Mubarak and the Islamists: Why did the "honeymoon" end?

Middle East Journal

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 62-80

  Al Awadi, Hesham ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ISLAMISM; STATE ROLE; WELFARE PROVISION;

AFRICA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EGYPT; NORTH AFRICA; WORLD;

EID: 14044267365     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/194034605783996934     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. Personal interview with Hilmi al-Jazzar, Cairo, August 5, 2002.
2. Qandil's writings include: Taqyim ada'al-Islamiyyin fi al-Niqabat al-Mihaniyya' [An Evaluation of the Performance of the Islamists in Professional Syndicates], paper presented to the 5th Franco-Egyptian Symposium on The Phenomenon of Political Violence, (Cairo: Cairo University Research Centre for Political Studies, 1993);
3. and Al-Dawr al-Siyasi li-Jama'at al-Masalih fi Misr. Dirasat Halat li-Niqabat al-Atiba'a 1984-1995 [The Political Role of Interest Groups in Egypt: a Case Study of the Medical Syndicate 1984-95], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1996).
4. Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam In Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999).
5. Al-Taqrir al-Istratiji al- 'Arabi, 1987 [Arab Strategic Report, 1987] (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, 1988), p. 380.
6. Al-Taqrir al-Istratiji al-'Arabi, 1988, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, 1990), p. 433.
7. Neither the name of the university nor the student union featured was mentioned in this questionnaire, although the academic year was 1987-1988. The questionnaire was taken from Ikhwan files.
8. Personal interview with 'Amr Abu Khalil, Alexandria, July 10, 2002.
9. Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, (August 1995), p. 329.
10. I am indebted to Badr Ghazi, President of the Faculty Staff Club in Cairo University in the early 1990s, and to Ahmad Lutfi in the same Club, for supplying me with the necessary background material and documents on the Club.
11. Personal interview with Badr Ghazi, Cairo, July 20, 2002.
12. Personal interview with Badr Ghazi, Cairo, July 20, 2002.
13. The fees for private tuition vary according to specialization, a teacher's reputation, and region/governorate. However, a science teacher can, on average, earn as much as £E100 an hour per student, while a humanities teacher earns, on average, £E60 an hour per student. Compared to a teacher's average net salary, which can be as low as £E300-400 per month. Such private tuition represents a significant source of income.
14. In the past, apart from their modest net salaries, academic teaching staff did not receive allowances for supervising NM and Ph.D. students, for undertaking serious scientific and practical research projects.
15. A teaching assistant holds a BA or a BSc with first class honors, while an associate lecturer holds an MA. Thus, those who enjoyed the privileges of the teachers' staff clubs were holders of Ph.D.
16. In addition to dealing with the problems of accommodation, wages and health, the Ikhwan also organized regular sales of consumer durables. The first sale in 1988, which made a profit of £E1 million, was again targeted at young, lower middle class teachers.
17. Personal interview with Badr Ghazi, Cairo, July 20, 2002.
18. Personal interview with Ahmad al-Nahas, Alexandria, July 10, 2002.
19. Salsabil was a computer company owned by two members of the Ikhwan.
20. Personal interview with Ahmad al-Nabas, Alexandria, July 10, 2002.
21. Personal interview with Anwar Shihata, Cairo, December 20, 2000.
22. Personal interview with an Ikhwan member, who asked not to be named.
23. Personal interview with 'Amr Abu Khalil, Alexandria, July 10, 2002.
24. Personal interview with Ahmad al-Nahas, Alexandria, July 10, 2002.
25. Asyut University, Al-Barnamij al-Intikhabi [The Election Program], no date.
26. The creation of this Committee was also in response to the state's efforts to create a "union for professional syndicates." Clearly the regime's aim was to confirm its control of such organizations, as it had done with the trade unions.
27. Personal interview with Amani Qandil, Cairo, July 2, 2002.
28. Personal interview with Amani Qandil, Cairo, July 2, 2002.
29. Al-Azma al-Mumtada: 'Ilaqat al-Nizam al-Misri bi al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, al-Mazahir al-Asbab, al-Nata'ij ["The Continuous Crisis: Relations of the Egyptian Regime with the Muslim Brothers: the Phenomenon, the Reasons and the Results"], internal and unpublished document, undated.
30. The Amal Party was founded by Muhammad al-Samman in 1994, allegedly as an individual endeavour, and without the permission of the organization, while the Wasat Party was initiated by Abu al-'Ila Madi. Personal interview with Muhammad al-Samman, Cairo, January 10, 2001, and Abu al-'Ila Madi, Cairo, January 7, 2001.
31. See their first statement on August 2, 1990, Published in al-Sha'b August 2, 1990.
32. See the Ikhwan's statements on August 11, 1990, and March 2 and 26, 1991. For a detailed study on the response of the Muslim Brothers to the Gulf War, see Gehad 'Auda, "An Uncertain Response: The Islamic Movement in Egypt," in James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, (Chicago: The Fundamentalism Project American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), pp. 109-130.
33. The statement was issued on August 15, 1990, al-Sha'b, August 15, 1990.
