Managing the reputation of an award to motivate performance

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-22

  Gavrila, C ^a   Caulkins, J P ^b   Feichtinger, G ^c   Tragler, G ^c   Hartl, R F ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROME TOR VERGATA   (Italy)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

^d UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Award; Management; Motivation; Optimal control; Reputation

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; HAMILTONIANS; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; MANAGERS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; OPTIMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS; PERSONNEL; WAGES;

AWARDS; MONETARY COMPONENTS; REPUTATION; STOCK MARKET;

MOTIVATION;

EID: 13944264002     PISSN: 14322994     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001860400400     Document Type: Review

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