Varieties in capitalism, varieties of association: Collaborative learning in American industry, 1900 to 1925

Politics and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 46-87

  Berk, Gerald ^a   Schneiberg, Marc ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Associations; Benchmarking; Economic governance; Institutionalism; Learning; Reflexivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 14544282009     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329204272390     Document Type: Review

References (238)

1. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
2. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
3. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
4. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
5. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
6. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
7. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
8. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
9. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
10. In developing these findings, we add to a growing body of work that documents organizational diversity within national economies during the Fordist era. However, we go beyond work that often focuses on a single industry or case to add a form and a whole series of industries to the accumulating anomalies for uniform institutional images of national economies. See Phillip P. Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip P. Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 27-90; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Howell J. Harris, "Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of Philadelphia," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Charles F. Säbel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Gerald Berk, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929," Social Science History 3 (1996): 375-400; Marc Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance," Politics and Society 27 (1999): 67-103; and Marc Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930," in Michael Lounsbury and Marc Vantresca, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2002).
11. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New' Institutionalism," in Larry Dodd and Calvin Jilson, eds., The Dynamics of Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review of American Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404; Colin Crouch and Henry Farrell, "Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/5, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln. mpg.de (2002); and Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, "Introduction: Convergence or Diversity? Stability and Change in German and Japanese Capitalism," in Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
12. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New' Institutionalism," in Larry Dodd and Calvin Jilson, eds., The Dynamics of Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review of American Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404; Colin Crouch and Henry Farrell, "Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/5, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln. mpg.de (2002); and Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, "Introduction: Convergence or Diversity? Stability and Change in German and Japanese Capitalism," in Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
13. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New' Institutionalism," in Larry Dodd and Calvin Jilson, eds., The Dynamics of Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review of American Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404; Colin Crouch and Henry Farrell, "Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/5, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln. mpg.de (2002); and Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, "Introduction: Convergence or Diversity? Stability and Change in German and Japanese Capitalism," in Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
14. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New' Institutionalism," in Larry Dodd and Calvin Jilson, eds., The Dynamics of Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review of American Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404; Colin Crouch and Henry Farrell, "Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/5, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln. mpg.de (2002); and Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, "Introduction: Convergence or Diversity? Stability and Change in German and Japanese Capitalism," in Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
15. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
16. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
17. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
18. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
19. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
20. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
21. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
22. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
23. Charles F. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," in Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 1 (1997): 229-51; Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 2003). For a more extended discussion, see Gerald Berk, American Possibilities: Brandeis, Antitrust and Trade Associations, 1890-1935, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2004).
24. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
25. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
26. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
27. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
28. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
29. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
30. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
31. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
32. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
33. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
34. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
35. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Herman Daems, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise: A New Perspective," in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1981); Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Elizabeth Sanders, "Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition and Anti-Trust Politics in America," Studies in American Political Development 1 (1986), 142-214; Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1900); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Charles Perrow, Organizing America and Concentrating Power in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
36. For reviews, see Berk, "Communities of Competitors"; Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions"; and M. Schneiberg, "It Can - And Did - Happen Here: Association and Inter-Firm competition in the American Fire Insurance Industry," paper presented at
37. For reviews, see Berk, "Communities of Competitors"; Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions"; and M. Schneiberg, "It Can - And Did - Happen Here: Association and Inter-Firm competition in the American Fire Insurance Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Madison, Wisconsin, July 1999.
38. For reviews, see Berk, "Communities of Competitors"; Schneiberg, "Political and Institutional Conditions"; and M. Schneiberg, "It Can - And Did - Happen Here: Association and Inter-Firm competition in the American Fire Insurance Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Madison, Wisconsin, July 1999.
39. Chandler, The Visible Hand; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Logic of Coordinating American Manufacturing Sectors," in John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon L. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
40. Chandler, The Visible Hand; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Logic of Coordinating American Manufacturing Sectors," in John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon L. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
41. Chandler, The Visible Hand; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Logic of Coordinating American Manufacturing Sectors," in John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon L. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
42. Chandler, The Visible Hand; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Logic of Coordinating American Manufacturing Sectors," in John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon L. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
43. Chandler, The Visible Hand; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Logic of Coordinating American Manufacturing Sectors," in John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon L. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
44. Chandler, The Visible Hand; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Logic of Coordinating American Manufacturing Sectors," in John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon L. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
45. Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Wave in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?" in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustufson, and Oliver E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage, 1990); Best, New Competition; Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control; Roy, Socializing Capital; and Frank Dobbin and Timothy J. Dowd, "The Market That Anti-Trust Built," American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 631-57.
46. Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Wave in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?" in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustufson, and Oliver E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage, 1990); Best, New Competition; Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control; Roy, Socializing Capital; and Frank Dobbin and Timothy J. Dowd, "The Market That Anti-Trust Built," American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 631-57.
47. Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Wave in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?" in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustufson, and Oliver E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage, 1990); Best, New Competition; Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control; Roy, Socializing Capital; and Frank Dobbin and Timothy J. Dowd, "The Market That Anti-Trust Built," American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 631-57.
48. Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Wave in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?" in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustufson, and Oliver E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage, 1990); Best, New Competition; Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control; Roy, Socializing Capital; and Frank Dobbin and Timothy J. Dowd, "The Market That Anti-Trust Built," American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 631-57.
49. Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Wave in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?" in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustufson, and Oliver E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage, 1990); Best, New Competition; Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control; Roy, Socializing Capital; and Frank Dobbin and Timothy J. Dowd, "The Market That Anti-Trust Built," American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 631-57.
50. Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Wave in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?" in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustufson, and Oliver E. Williamson, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage, 1990); Best, New Competition; Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control; Roy, Socializing Capital; and Frank Dobbin and Timothy J. Dowd, "The Market That Anti-Trust Built," American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 631-57.
51. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
52. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
53. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
54. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
55. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
56. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
57. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3-21; Paul W. McAvoy, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (Washington, D.C.: American Institute, 1977); A. Jaquemin and M. Slade, "Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Merger," in Richard Schmalansee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989); Paul Joskow and N. Rose, "The Effects of Economic Regulation," in Schmalansee and Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1; Richard H. K. Victor, Contrived Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
58. John R. Bowman, "The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists," Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35-88; John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gordon, New Deals; Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pepper D. Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-307; and Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
59. John R. Bowman, "The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists," Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35-88; John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gordon, New Deals; Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pepper D. Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-307; and Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
60. John R. Bowman, "The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists," Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35-88; John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gordon, New Deals; Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pepper D. Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-307; and Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
61. John R. Bowman, "The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists," Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35-88; John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gordon, New Deals; Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pepper D. Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-307; and Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
62. John R. Bowman, "The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists," Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35-88; John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gordon, New Deals; Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pepper D. Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-307; and Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
63. John R. Bowman, "The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists," Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35-88; John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gordon, New Deals; Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pepper D. Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-307; and Pepper D. Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
64. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; and Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, 8-11, 111-12, 129-36. For a more general discussion of the role of associations in contemporary capitalist democracy, see Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, Associations and Democracy (New York: Verso, 1995).
65. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; and Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, 8-11, 111-12, 129-36. For a more general discussion of the role of associations in contemporary capitalist democracy, see Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, Associations and Democracy (New York: Verso, 1995).
66. Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; and Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, 8-11, 111-12, 129-36. For a more general discussion of the role of associations in contemporary capitalist democracy, see Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, Associations and Democracy (New York: Verso, 1995).
67. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
68. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
69. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
70. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
71. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
72. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
73. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
74. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
75. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
76. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
77. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
78. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
79. On arguments about isomorphism, diffusion and the national industrial cultures, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 147-60; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-40; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Meyer, John Boli, et al., "World Society and the Nation State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1441-81; David John Frank, John Meyer, and David Miyahara, "The Individualist Polity and the Prevalence of Professionalized Psychology: A Cross National Study," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 360-77; and John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture and World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organizations," American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 171-90. On the arguments about complementarities and interlock, see, David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 1-68; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany and the United States," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 265-310; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997), 132-47; J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, "Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production," in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism, 1-47; Ronald Dore, "The Distinctiveness of Japan," in Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, 21-32; and Richard Whitley, "Varieties of Capitalism," in Richard Whitley, ed., Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
80. Milton Nels Nelson, Open Price Associations, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences 10, no. 2 (June 1922): 24-25.
81. Arthur Jerome Eddy, The New Competition (New York: Appleton, 1912), 100-1.
82. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade associations or similar institutions can perform a clearing house function and collect and disseminate "average" past prices or current prices, which, with very little imagination, can be transformed into current minimum prices. The same end can be achieved through the circulation of studies, which calculate "average" or "typical" costs. A more subtle method of communicating cost (and price) data among competing firms is through "cost education"-making sure that capitalists know all of their costs and circulating rules of thumb that tend to equalize costs (at a relatively high level) throughout an industry. See also Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets. For a more general appeal to conceptualize business associations within an institutionally situated game theory approach as mechanisms to thicken expectations and otherwise solve coordination problems via information, see Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," 9-12; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
83. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade associations or similar institutions can perform a clearing house function and collect and disseminate "average" past prices or current prices, which, with very little imagination, can be transformed into current minimum prices. The same end can be achieved through the circulation of studies, which calculate "average" or "typical" costs. A more subtle method of communicating cost (and price) data among competing firms is through "cost education"-making sure that capitalists know all of their costs and circulating rules of thumb that tend to equalize costs (at a relatively high level) throughout an industry. See also Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets. For a more general appeal to conceptualize business associations within an institutionally situated game theory approach as mechanisms to thicken expectations and otherwise solve coordination problems via information, see Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," 9-12; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
84. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade
85. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade associations or similar institutions can perform a clearing house function and collect and disseminate "average" past prices or current prices, which, with very little imagination, can be transformed into current minimum prices. The same end can be achieved through the circulation of studies, which calculate "average" or "typical" costs. A more subtle method of communicating cost (and price) data among competing firms is through "cost education"-making sure that capitalists know all of their costs and circulating rules of thumb that tend to equalize costs (at a relatively high level) throughout an industry. See also Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets. For a more general appeal to conceptualize business associations within an institutionally situated game theory approach as mechanisms to thicken expectations and otherwise solve coordination problems via information, see Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," 9-12; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
86. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade associations or similar institutions can perform a clearing house function and collect and disseminate "average" past prices or current prices, which, with very little imagination, can be transformed into current minimum prices. The same end can be achieved through the circulation of studies, which calculate "average" or "typical" costs. A more subtle method of communicating cost (and price) data among competing firms is through "cost education"-making sure that capitalists know all of their costs and circulating rules of thumb that tend to equalize costs (at a relatively high level) throughout an industry. See also Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets. For a more general appeal to conceptualize business associations within an institutionally situated game theory approach as mechanisms to thicken expectations and otherwise solve coordination problems via information, see Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," 9-12; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
87. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade associations or similar institutions can perform a clearing house function and collect and disseminate "average" past prices or current prices, which, with very little imagination, can be transformed into current minimum prices. The same end can be achieved through the circulation of studies, which calculate "average" or "typical" costs. A more subtle method of communicating cost (and price) data among competing firms is through "cost education"-making sure that capitalists know all of their costs and circulating rules of thumb that tend to equalize costs (at a relatively high level) throughout an industry. See also Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets. For a more general appeal to conceptualize business associations within an institutionally situated game theory approach as mechanisms to thicken expectations and otherwise solve coordination problems via information, see Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," 9-12; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
88. See Bowman, "The Politics of the Market," 51, where he writes, When direct communication is impossible [because of antitrust], trade associations or similar institutions can perform a clearing house function and collect and disseminate "average" past prices or current prices, which, with very little imagination, can be transformed into current minimum prices. The same end can be achieved through the circulation of studies, which calculate "average" or "typical" costs. A more subtle method of communicating cost (and price) data among competing firms is through "cost education"-making sure that capitalists know all of their costs and circulating rules of thumb that tend to equalize costs (at a relatively high level) throughout an industry. See also Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets. For a more general appeal to conceptualize business associations within an institutionally situated game theory approach as mechanisms to thicken expectations and otherwise solve coordination problems via information, see Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," 9-12; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
89. Eddy, The New Competition, 129-30.
90. Eddy, The New Competition, 148 (italics in original).
91. See J. H. Foy, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, New York City, March 25-26, 1924, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, 84-87 (hereafter cited as CofC, March 1924); Robert Belt, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 23, 1923, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Ace. # 1960, 4-5 (hereafter cited as CofC, October 1923); Austin Cheney, CofC, March 1924, 92; "7th International Cost Conference," National Association of Cost Accountants, NACA Yearbook, 1926 (New York: National Association of Cost Accountants, 1921), 34 (hereafter cited as NACA Yearbook with year); and George N. Voorhees, "The Story of Production Records," Typotehtae Bulletin 21, no. 17 (July 27, 1925): 281.
