mansfield overstates the Machiavellian origins of modern executive power. As I hope to show, Hamilton's debt to traditional (Christian) ideas of kingship are significant.
74. In Federalist 28, for example, Hamilton writes that during an emergency, "the means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief" (178).
75. The Letters of Pacifiais and Helvidius with the Letters of Americanus, ed. Richard Loss (Delmar, New York: Scholars' Facsimiles, 1976 [1793]), where Madison accuses Hamilton of undertaking to import a royalist conception of prerogative into the operations of the U.S. government. Commenting on Locke and Montesquieu, Madison writes: "Both of them are too evidently warped by a regard to the particular government of England, to which one of them owed allegiance; and the other professed an admiration bordering on idolatry" On Locke, Madison continues: "The chapter on prerogative shows, how much the reason of the philosopher was clouded by the royalism of the Englishman" (56). To the extent that Hamilton builds on their ideas, Madison presciently observes, he reproduces their royalist institutional agenda.
76. This trend was noted by Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, 4th ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957). On presidential emergency power, see the classic study by Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Government: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 2002 [1948]), 207-87.
77. This trend was noted by Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, 4th ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957). On presidential emergency power, see the classic study by Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Government: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 2002 [1948]), 207-87.
78. After the revolution, only New York "established a chief executive office that was vested with any significant power" (McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History, 132). The New York Governor exercised a veto (which he shared with a "council of revision"), was empowered to call the legislature into session and could prorogue it for sixty days; he also possessed powers of pardon and reprieve, and was commander in chief of the New York military forces (McDonald, American Presidency, 134).
79. After the revolution, only New York "established a chief executive office that was vested with any significant power" (McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History, 132). The New York Governor exercised a veto (which he shared with a "council of revision"), was empowered to call the legislature into session and could prorogue it for sixty days; he also possessed powers of pardon and reprieve, and was commander in chief of the New York military forces (McDonald, American Presidency, 134).
80. Federalist 68, 414.
81. Federalist 71, 431; Federalist 72, 436.
82. Federalist 71, 431; Federalist 72, 436.
83. Federalist 72, 437.
84. Federalist 73, 444.
85. See again, Federalist 69, 419-20.
86. Federalist 74, 448.
87. In Federalist 69 (415), Hamilton summarizes this criticism.
88. Federalist 70, 425-26.
89. Federalist 70, 427-29.
90. See Hamilton's praise for De Lolme (Federalist 70, 430) and Blackstone (federalist 69, 419-20). Also, De Lolme, Constitution of England, 154-56, 192-96, 253-62; Blackstone, Commentaries, 242-43.
91. See Hamilton's praise for De Lolme (Federalist 70, 430) and Blackstone (federalist 69, 419-20). Also, De Lolme, Constitution of England, 154-56, 192-96, 253-62; Blackstone, Commentaries, 242-43.
92. See Hamilton's praise for De Lolme (Federalist 70, 430) and Blackstone (federalist 69, 419-20). Also, De Lolme, Constitution of England, 154-56, 192-96, 253-62; Blackstone, Commentaries, 242-43.
93. See Hamilton's praise for De Lolme (Federalist 70, 430) and Blackstone (federalist 69, 419-20). Also, De Lolme, Constitution of England, 154-56, 192-96, 253-62; Blackstone, Commentaries, 242-43.
94. Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention, 656.
95. See Federalist 6. Hamilton also notes: "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority" (Federalist 8, 68) .
96. See Federalist 6. Hamilton also notes: "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority" (Federalist 8, 68) .
97. St. Thomas Aquinas, "On Kingship," in The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Haner, 1953), 181.
98. William of Ockam, "Dialogue on the Rawer of Pope and Clergyf in A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 123.
99. Ockham, "Dialogue on the Power of Pope and Clergyf 125.
100. Dante, On Monarchy, ed. D. Nicholl (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), 11.
101. Dante, Monarchy, 14.
102. Ockam, Dialogue on the Power of Pope and Clergy, 164.
103. Mansfield, Taming the Prince, 266-67. Clinton Rossiter associates Hamilton's notion of executive energy with "confidence, dignity, authority," "getting things done," "strength," as well as the "use of power imaginatively and forcefully in the public interest." Needless to say, this suggests a certain amount of conceptual ambiguity Unfortunately, the ambiguity is probably Hamilton's. See Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), 21, 83, 162-63, 189, 252.