34. Personal interview with Amani Qandil, Cairo, July 2, 2002.
35. The second statement was issued after the war, on January 20, 1991. Its title summarized its content: "No to the Invasion of Kuwait, No to War in the Gulf, No to the Destruction of Iraq." Al-Sha'b, August 15, 1990. It was signed by only seven syndicates, as opposed to the eleven that had signed the first statement.
36. Personal nterview with 'Isam al-'Aryan, December 19, 2000.
37. These accusations were made by senior officials in the National Democratic Party, such as Yusif Wali and Kamal al-Shadhili, in their private meetings with syndical representatives. Cited in Amani Qandil, "Al-Niqabat al-Mihaniyya fi Misr wa 'Azmat al-Khalij" ["Professional Syndicates in Egypt and the Gulf Crisis"], in Mustafa al-Sayyid, ed., Hata La Tanshab Harbun 'Arabiyya-'Arabiyya Ukhra [So that No Other Arab-Arab War Erupts], (Cairo: Centre for Research and Political Studies, 1992), p. 308.
38. Al Umma fi A'am, [The Umma through the Years], (Cairo: The Centre for Civilisational Studies, 1992-93), p.318.
39. See also Al-Muhandisin, issue 441, (November 1992), a special issue on the earthquake.
40. Personal interview with Abu al-'Ila Madi, Cairo, January 7, 2000.
41. Al-Aryan claims that the reason why some Ikhwan members put up banners was not necessarily for any political purpose, but was only to enable members to distinguish themselves from other relief organizations and attract those who wanted to provide material aid through trustworthy organizational channels. Personal interview with 'Isarn al-'Aryan, Cairo, December 19, 2000.
42. The new law specified that there must be at least a 50% attendance for the elections to be valid. If the turnout was lower, the elections could be rerun twice, in which case a turnout of 33% guaranteed their validity. If this 33% turnout was not achieved in the second run, the syndicate came under the administration of government-appointed officials until new elections were held.
43. Personal interview with Jamal Muhammad, former Cairo University medical student, Cairo, August 5, 2002.
44. See al-Sha'b, October 22, 1993, al-Ahali, October 20, 1993 and al-Wafd, November 17, 1993.
45. al-Ahali, October 20, 1993
46. and al-Wafd, November 17, 1993.
47. Personal interview with Jamal Muhammad, Cairo, August 5, 2002.
48. Personal interview with Jamal Muhammad, Cairo, August 5, 2002.
49. These restrictive measures were mostly taken by the university administration, though in some cases they were also taken by the ministry of social affairs or the governors of the respective universities.
50. Personal interview with Khayrat al-Shatir, Cairo, June 30, 2002.
51. The figure above is from Ahmad Hassan, Al-Su'ud al-Siyasi al-Islami Dakhil al-Niqabat al-Mihaniyya [The Islamic Political Ascension to Professional Syndicates], (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafiyya li al-Nashr, 2000), p. 239.
52. Personal interview with Kamal Abu al-Majd, Cairo, December 5, 2000.
53. Personal interview with Makram Muhammad Ahmad, Cairo, July 17, 2002.
54. Historically, the lawyers' syndicate has a long tradition of political activity since lawyers played a central role in Egyptian's political history, both before and after the 1952 revolution.
55. Nabil Abdul-Fattah, Veiled Violence: Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics in 1990s, (Cairo: Dar Sechat for Studies, Publishing and Distribution, 1994), p. 36.
56. The Muslim Brothers were also able to win seats in the lawyers' syndicates, partly because of their ability to provide constituencies with services. The revenues from these services, according to one study, reached £E5 million in 1993. See Hamdi Al-Basir, "Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, wa al-Tanshi'al-Siyasiyya li'l Shabab" ["The Muslim Brothers and the Political Upbringing of Youth"] in Kamal Al-Munifi and Hassanain Ibrahim, Al-Thisqafa al-Siyasiyyafi Misr [Political Culture in Egypt], Vol. 2, (Cairo: Centre for Research and Political Studies, 1994), p. 1181.
57. Responsibility for this attempt was claimed by a group calling itself Manazamat tala'i al-fath al-islami [Vanguard Organization of Islamic Conquest], known as the military wing of Egypt's Jihad.
58. See Mustafa Mashhur, Al-Tayyar al-Islami wa Dawruhu fi al-Bina' [The Islamic Trend and Its Role in Building], (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi'wa al-Nashr, 1987), pp. 45-46.
59. Personal interview with Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, Akhir Sa'a (magazine), 25 November 1992.
60. Personal interview with Makram Muhammad Ahmad, Cairo, July 17, 2002.
61. Personal interview with Nabil 'Abd al-Fatah, Cairo, August 5, 2002.
62. According to Liwa'al-Islam, the court delayed the case concerning the legality of the Muslim Brothers more than 40 times between 1977 and 1990;
63. see Liwa'al-Islam, June 23, 1990, p. 47.
64. Personal interview with Hamid 'Abd al-Majid, London, September 13, 2001.
65. Personal interview with 'Isam Hashish, leading Islamist in the Engineers' Syndicate, Cairo, January 9, 2001.
66. This was acknowledged by Mahmud 'Abd al-Maqsud, an Ikhwan activist and General Secretary of the Pharmacists' Syndicate. Personal interview, Cairo, December 25, 2001.
67. Personal interview with Ahmad al-Nahas, Alexandria, July 10, 2002.
68. Tagrubatuna al Niqabiyya [Our Syndical Experience] (1984-95), no author, no date.
69. Tagrubatuna, p. 11.
70. Tagrubatuna, p. 11.