92. See J. H. Foy, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, New York City, March 25-26, 1924, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, 84-87 (hereafter cited as CofC, March 1924); Robert Belt, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 23, 1923, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Ace. # 1960, 4-5 (hereafter cited as CofC, October 1923); Austin Cheney, CofC, March 1924, 92; "7th International Cost Conference," National Association of Cost Accountants, NACA Yearbook, 1926 (New York: National Association of Cost Accountants, 1921), 34 (hereafter cited as NACA Yearbook with year); and George N. Voorhees, "The Story of Production Records," Typotehtae Bulletin 21, no. 17 (July 27, 1925): 281.
93. See J. H. Foy, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, New York City, March 25-26, 1924, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, 84-87 (hereafter cited as CofC, March 1924); Robert Belt, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 23, 1923, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Ace. # 1960, 4-5 (hereafter cited as CofC, October 1923); Austin Cheney, CofC, March 1924, 92; "7th International Cost Conference," National Association of Cost Accountants, NACA Yearbook, 1926 (New York: National Association of Cost Accountants, 1921), 34 (hereafter cited as NACA Yearbook with year); and George N. Voorhees, "The Story of Production Records," Typotehtae Bulletin 21, no. 17 (July 27, 1925): 281.
94. See J. H. Foy, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, New York City, March 25-26, 1924, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, 84-87 (hereafter cited as CofC, March 1924); Robert Belt, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 23, 1923, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Ace. # 1960, 4-5 (hereafter cited as CofC, October 1923); Austin Cheney, CofC, March 1924, 92; "7th International Cost Conference," National Association of Cost Accountants, NACA Yearbook, 1926 (New York: National Association of Cost Accountants, 1921), 34 (hereafter cited as NACA Yearbook with year); and George N. Voorhees, "The Story of Production Records," Typotehtae Bulletin 21, no. 17 (July 27, 1925): 281.
95. See J. H. Foy, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, New York City, March 25-26, 1924, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, 84-87 (hereafter cited as CofC, March 1924); Robert Belt, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 23, 1923, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Papers, Ace. 3 1960, 4-5 (hereafter cited as CofC, October 1923); Austin Cheney, CofC, March 1924, 92; "7th International Cost Conference," National Association of Cost Accountants, NACA Yearbook, 1926 (New York: National Association of Cost Accountants, 1921), 34 (hereafter cited as NACA Yearbook with year); and George N. Voorhees, "The Story of Production Records," Typotehtae Bulletin 21, no. 17 (July 27, 1925): 281.
96. NACA Yearbook, 1921, 163-64.
97. Uniform Cost Accounting Conference held at Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, October 28-29, 1924, 81, Hagley Museum and Library, Papers of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Ace. # 1960 (hereafter cited as CofC, October 1924).
98. Understanding the sources, character, and consequence of this policy reflexivity is the topic for another article. Here we simply want to document how antitrust authorities came to embrace collaborative learning and developmental associations.
99. Edward M. Hurley, Awakening of Business (New York: Doubleday, 1917), 57.
100. Hurley, Awakening, 59.
101. Nelson B. Gaskill, "The Reason for Cost Accounting," NACA Yearbook 1926, 21-24; Nelson B. Gaskill, chairman, Federal Trade Commission, "Some Aspects of Price Cut-ting," address to National Wholesale Grocers, June 8, 1922, 3, Federal Trade Commission Library.
102. Nelson B. Gaskill, "The Reason for Cost Accounting," NACA Yearbook 1926, 21-24; Nelson B. Gaskill, chairman, Federal Trade Commission, "Some Aspects of Price Cut-ting," address to National Wholesale Grocers, June 8, 1922, 3, Federal Trade Commission Library.
103. See Federal Trade Commission, Fundamentals of a Cost System for Manufacturers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916); and Federal Trade Commission, "Helpful Activities to Strengthen American Business," January 1916, NARA, RG122, Box 3390, Act 5, Gov 5.
104. See Federal Trade Commission, Fundamentals of a Cost System for Manufacturers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916); and Federal Trade Commission, "Helpful Activities to Strengthen American Business," January 1916, NARA, RG122, Box 3390, Act 5, Gov 5.
105. Gerald Berk, "Discursive Cartels: Uniform Cost Accounting among American Manufacturers before the New Deal," Business and Economic History 26, no. 1 (Fall 1997): 229-51.
106. See address of NACA's second president, CofC March 1924, 51-57.
107. For discussions among the accountants of the importance of associational systems, see NACA Yearbook, 1921, 13-14, 39; NACA Yearbook, 1922, 16; and NACA Yearbook, 1923, 14, 19-20.
108. For discussions among the accountants of the importance of associational systems, see NACA Yearbook, 1921, 13-14, 39; NACA Yearbook, 1922, 16; and NACA Yearbook, 1923, 14, 19-20.
109. For discussions among the accountants of the importance of associational systems, see NACA Yearbook, 1921, 13-14, 39; NACA Yearbook, 1922, 16; and NACA Yearbook, 1923, 14, 19-20.
110. On the Chamber of Commerce, see "The New Umpires of American Business," and "The National Chamber Appoints a Cooperating Committee," Nation's Business (April 15, 1915): 7-8; and "Report of the Federal Trade Committee," Chamber of Commerce, Minutes of the Fourth Annual Meeting, 1916, 138, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, Box 2.
111. On the Chamber of Commerce, see "The New Umpires of American Business," and "The National Chamber Appoints a Cooperating Committee," Nation's Business (April 15, 1915): 7-8; and "Report of the Federal Trade Committee," Chamber of Commerce, Minutes of the Fourth Annual Meeting, 1916, 138, Hagley Museum and Library, Ace. # 1960, Box 2.
112. CofC, October 1923, 87-91; CofC, March 1924, 3-5; and CofC, October 1924,57-59.
113. CofC, October 1923, 87-91; CofC, March 1924, 3-5; and CofC, October 1924,57-59.
114. CofC, October 1923, 87-91; CofC, March 1924, 3-5; and CofC, October 1924,57-59.
115. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
116. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
117. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
118. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
119. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
120. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
121. Bowman, "Politics of the Market"; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action; Gordon, New Deals; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Hall and Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism"; Culpepper, "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation"; and Culpepper, Creating Cooperation.
122. S. V. Dunkel, CofC, October 1923, 14-17.
123. R. E. Little, "The Results of Twelve Month's Intensive Work in the Milk Industry," CofC, October 1923, 3-4.
124. S. V. Dunkel, CofC, October 1923, 14-17.
125. Eric A. Camman, Basic Standard Costs (New York: American Institute Publishing, 1932), 34-35. For evidence of Camman's vice presidency, see NACA letter to Cost Accounting Unit of the Research and Planning Division of the NRA, RG 9, Entry 256, Box 1.
