Descriptivism defended

Nous

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 408-435

  Nelson, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13844288448     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0068.00378     Document Type: Article

References (65)

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