Internal market failure: A framework for diagnosing firm inefficiency

Journal of Management Studies

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 431-457

  Vining, Aidan R ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 14544308214     PISSN: 00222380     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6486.00346     Document Type: Article

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