126. Eric A. Camman, Basic Standard Costs (New York: American Institute Publishing, 1932), 34-35. For evidence of Camman's vice presidency, see NACA letter to Cost Accounting Unit of the Research and Planning Division of the NRA, RG 9, Entry 256, Box 1.
127. For the experience in Portland Cement, see CofC, October 1923, 34; in paper boxes, see CofC, October 1924, 70;
128. For the experience in Portland Cement, see CofC, October 1923, 34; in paper boxes, see CofC, October 1924, 70;
129. in cotton finishing, see G. A. McClatchie, chairman of the Cost Committee of the National Association of Cotton Finishers, CofC, March 1924, 152-55;
130. in foundries, see W. B. Greenlee, chairman of the Committee on Costs of the American Foundrymen's Association, "Section E-Cost Accounting Committees," CofC, October 1923, 6;
131. in tents and awnings, see CofC, March 1924, 175-77;
132. and in photo engraving, see CofC, October 1924, 66-67.
133. Charles R. Stevenson, "The Future of Trade Association Cost Work," NACA Year-book, 1923, 297-98; Ronald Zinn, CofC, March 1924, 113-14; and T. J. Bolitho, International Milk Dealers' Association, CofC, October 1924, 20.
134. Charles R. Stevenson, "The Future of Trade Association Cost Work," NACA Year-book, 1923, 297-98; Ronald Zinn, CofC, March 1924, 113-14; and T. J. Bolitho, International Milk Dealers' Association, CofC, October 1924, 20.
135. Charles R. Stevenson, "The Future of Trade Association Cost Work," NACA Year-book, 1923, 297-98; Ronald Zinn, CofC, March 1924, 113-14; and T. J. Bolitho, International Milk Dealers' Association, CofC, October 1924, 20.
136. On the use of loose-leaf binders, see George J. Warmbold Jr., vice president of the Printing Ink Cost Bureau, CofC, October 1924, 5-11.
137. W. B. Lawrence, director, Cost Accounting & Statistical Department, American Photo-Engravers' Assn., CofC, March 1924, 24.
138. W. B. Lawrence, director, Cost Accounting & Statistical Department, American Photo-Engravers' Assn., CofC, March 1924, 24.
139. G. A. Ware, Newsprint Service Bureau, CofC, March 1924, 166-172.
140. Charles R. Stevenson, "The Future of Trade Association Cost Work," NACA Yearbook, 1923, 297-301; and Stevenson's 1926 address before ATAE on Standard Costs.
141. Charles R. Stevenson, "The Future of Trade Association Cost Work," NACA Yearbook, 1923, 297-301; and Stevenson's 1926 address before ATAE on Standard Costs.
142. Cited in U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Open Price Associations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929), 12.
143. Charles R. Stevenson, "The Economic Effect of Taking Business at or Below Cost," NACA Yearbook, 1927, 25.
144. NACA Yearbook, 1934, 63-64.
145. UTA Department of Industrial Information, "Economic and Industrial Relations Background," May 1922, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG122, Box 216, File 2/459-2.
146. Leona M. Powell, The History of the United Typothetae of American (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926). See also Typographical Journal 36, no. 5 (May 1910): 612.
147. Leona M. Powell, The History of the United Typothetae of American (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926). See also Typographical Journal 36, no. 5 (May 1910): 612.
148. Nelson B. Gaskill, Profit and Social Security: A Study of Costs, Claims and Controls under Capitalism (New York: Harper & Bros., 1935), 124-28.
149. W. R. Ashe, "The Value of the Standard Cost Finding System to Management," Typothetae Bulletin 32, no. 7 (November 17, 1930): 231 -34, quote on 233, emphasis added.
150. On Form 9-H, see Elmer J. Koch, The Standard Book on Cost Finding for Printers (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1928), 31-33; United Typothetae of America, United Typothetae Standard Cost Finding System (Chicago: UTA, 1927), 6-19, 24-25; "Resolutions Submitted by the Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1913), 107-8.
151. On Form 9-H, see Elmer J. Koch, The Standard Book on Cost Finding for Printers (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1928), 31-33; United Typothetae of America, United Typothetae Standard Cost Finding System (Chicago: UTA, 1927), 6-19, 24-25; "Resolutions Submitted by the Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1913), 107-8.
152. On Form 9-H, see Elmer J. Koch, The Standard Book on Cost Finding for Printers (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1928), 31-33; United Typothetae of America, United Typothetae Standard Cost Finding System (Chicago: UTA, 1927), 6-19, 24-25; "Resolutions Submitted by the Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1913), 107-8.
153. On departmentalization, see F. I. Ellick, Omaha (member of cost commission), "Exposition of the Standard Cost Finding System," in Proceedings of the Second International Cost Congress of Employing Printers of America (Chicago: American Printers' Cost Commission, 1910), 76-84; and F. I. Ellick, "Cost Accounting," Typographical Journal 44, no. 1 (January 1914): 11.
154. On departmentalization, see F. I. Ellick, Omaha (member of cost commission), "Exposition of the Standard Cost Finding System," in Proceedings of the Second International Cost Congress of Employing Printers of America (Chicago: American Printers' Cost Commission, 1910), 76-84; and F. I. Ellick, "Cost Accounting," Typographical Journal 44, no. 1 (January 1914): 11.
155. On product costing, or the "productive hour method," see F. I. Ellick, "The Results a Cost System Should Bring," in Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae of America, 1910 (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1910).
156. On product costing, or the "productive hour method," see F. I. Ellick, "The Results a Cost System Should Bring," in Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae of America, 1910 (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1910).
157. "A Few Things the Cost System Has Done for the JB Lyon Co.," Proceedings of the Second International Cost Congress of Employing Printers of America (Chicago: American Printers' Cost Commission, 1910), 33-35.
158. On the use of "fillers," see Testimony of Frank W. Fillmore in Hearings re: FTC v. UTA, National Archives, NARA, RG122, Box 217, File # 459-2-1, 1055, 1062-63. On stationery and other sales taken at a loss, see Ellick, "The Results a Cost System Should Bring."
159. On the use of "fillers," see Testimony of Frank W. Fillmore in Hearings re: FTC v. UTA, National Archives, NARA, RG122, Box 217, File # 459-2-1, 1055, 1062-63. On stationery and other sales taken at a loss, see Ellick, "The Results a Cost System Should Bring."
160. Mabel H. Dwyer, "Departmental Cost Analysis," in Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Convention of the UTA (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1930); also in Typothetae Bulletin 32, no. 3 (October 27, 1930): 100-3.
161. Mabel H. Dwyer, "Departmental Cost Analysis," in Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Convention of the UTA (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1930); also in Typothetae Bulletin 32, no. 3 (October 27, 1930): 100-3.
