Employment protection and effort among German employees

Economics Letters

Volumn 85, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 353-357

  Riphahn, Regina T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Absenteeism; Effort; Employment protection; Public sector; Shirking

Indexed keywords

EID: 13844250390     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.035     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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5. Lazear E.P. Job security provisions and unemployment Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 3 1990 699-726
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