Electoral reforms, membership stability and the existence of committee property rights in American state legislatures

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 169-181

  Squire, Peverill ^a   Hamm, Keith E ^b   Hedlund, Ronald D ^c   Moncrief, Gary F ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444301459     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000086     Document Type: Review

References (83)

1. Jonathon N. Katz and Brian R. Sala, 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 21-33.
2. State legislative committee data used in this Note were gathered through the support of two National Science Foundation Grants (SES-8411353 and SBR-9511518) and by Northeastern University and Rice University. Acquiring historical data such as these is difficult. Historical studies of state legislatures are rare. As a consequence, basic information on members and committees has generally not been collected. Moreover, no single facility houses all of the relevant information. Hamm and Hedlund acquired these data through visits to a variety of research sites (e.g., Wisconsin Historical Society), state capitals and the Library of Congress. Data for some legislative chambers proved impossible to locate.
3. Katz and Sala, 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', p. 23.
4. Ballard C. Campbell, Representative Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 2; and Paul S. Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods (New York: The Century Co., 1907), p. 127.
5. Ballard C. Campbell, Representative Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 2; and Paul S. Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods (New York: The Century Co., 1907), p. 127.
6. William H. Riker, 'The Senate and American Federalism', American Political Science Review, 49 (1955), 452-69, pp. 463-5.
7. These data were collected from The New York Times Index for the Published News of 1908 (New York: New York Times, 1976). The relative importance of state politics is further demonstrated by the fact that the New York Times ran 335 stories on the race for governor in 1908.
8. Christopher J. Deering, and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress, 3rd edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997), p. 27; George B. Galloway, 'Development of the Committee System in the House of Representatives', American Historical Review, 65 (1959), 17-30, pp. 17-21; and George B. Galloway, A History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961), pp. 64-7.
9. Christopher J. Deering, and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress, 3rd edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997), p. 27; George B. Galloway, 'Development of the Committee System in the House of Representatives', American Historical Review, 65 (1959), 17-30, pp. 17-21; and George B. Galloway, A History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961), pp. 64-7.
10. Christopher J. Deering, and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress, 3rd edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997), p. 27; George B. Galloway, 'Development of the Committee System in the House of Representatives', American Historical Review, 65 (1959), 17-30, pp. 17-21; and George B. Galloway, A History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961), pp. 64-7.
11. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
12. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
13. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
14. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
15. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
16. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
17. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
18. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
19. Concerns may be raised that the adoption of the Australian ballot was exogenous to the US House but it was endogenous to state legislatures. The fear is that state legislators may have enacted the reforms for their own strategic electoral reasons, thus accounting for any differences in the appearance of committee property between the House and state legislatures. We do not find this concern to be compelling for two reasons. First, the historical record of the battles over the Australian ballot in the states shows that there was a range of motives on the part of its backers. See Peter H. Argersinger, ' "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws', American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 287-306; Peter H. Argersinger, 'Regulating Democracy: Election Laws and Dakota Politics, 1889-1902', Midwest Review, 5 (1983), 1-20; Charles D. Farris, 'The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida', Journal of Negro History, 39 (1954), 259-83; William H. Glasson, 'The Australian Ballot - Why North Carolina Should Adopt It', South Atlantic Review, 8 (1909), 132-42, pp. 140-1; and J. Morgan Kousser, 'Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V. O. Key Thesis', Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, pp. 665-8. Moreover, the reform enjoyed bipartisan support in most states. See Philip Loring Allen, 'The Multifarious Australian Ballot', North American Review, 191 (1910), 602-11; Lionel E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 32; and Erik Falk Petersen, 'The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California', California Historical Quarterly, 51 (1972), 227-43, p. 239. Moreover, as Reynolds and McCormick observed, 'The Australian ballot ... won support from groups having different, even contradictory, goals and expectations. None of them anticipated the political patterns that finally emerged from "reform," and none was fully satisfied with voting behavior in the new era.' See John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, 'Outlawing "Treachery": Split Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910', Journal of American History, 72 (1986), 835-58, p. 838. While state legislators probably contemplated the reform's potential impact on their political party's prospects, there is no evidence that they anticipated that it would have any consequences on the internal workings of their legislature. Secondly, committee property rights in the US House did not appear immediately after the adoption of the Australian ballot by the states. There was a time lag as members presumably figured out how to adapt to the reform. Moreover, the Australian ballot was adopted in different states in different years. The time lag and different years of adoption greatly muddle the endogenous/exogenous picture because of substantial membership turnover in both US House and state legislatures. The state legislatures examined here were overwhelmingly composed of members who were not in those institutions when the Australian ballot reform was instituted. So it does not seem to us that questions about whether the reforms were endogenous or exogenous are relevant to this study.
20. Katz and Sala, 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', p. 24.