162. Powell, History of the UTA, 168-73; and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1916), 45-46.
163. Powell, History of the UTA, 168-73; and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1916), 45-46.
164. Powell, History of the UTA, 168-73; and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1916), 45-46.
165. Powell, History of the UTA, 168-73; and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1916), 45-46.
166. George N. Voorhees, "The Use of Production Records: How Interest in Records Work has Spread-Necessity of Accurate Estimating-Typothetae Production Records Provide Accurate Efficiency Gauge," in Proceedings of the Thirty-ninth Annual Convention (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1925); also in Typothetae Bulletin (October 26, 1925): 136.
167. George N. Voorhees, "The Use of Production Records: How Interest in Records Work has Spread-Necessity of Accurate Estimating-Typothetae Production Records Provide Accurate Efficiency Gauge," in Proceedings of the Thirty-ninth Annual Convention (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1925); also in Typothetae Bulletin (October 26, 1925): 136.
168. George N. Voorhees, "Better Pricing of the Product of the Printing Plant," address before the Convention of the Seventh District Typothetae Federation of Springfield, Ohio (November 9, 1920). NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2, 8-9.
169. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
170. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
171. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
172. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
173. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
174. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
175. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
176. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
177. For UTA annual membership from 1888 to 1926, see Powell, History of the UTA, 192-93. For figures on the growth of local and regional associations, and cost system distribution, see Proceedings of the Twenty Sixth Annual Convention of the UTA, September 3-6, 1912, 33-37; Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1914, 97-98; Proceedings of the 30th Annual Convention United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1916, 39; Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 21-22; and Proceedings of the First Printers'Cost Congress of the Southeastern States, April 20, 1911. For a list of new locals, see Proceedings of Twenty-seventh Annual Convention of the United Typothetae and Franklin Clubs of America, 1913, 27-29. On the growth of the composite statement, see H. W. J. Meyer, "Report of the American Cost Commission," in Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917,89-91. A year later, the figures on the composite statement were very much the same; see Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 24.
178. "Meeting of the Executive Council of the UTA and the Advisory Committee of the Allied Interests, August 23 and 24, 1918," 3. NARA, RG 122, Box 216, File 2/459-2.
179. "Development of the Three Year Plan," Resume of Progress made by the UTA as Reported to Representatives of the Allied Industries at a Meeting with the Executive Council of the UTA on January 23, 1920; and Edward T. Miller, "Uniform Cost Systems," American Trade Association Executives, Proceedings and Addresses, Second Annual Convention, 1921, 67.
180. "Development of the Three Year Plan," Resume of Progress made by the UTA as Reported to Representatives of the Allied Industries at a Meeting with the Executive Council of the UTA on January 23, 1920; and Edward T. Miller, "Uniform Cost Systems," American Trade Association Executives, Proceedings and Addresses, Second Annual Convention, 1921, 67.
181. E. T. Miller, CofC October 1924, 92; and Testimony of Miller, in the Official Report of the Proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, Docket 459, FTC v UTA, July 5, 1922, 982, 990-991, in NARA, RG 122, Box 217, File # 459-2-1.
182. E. T. Miller, CofC October 1924, 92; and Testimony of Miller, in the Official Report of the Proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, Docket 459, FTC v UTA, July 5, 1922, 982, 990-991, in NARA, RG 122, Box 217, File # 459-2-1.
183. W. O. Foote, "Will the Use of the Cost System Cause Loss of Business, and the Results?" in Proceedings of the Second International Cost Congress of Employing Printers of America (Chicago: American Printers' Cost Commission, 1910), 114-18.
184. Quoted in Miller, "Uniform Methods and Standardized Costs," 150-51.
185. Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 7 (January 1918): 3.
186. Mabel H. Dwyer, "Departmental Cost Analysis," in Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Convention of the UTA (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1930); also in Typothetae Bulletin 32, no. 3 (October 27, 1930): 100-3.
187. Mabel H. Dwyer, "Departmental Cost Analysis," in Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Convention of the UTA (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1930); also in Typothetae Bulletin 32, no. 3 (October 27, 1930): 100-3.
188. Reported by George N. Voorhees, "Management and the Accountant," Typothetae Bulletin (October 26,1925): 143-45.
189. Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae of America, May 17-19,1910 (Assn, 1910), 29-97; and Miller, "Uniform Methods and Standardized Costs," 150.
190. Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention of the United Typothetae of America, May 17-19,1910 (Assn, 1910), 29-97; and Miller, "Uniform Methods and Standardized Costs," 150.
191. Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 25-26; "Development of the Three Year Plan," Resume of Progress made by the UTA as reported to Representatives of the Allied Industries at a meeting with the Exec Council of the UTA on January 23,1920, p. 1. NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2; and Testimony of Edward T. Miller, in Official Report of Proceedings before the FTC, Docket No. 459, In the Matter of FTC vs. UTA, Chicago, July 5, 1922, p. 990. RG 122, Box 217, File 459-2-1.
192. Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 25-26; "Development of the Three Year Plan," Resume of Progress made by the UTA as reported to Representatives of the Allied Industries at a meeting with the Exec Council of the UTA on January 23,1920, p. 1. NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2; and Testimony of Edward T. Miller, in Official Report of Proceedings before the FTC, Docket No. 459, In the Matter of FTC vs. UTA, Chicago, July 5, 1922, p. 990. RG 122, Box 217, File 459-2-1.
193. Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November 1918): 25-26; "Development of the Three Year Plan," Resume of Progress made by the UTA as reported to Representatives of the Allied Industries at a meeting with the Exec Council of the UTA on January 23,1920, p. 1. NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2; and Testimony of Edward T. Miller, in Official Report of Proceedings before the FTC, Docket No. 459, In the Matter of FTC vs. UTA, Chicago, July 5, 1922, p. 990. RG 122, Box 217, File 459-2-1.
194. "Development of the Three Year Plan," Resume of Progress made by the UTA as reported to Representatives of the Allied Industries at a meeting with the Exec Council of the UTA on January 23,1920, 3. NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2.