104. Mansfield, Taming the Prince, 266-67. Clinton Rossiter associates Hamilton's notion of executive energy with "confidence, dignity, authority," "getting things done," "strength," as well as the "use of power imaginatively and forcefully in the public interest." Needless to say, this suggests a certain amount of conceptual ambiguity Unfortunately, the ambiguity is probably Hamilton's. See Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), 21, 83, 162-63, 189, 252.
105. Francis D. Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative, 1603-49 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1939), 8. Paul Kleber Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 77-78.
106. Francis D. Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative, 1603-49 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1939), 8. Paul Kleber Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 77-78.
107. Aquinas, "On Princely Government," in Selected Political Writings, ed. A. P d'Entreves (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1954), 67.
108. Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pads, Irans. Alan Gewirth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 67.
109. A letter penned by Hamilton to Washington on July 30th 1792 is particularly interesting on this score. While responding to criticism of his monarchist impulses, Hamilton admits that " [a] very small number (not more than three or four) [of delegates at the Philadelphia Convention] manifested theoretical opinions favourable in the abstract to a constitution like that of Great Britain, but every one agreed that such a constitution except as the general distribution of departments and powers was out of the Question in reference to this Country. The Member who was most explicit on this point (A Member from New York [surely Hamilton himself]) declared in strong terms that a republican theory ought to be adhered to in this Country as long as there was any chance of its success-that the idea of perfect equality of political rights among the citizens, exclusive of all permanent or hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to engage the good wishes of every good man, whatever might be his theoretic doubts. . .and that the endeavour ought then to be to secure it to a better chance of success by a government more capable of energy and order" (Hamilton, Writings, 783). Even if we ignore Hamilton's attempt to downplay the enthusiastic monarchist tones of his 1787 Convention speech, it is interesting that he still admits that his (presidentialist) model of the separation of powers builds directly on his (idealized) interpretation of the British Constitution's "general distribution of departments and powers." By implication, Hamilton might be read as conceding that the U.S. presidency builds on the British (monarchical) executive. It is also interesting that Hamilton reiterates his view that his programmatic agenda might be accomplished within a "republican" structure, here characterized by a commitment to equal political rights and concomitant hostility to hereditary or permanent political privilege. Hamilton conveniently drops any reference to his June 1787 advocacy of an "elected monarch," which arguably is the linchpin of Hamilton's uneasy mix of monarchist and republican ideas: the U.S. presidency would rest on the republican principle of free elections and equal political rights, but it nonetheless would be modeled in accordance with key facets of the British crown in order to assure the "energy and order" only monarchy hitherto had achieved.
110. As Juan Linz notes, "all presidential democracies were inspired by the U.S. model" ("Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" 5). Hamilton exerted a significant influence on the U.S. presidency, though contemporary presidentialism includes some notable elements (for example, plebiscitarianism) alien to Hamilton's model. For a useful conceptualization of the key differences between parliamentary and presidential versions of liberal democracy, see Douglas V. Vemey, "Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 31-47.
111. As Juan Linz notes, "all presidential democracies were inspired by the U.S. model" ("Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" 5). Hamilton exerted a significant influence on the U.S. presidency, though contemporary presidentialism includes some notable elements (for example, plebiscitarianism) alien to Hamilton's model. For a useful conceptualization of the key differences between parliamentary and presidential versions of liberal democracy, see Douglas V. Vemey, "Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 31-47.
112. The latter example refers to a recent incident at Ohio State University, where student opponents of the president's Iraq war plans were prevented from waving anti-war banners at a large meeting otherwise open to them and their peers.
113. Federalist 70, 424; Federalist 75, 452-53.
114. Federalist 70, 424; Federalist 75, 452-53.
115. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" 6.
116. In his analysis of Bonapartism, Karl Marx anticipated this development. See The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International, 1963), 32-33.
117. Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995);
118. Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
119. Recall Weber's suggestive observation that appeals to charismatic authority typically surface "in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress." from Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 245.
120. In order to understand the plebiscitary character of the U.S. presidency an analysis of its evolution after the founding (with special focus on Andrew Jackson) is necessary Unfortunately that important task would take us beyond the confines of this essay
121. Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
122. Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
123. On the present situation, see Andrew Arato, "The Bush Tribunals and the Specter of Dictatorship," Constellations 9 (2002): 457-76.
124. Ackerman, "The New Separation of Powers," 641.
125. Ackerman, "New Separation of Powers," 712.
126. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Matter?" 18.
127. Ackerman, "The New Separation of Powers," 661. In a parliamentary system, the governing party's backbenchers "will turn with sudden ferocity when the polls reveal that their leader's personality has become a permanent liability. Better to dump the guy immediately and replace him with somebody who will present the party's program with a more pleasing face at the next election. Even so dominating a persona as Margaret Thatcher found that British backbenchers were utterly ruthless once polls revealed that the Iron Lady had become an obstacle to future success" (658).
128. To the extent that Weber sees "a particularly important case of the charismatic legitimation of institutions" in the "rise of kingship," while simultaneously suggesting a special relationship between presidentialism and charismatic rule, he implicitly draws a close conceptual link between (charismatic) kings and their modem successor, the plebiscitary president (Weber, Economy and Society, 241, 266-69, 1141-42, 1451-62).
129. This is a complicated historical and conceptual story with many twists and turns.
130. Probably inspired by Aristotle's discussion of kingship and the law, this is also a central theme in medieval defenses of monarchy. For example, see John of Salisbury Policmticus, 47; Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pads, 56-58. The need for (divine) royal "equity" is closely linked to the pardon power; it is also revealing that Blackstone considers both the royal veto and pardon power as examples of royal "prerogative" (Blackstone, Commentaries, 243-44). In short, these distinct features of royal authority were intimately connected in the traditional view, since they all rested on the need for the intervention of the "superior" person of the king.
131. Probably inspired by Aristotle's discussion of kingship and the law, this is also a central theme in medieval defenses of monarchy. For example, see John of Salisbury Policmticus, 47; Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pads, 56-58. The need for (divine) royal "equity" is closely linked to the pardon power; it is also revealing that Blackstone considers both the royal veto and pardon power as examples of royal "prerogative" (Blackstone, Commentaries, 243-44). In short, these distinct features of royal authority were intimately connected in the traditional view, since they all rested on the need for the intervention of the "superior" person of the king.
132. Probably inspired by Aristotle's discussion of kingship and the law, this is also a central theme in medieval defenses of monarchy. For example, see John of Salisbury Policmticus, 47; Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pads, 56-58. The need for (divine) royal "equity" is closely linked to the pardon power; it is also revealing that Blackstone considers both the royal veto and pardon power as examples of royal "prerogative" (Blackstone, Commentaries, 243-44). In short, these distinct features of royal authority were intimately connected in the traditional view, since they all rested on the need for the intervention of the "superior" person of the king.
133. Hanson, From Kingdom to Commonwealth, 72-73, 93, 101. Also, on the common law and royal discretion, see Charles Ogilvie, The King's Government and the Common Law, 1471-1641 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).
134. Hanson, From Kingdom to Commonwealth, 72-73, 93, 101. Also, on the common law and royal discretion, see Charles Ogilvie, The King's Government and the Common Law, 1471-1641 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).
135. See Hanson, From Kingdom to Commonwealth; Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative.
136. Scigliano, "The President's 'Prerogative Power,'" 236-44; Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative; Ogilvie, The King's Government.
137. Scigliano, "The President's 'Prerogative Power,'" 236-44; Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative; Ogilvie, The King's Government.
138. Federalist 73, 443.
139. Federalist 74, 447-49.
140. Federalist 73, 443.
141. For the details, see John Dinan, "The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition,' Polity 35 (2003): 389-418.
142. Locke, Second Treatise, Chapter 14, para. 166-67.