Engineering genetic injustice

Bioethics

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-11

  Wenz, Peter ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT SPRINGFIELD   (United States)

^b SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GENE TECHNOLOGY; GENETIC ENGINEERING; GENETIC MANIPULATION; GERM LINE; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HUMAN; MEDICAL ETHICS; MORALITY; RESEARCH ETHICS; REVIEW; SOCIAL ASPECT; SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT; SOCIOECONOMICS; SURVIVAL RATE;

EID: 13544250817     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00421.x     Document Type: Review

References (33)

1. Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels & Daniel Wikler. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. New York. Cambridge University Press: 21.
2. Ibid. p. 375.
3. Ibid. pp. 329-330.
4. Ibid. pp. 4-5, emphasis in original.
5. Ibid. p. 102, emphasis added.
6. Ibid. p. 343.
7. Ibid. p. 67.
8. Ibid. p. 101, emphasis added.
9. Ibid. p. 4, emphasis in original.
10. Ibid. See especially pp. 318-320.
11. Waldon Bello. 1994. Dark Victory. London. Pluto Press: 90.
12. Buchanan et al., op. cit. note 1, pp. 309-310.
13. Ibid. pp. 329-330.
14. Ibid. p. 259.
15. Ibid. p. 22, emphasis added.
16. Ibid. p. 375.
17. I b i d.
18. Ibid. p. 142.
19. Ibid. p. 144.
20. Ibid. p. 72.
21. Ibid. p. 259.
22. Ibid. pp. 152-153.
23. Ibid. p. 154.
24. See: Eric T. Juengst. Can Enhancement be Distinguished from Prevention in Genetic Medicine? The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1997; 22: 125-142. Juengst's distinction between genetic prevention and genetic enhancement is the same as what I here call the distinction between health-related and desire-related enhancement. I refer to both as enhancement because the authors of From Chance to Choice do so, and even (rather confusingly) Juengst does so at times, as one can see by comparing his language on p. 145 with what he writes on p. 147. The same distinction, with the same problem of inconsistent use of terms, appears also in: Juan Manuel Torres. On the Limits of Enhancement in Human Gene Transfer: Drawing the Line. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1997; 22: 43-53, especially p. 47.
25. See: Eric T. Juengst. Can Enhancement be Distinguished from Prevention in Genetic Medicine? The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1997; 22: 125-142. Juengst's distinction between genetic prevention and genetic enhancement is the same as what I here call the distinction between health-related and desire-related enhancement. I refer to both as enhancement because the authors of From Chance to Choice do so, and even (rather confusingly) Juengst does so at times, as one can see by comparing his language on p. 145 with what he writes on p. 147. The same distinction, with the same problem of inconsistent use of terms, appears also in: Juan Manuel Torres. On the Limits of Enhancement in Human Gene Transfer: Drawing the Line. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1997; 22: 43-53, especially p. 47.
26. Buchanan et al., op. cit. note 1, p. 195.
27. Ibid. p. 155.
28. Ibid. p. 319.
29. Ibid. p. 95.
30. Ibid. See pp. 3-4, pp. 97-98, and pp. 296-297.
31. Ibid. p. 297. See also p. 298 and pp. 97-98.
32. Ibid. p. 298.
33. W. French Anderson. Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line? The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1989; 14: 681-693, considers the possibility of enhanced resistance to environmental toxins, but relates this only to occupational contexts. See especially p. 687.