195. In 1924, Secretary Miller told participants at a National Chamber of Commerce meeting on uniform cost accounting that printers had long been "next to last in the credit ratings, in 80th place and the 81 st place was the saloonkeeper. They are up to about the 15th place now." Charles L. Estey, "Address on the Three-Year-Plan," before the National Paper Trade Association, the Writing Paper Mfrs. Association, and the Cover Paper Mfrs. Association, June 1919, NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2. E. T. Miller, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 28-29, 1924, U.S. Chamber Papers, Ace. # 1960, p. 95. See also Edward T. Miller testimony in FTC v. UTA Hearings, Chicago, etc., 928; George H. Gardner, vice president of the UTA, "Price Control," Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November, 1918): 147-48. In 1917, the UTA conducted its own credit study, comparing a sample of "those members who used the Standard Cost system and an equal number of the same kinds and character of plants outside of the Organization." They found that "of the Cost System users, 84 percent were given first-grade credit.... Of those plants outside of the Organization, it was shown that 38 percent of them had no credit rating whatever." See Proceedings of the 31st Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917, 23-27. Four years later, the association reported that according to Dun and Bradstreet's, 90 percent of the failures in the printing business in 1921 were in cities without a UTA chapter. "The Proof of the Puddin'," Typothetae Bulletin 17, no. 25 (September 17, 1923): 389.
196. In 1924, Secretary Miller told participants at a National Chamber of Commerce meeting on uniform cost accounting that printers had long been "next to last in the credit ratings, in 80th place and the 81 st place was the saloonkeeper. They are up to about the 15th place now." Charles L. Estey, "Address on the Three-Year-Plan," before the National Paper Trade Association, the Writing Paper Mfrs. Association, and the Cover Paper Mfrs. Association, June 1919, NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2. E. T. Miller, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 28-29, 1924, U.S. Chamber Papers, Ace. # 1960, p. 95. See also Edward T. Miller testimony in FTC v. UTA Hearings, Chicago, etc., 928; George H. Gardner, vice president of the UTA, "Price Control," Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November, 1918): 147-48. In 1917, the UTA conducted its own credit study, comparing a sample of "those members who used the Standard Cost system and an equal number of the same kinds and character of plants outside of the Organization." They found that "of the Cost System users, 84 percent were given first-grade credit.... Of those plants outside of the Organization, it was shown that 38 percent of them had no credit rating whatever." See Proceedings of the 31st Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917, 23-27. Four years later, the association reported that according to Dun and Bradstreet's, 90 percent of the failures in the printing business in 1921 were in cities without a UTA chapter. "The Proof of the Puddin'," Typothetae Bulletin 17, no. 25 (September 17, 1923): 389.
197. In 1924, Secretary Miller told participants at a National Chamber of Commerce meeting on uniform cost accounting that printers had long been "next to last in the credit ratings, in 80th place and the 81 st place was the saloonkeeper. They are up to about the 15th place now." Charles L. Estey, "Address on the Three-Year-Plan," before the National Paper Trade Association, the Writing Paper Mfrs. Association, and the Cover Paper Mfrs. Association, June 1919, NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2. E. T. Miller, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 28-29, 1924, U.S. Chamber Papers, Ace. # 1960, p. 95. See also Edward T. Miller testimony in FTC v. UTA Hearings, Chicago, etc., 928; George H. Gardner, vice president of the UTA, "Price Control," Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November, 1918): 147-48. In 1917, the UTA conducted its own credit study, comparing a sample of "those members who used the Standard Cost system and an equal number of the same kinds and character of plants outside of the Organization." They found that "of the Cost System users, 84 percent were given first-grade credit.... Of those plants outside of the Organization, it was shown that 38 percent of them had no credit rating whatever." See Proceedings of the 31st Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917, 23-27. Four years later, the association reported that according to Dun and Bradstreet's, 90 percent of the failures in the printing business in 1921 were in cities without a UTA chapter. "The Proof of the Puddin'," Typothetae Bulletin 17, no. 25 (September 17, 1923): 389.
198. In 1924, Secretary Miller told participants at a National Chamber of Commerce meeting on uniform cost accounting that printers had long been "next to last in the credit ratings, in 80th place and the 81 st place was the saloonkeeper. They are up to about the 15th place now." Charles L. Estey, "Address on the Three-Year-Plan," before the National Paper Trade Association, the Writing Paper Mfrs. Association, and the Cover Paper Mfrs. Association, June 1919, NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2. E. T. Miller, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 28-29, 1924, U.S. Chamber Papers, Ace. # 1960, p. 95. See also Edward T. Miller testimony in FTC v. UTA Hearings, Chicago, etc., 928; George H. Gardner, vice president of the UTA, "Price Control," Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November, 1918): 147-48. In 1917, the UTA conducted its own credit study, comparing a sample of "those members who used the Standard Cost system and an equal number of the same kinds and character of plants outside of the Organization." They found that "of the Cost System users, 84 percent were given first-grade credit.... Of those plants outside of the Organization, it was shown that 38 percent of them had no credit rating whatever." See Proceedings of the 31st Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917, 23-27. Four years later, the association reported that according to Dun and Bradstreet's, 90 percent of the failures in the printing business in 1921 were in cities without a UTA chapter. "The Proof of the Puddin'," Typothetae Bulletin 17, no. 25 (September 17, 1923): 389.
199. In 1924, Secretary Miller told participants at a National Chamber of Commerce meeting on uniform cost accounting that printers had long been "next to last in the credit ratings, in 80th place and the 81 st place was the saloonkeeper. They are up to about the 15th place now." Charles L. Estey, "Address on the Three-Year-Plan," before the National Paper Trade Association, the Writing Paper Mfrs. Association, and the Cover Paper Mfrs. Association, June 1919, NARA, RG 122, Box 218, File 2/459-2. E. T. Miller, Uniform Cost Accounting Conference, Chicago, October 28-29, 1924, U.S. Chamber Papers, Ace. # 1960, p. 95. See also Edward T. Miller testimony in FTC v. UTA Hearings, Chicago, etc., 928; George H. Gardner, vice president of the UTA, "Price Control," Typothetae Bulletin 12, no. 5 (November, 1918): 147-48. In 1917, the UTA conducted its own credit study, comparing a sample of "those members who used the Standard Cost system and an equal number of the same kinds and character of plants outside of the Organization." They found that "of the Cost System users, 84 percent were given first-grade credit.... Of those plants outside of the Organization, it was shown that 38 percent of them had no credit rating whatever." See Proceedings of the 31st Annual Convention, United Typothetae of America, 1917, 23-27. Four years later, the association reported that according to Dun and Bradstreet's, 90 percent of the failures in the printing business in 1921 were in cities without a UTA chapter. "The Proof of the Puddin'," Typothetae Bulletin 17, no. 25 (September 17, 1923): 389.
200. Elizabeth F. Baker, Displacement of Men by Machines: Effects of Technological Change in Commercial Printing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), 18-24, 201. Baker divides her figures on press sales at 1913. In order to adjust for the effects of uniform cost accounting, we reconfigured her calculations to break at 1916.
201. Between 1900 and 1919, value added per worker in book and job printing increased from $26, 372 to $31,118. These levels exceeded the average value added per worker for all American manufacturing industries by $3,825 to $7,864. Following the three-year plan, value added for printers increased from $31,118 in 1919 to $50,411 in 1929, levels that exceeded the American manufacturing average by $9,058 to $14,469.
202. Warren D. Devine Jr., Technological Change and Electrification in the Printing Industry, 1880-1930, Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, January 1985, Research Memorandum ORAU/IEA-84-8 (M), 58-59; and Baker, Displacement of Men by Machines, 48-80. Nor was the continued decentralization of the industry a foregone conclusion. In the late 1910s and the early 1920s, census data seemed to show the opposite and some knowledgeable commentators predicted continued concentration. See Lewis, "The UTA Marketing Program," 96.
203. Warren D. Devine Jr., Technological Change and Electrification in the Printing Industry, 1880-1930, Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, January 1985, Research Memorandum ORAU/IEA-84-8 (M), 58-59; and Baker, Displacement of Men by Machines, 48-80. Nor was the continued decentralization of the industry a foregone conclusion. In the late 1910s and the early 1920s, census data seemed to show the opposite and some knowledgeable commentators predicted continued concentration. See Lewis, "The UTA Marketing Program," 96.
204. Warren D. Devine Jr., Technological Change and Electrification in the Printing Industry, 1880-1930, Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, January 1985, Research Memorandum ORAU/IEA-84-8 (M), 58-59; and Baker, Displacement of Men by Machines, 48-80. Nor was the continued decentralization of the industry a foregone conclusion. In the late 1910s and the early 1920s, census data seemed to show the opposite and some knowledgeable commentators predicted continued concentration. See Lewis, "The UTA Marketing Program," 96.
205. As noted in part I, the Chamber of Commerce formed its own uniform cost accounting group, and convened a series of conferences in April 1920, October 1923, and March and October 1924, bringing together hundreds of firms and associations to discuss cost accounting systems and their implementation. These conferences provide us with lists of participants, as well as proceedings and papers describing what particular associations had done to develop and operate classification schemes, costs manuals, and benchmarking systems. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission conducted an extensive investigation of open price associations in the 1920s, generating an inventory of associations that had "Uniform Systems" and a table documenting the activities of those organizations in some detail in its 1927 Report. Taken together, these sources provide a wealth of detailed data on developmental associations and their activity across American industries in the 1920 to 1925 period.
206. In compiling this list, we focused on associations-they dominated the conference proceedings numerically and were the only organizations listed in the FTC study. Yet we also kept track of businesses, typically large corporations like Kodak, Bethlehem Steel, and AT&T, who attended conferences, but as individual firms rather than as officers, representatives, or members of associations.
207. Note that in constructing these data sets, we took a conservative approach in assigning higher levels of involvement to associations and industries. We coded them to the substantial involvement or benchmarking
208. This group of firms included AT&T and Stromberg Carlson, Kodak, Johnson and Johnson, National Cash Register, Standard Chemical, and Harrisburg Shoe, as well as General Tire, Deere, Corona Typewriter, and a number of large steel producers including Bethlehem, Laclede, and Peerless Tube.
209. The figures presented are calculated as percentages of ( 1 ) the total number of manufacturing industries listed in the U.S. Census in 1919, and (2) the estimated number of national and regional business associations in existence in the United States in the 1920s. Reliable estimates of associations during this time period vary between 600 and 1,000. For perhaps the most comprehensive study, which results in the lower estimate, see Howard Aldrich and Udo Staber, "Organizing Business Interests: Patterns of Trade Association Founds, Transformations and Deaths," in Glen Carroll ed., Ecological Models of Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 123; and Howard Aldrich, Udo Staber, Catherine Zimmer, and John J Beggs, "Minimalism and Organizational Mortality: Patterns of Disbanding among U.S. Trade Associations, 1900-1983," in Jitrendra Singh, ed., Organizational Evolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1990), 33. Studies from the 1920s to 1940s vary between 500 and 1,500 (though the latter includes about 500 fraternal associations). After careful review, the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) concluded there were between 800 and 1,000 national or interstate business associations in 1925. See National Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1925): 319-26. Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949), viii, and National Trade and Professional Associations of the United States (New York: Columbia Books, 1990), 7, both report approximately 1,000 trade associations in 1920. We report the interval between 600 and 1,000.
210. The figures presented are calculated as percentages of ( 1 ) the total number of manufacturing industries listed in the U.S. Census in 1919, and (2) the estimated number of national and regional business associations in existence in the United States in the 1920s. Reliable estimates of associations during this time period vary between 600 and 1,000. For perhaps the most comprehensive study, which results in the lower estimate, see Howard Aldrich and Udo Staber, "Organizing Business Interests: Patterns of Trade Association Founds, Transformations and Deaths," in Glen Carroll ed., Ecological Models of Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 123; and Howard Aldrich, Udo Staber, Catherine Zimmer, and John J Beggs, "Minimalism and Organizational Mortality: Patterns of Disbanding among U.S. Trade Associations, 1900-1983," in Jitrendra Singh, ed., Organizational Evolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1990), 33. Studies from the 1920s to 1940s vary between 500 and 1,500 (though the latter includes about 500 fraternal associations). After careful review, the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) concluded there were between 800 and 1,000 national or interstate business associations in 1925. See National Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1925): 319-26. Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949), viii, and National Trade and Professional Associations of the United States (New York: Columbia Books, 1990), 7, both report approximately 1,000 trade associations in 1920. We report the interval between 600 and 1,000.
211. The figures presented are calculated as percentages of ( 1 ) the total number of manufacturing industries listed in the U.S. Census in 1919, and (2) the estimated number of national and regional business associations in existence in the United States in the 1920s. Reliable estimates of associations during this time period vary between 600 and 1,000. For perhaps the most comprehensive study, which results in the lower estimate, see Howard Aldrich and Udo Staber, "Organizing Business Interests: Patterns of Trade Association Founds, Transformations and Deaths," in Glen Carroll ed., Ecological Models of Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 123; and Howard Aldrich, Udo Staber, Catherine Zimmer, and John J Beggs, "Minimalism and Organizational Mortality: Patterns of Disbanding among U.S. Trade Associations, 1900-1983," in Jitrendra Singh, ed., Organizational Evolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1990), 33. Studies from the 1920s to 1940s vary between 500 and 1,500 (though the latter includes about 500 fraternal associations). After careful review, the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) concluded there were between 800 and 1,000 national or interstate business associations in 1925. See National Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1925): 319-26. Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949), viii, and National Trade and Professional Associations of the United States (New York: Columbia Books, 1990), 7, both report approximately 1,000 trade associations in 1920. We report the interval between 600 and 1,000.
212. The figures presented are calculated as percentages of ( 1 ) the total number of manufacturing industries listed in the U.S. Census in 1919, and (2) the estimated number of national and regional business associations in existence in the United States in the 1920s. Reliable estimates of associations during this time period vary between 600 and 1,000. For perhaps the most comprehensive study, which results in the lower estimate, see Howard Aldrich and Udo Staber, "Organizing Business Interests: Patterns of Trade Association Founds, Transformations and Deaths," in Glen Carroll ed., Ecological Models of Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 123; and Howard Aldrich, Udo Staber, Catherine Zimmer, and John J Beggs, "Minimalism and Organizational Mortality: Patterns of Disbanding among U.S. Trade Associations, 1900-1983," in Jitrendra Singh, ed., Organizational Evolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1990), 33. Studies from the 1920s to 1940s vary between 500 and 1,500 (though the latter includes about 500 fraternal associations). After careful review, the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) concluded there were between 800 and 1,000 national or interstate business associations in 1925. See National Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1925): 319-26. Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949), viii, and National Trade and Professional Associations of the United States (New York: Columbia Books, 1990), 7, both report approximately 1,000 trade associations in 1920. We report the interval between 600 and 1,000.
213. The figures presented are calculated as percentages of ( 1 ) the total number of manufacturing industries listed in the U.S. Census in 1919, and (2) the estimated number of national and regional business associations in existence in the United States in the 1920s. Reliable estimates of associations during this time period vary between 600 and 1,000. For perhaps the most comprehensive study, which results in the lower estimate, see Howard Aldrich and Udo Staber, "Organizing Business Interests: Patterns of Trade Association Founds, Transformations and Deaths," in Glen Carroll ed., Ecological Models of Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 123; and Howard Aldrich, Udo Staber, Catherine Zimmer, and John J Beggs, "Minimalism and Organizational Mortality: Patterns of Disbanding among U.S. Trade Associations, 1900-1983," in Jitrendra Singh, ed., Organizational Evolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1990), 33. Studies from the 1920s to 1940s vary between 500 and 1,500 (though the latter includes about 500 fraternal associations). After careful review, the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) concluded there were between 800 and 1,000 national or interstate business associations in 1925. See National Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1925): 319-26. Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949), viii, and National Trade and Professional Associations of the United States (New York: Columbia Books, 1990), 7, both report approximately 1,000 trade associations in 1920. We report the interval between 600 and 1,000.
214. In The Great Merger Movement, 88fnl, Lamoreaux finds that 52 of the 232 industries in her study, or 22 percent, experienced significant consolidation activity during the great merger wave, a figure broadly consistent with Fligstein's reanalysis, which finds that 21 percent of 230 sectors, or 48 industries, underwent consolidation (in Transformation of Corporate Control, 318-19). Curiously, there are no established metrics or benchmarks in the literature on economic organization for establishing when or where a particular form, institutional logic, or industrial order becomes significant or dominant within an economy.
215. These are industry level data from the 1919 and 1929 Census of Manufactures. Productivity data consist of (1) the average of the value added per worker for all of the industries falling in each category for 1919, and (2) the average of the increase in the value added per worker from 1919 to 1929 for all industries in each category. Growth data consist of ( 1 ) the average of the number of workers employed per industry for all of the industries falling in each category for 1919, and (2) the average of the increase in employment from 1919 to 1929 for all industries in each category. The averages are not adjusted for the sizes or initial productivity. Note that the involvement categories listed here are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
216. Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, "Community, Market, State-and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order," in Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985); Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Corporatism and Industrial Policy," in Alan Cawson, ed, Organized Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985); Philippe Schmitter, "Neo-corporatism and the State," in Wyn Grant, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1986); Schneiberg and Rollings worth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?"; and Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth, "Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy."
217. Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, "Community, Market, State-and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order," in Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985); Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Corporatism and Industrial Policy," in Alan Cawson, ed, Organized Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985); Philippe Schmitter, "Neo-corporatism and the State," in Wyn Grant, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1986); Schneiberg and Rollings worth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?"; and Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth, "Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy."
218. Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, "Community, Market, State-and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order," in Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985); Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Corporatism and Industrial Policy," in Alan Cawson, ed, Organized Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985); Philippe Schmitter, "Neo-corporatism and the State," in Wyn Grant, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1986); Schneiberg and Rollings worth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?"; and Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth, "Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy."
219. Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, "Community, Market, State-and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order," in Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985); Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Corporatism and Industrial Policy," in Alan Cawson, ed, Organized Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985); Philippe Schmitter, "Neo-corporatism and the State," in Wyn Grant, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1986); Schneiberg and Rollings worth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?"; and Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth, "Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy."
220. Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, "Community, Market, State-and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order," in Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985); Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Corporatism and Industrial Policy," in Alan Cawson, ed, Organized Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985); Philippe Schmitter, "Neo-corporatism and the State," in Wyn Grant, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1986); Schneiberg and Rollings worth, "Can Transaction Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations?"; and Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth, "Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy."
221. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
222. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
223. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
224. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
225. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
226. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
227. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
228. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
229. See notes 2 and 3 above. We also draw here on our own recent work along these lines, and research by new institutionalists in organizational sociology that have begun to reconceptualize systems and fields as constituted by multiple institutional logics. See Berk, American Possibilities; Schneiberg, "Organizational Heterogeneity and the Production of New Forms"; and Marc Schneiberg, "Private, Public, or Cooperative? Economic Order, Institutional Embeddedness and Organizational Form in the US Electrical Utility Industry," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 27-30,2002. The classic piece in sociology is Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Powell and DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. See also Bruce Carruthers and Sarah Babb, "The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America," American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), 1556-91; Elizabeth Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hayagareeva Rao, "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Watchdog Organizations," American Journal of Sociology 4 (1998): 912-51; W. Richard Scott, Martin Ruef, Peter Mendel, and Carol Caronna, Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000); and Robin Stryker, "Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications for Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations," in Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler, eds., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 2000).
230. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
231. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
232. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
233. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
234. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
235. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
236. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
237. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu
238. Berk, American Possibilities, chap. 1, provides a fuller discussion of reflexivity and agency in institutional development, and the related concepts of recombination, syncretism, and redeployment. See also, Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring"; Sabel and Zeitlin, "Stories, Strategies, Structures;" Stark, "Recombinant Property in Eastern European Capitalism"; Berk, "Discursive Cartels"; Joas, The Creativity of Action; Sewell, "A Theory of Structure"; Clemens, People 's Lobby; Calvin Morrill, "Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, eds., How Institutions Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, chap. 1 (unpublished ms., 2003). gberk@uoregon.edu marc.schneiberg@directory.reed.edu