21. See Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Development of Committee Specialization in State Legislatures' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, 'Tapping the Talents of Legislators: Constructing Committees in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1995); Keith E. Hamm, Ronald D. Hedlund and Stephanie Post, 'Committee Specialization in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century: Do Legislatures Tap the Talents of Their Members?' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1997); and Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm, 'The Evolution and Role of Committee Specialization in the Legislative Process: Developing and Testing a Cross-System Model' (paper presented at the XVth World Congress, International Political Science Association, Berlin, 1994).
22. See Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Development of Committee Specialization in State Legislatures' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, 'Tapping the Talents of Legislators: Constructing Committees in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1995); Keith E. Hamm, Ronald D. Hedlund and Stephanie Post, 'Committee Specialization in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century: Do Legislatures Tap the Talents of Their Members?' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1997); and Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm, 'The Evolution and Role of Committee Specialization in the Legislative Process: Developing and Testing a Cross-System Model' (paper presented at the XVth World Congress, International Political Science Association, Berlin, 1994).
23. See Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Development of Committee Specialization in State Legislatures' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, 'Tapping the Talents of Legislators: Constructing Committees in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1995); Keith E. Hamm, Ronald D. Hedlund and Stephanie Post, 'Committee Specialization in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century: Do Legislatures Tap the Talents of Their Members?' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1997); and Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm, 'The Evolution and Role of Committee Specialization in the Legislative Process: Developing and Testing a Cross-System Model' (paper presented at the XVth World Congress, International Political Science Association, Berlin, 1994).
24. See Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Development of Committee Specialization in State Legislatures' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); Keith E. Hamm and Ronald D. Hedlund, 'Tapping the Talents of Legislators: Constructing Committees in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1995); Keith E. Hamm, Ronald D. Hedlund and Stephanie Post, 'Committee Specialization in State Legislatures During the Twentieth Century: Do Legislatures Tap the Talents of Their Members?' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1997); and Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm, 'The Evolution and Role of Committee Specialization in the Legislative Process: Developing and Testing a Cross-System Model' (paper presented at the XVth World Congress, International Political Science Association, Berlin, 1994).
25. No legislator was re-elected to the Vermont Senate and only one was re-elected to the Delaware House. Committee retention rates are meaningless for these chambers and were not calculated. The difference between the chambers approaches statistical significance, p = 0.055 two-tailed. A table giving the retention rate in each chamber for which we have data is available from the authors.
26. Arthur Ludington, 'Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States', American Political Science Review, 3 (1909), 252-61, p. 260.
27. Once chosen, a state's ballot design was not necessarily fixed. Indeed, by 1905 six states that first employed the office bloc ballot had switched to the party column design, while four states had changed to the office bloc ballot from the party column ballot. Nebraska went back and forth, first adopting the office bloc ballot in 1891, then switching to the party column ballot in 1897, and returning to an office bloc ballot in 1899. See Ludington, 'Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States', p. 260; and Arthur Ludington, American Ballot Laws, 1880-1910 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1911).
28. Once chosen, a state's ballot design was not necessarily fixed. Indeed, by 1905 six states that first employed the office bloc ballot had switched to the party column design, while four states had changed to the office bloc ballot from the party column ballot. Nebraska went back and forth, first adopting the office bloc ballot in 1891, then switching to the party column ballot in 1897, and returning to an office bloc ballot in 1899. See Ludington, 'Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States', p. 260; and Arthur Ludington, American Ballot Laws, 1880-1910 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1911).
29. See, for example, Allen, "The Multifarious Australian Ballot'.
30. Ludington, 'Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States', p. 259.
31. Philip Loring Allen, 'Ballot Laws and Their Workings', Political Science Quarterly, 21 (1906), 38-58; and Jerrold G. Rusk, 'The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908', American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 1220-38, p. 1235.
32. Philip Loring Allen, 'Ballot Laws and Their Workings', Political Science Quarterly, 21 (1906), 38-58; and Jerrold G. Rusk, 'The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908', American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 1220-38, p. 1235.
33. Allen, 'Ballot Laws and Their Workings', and Ludington, American Ballot Laws, 1880-1910.
34. Allen, 'Ballot Laws and Their Workings', p. 42.
35. Katz and Sala, 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', p. 24, make a passing reference to this important difference, 'A system that allows voters to evaluate and vote for candidates on an office-by-office, case-by-case basis encourages incumbents to invest more in their personal reputations than when voters cannot discriminate between individual candidates on a partisan slate.' They did not, however, distinguish between the two variations of the Australian ballot in their analysis.
36. It is widely agreed which states had not adopted the Australian ballot at this point in time. But, the ballot designs used in the non-reform states were not all the same. See Ludington, 'Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States', pp. 255-6.
37. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
38. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
39. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
40. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
41. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
42. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
43. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
44. The late adopting states did not systematically differ from the states that adopted the Australian ballot. All eventually adopted the reform: Connecticut in 1909, New Jersey in 1911, Georgia in 1922, North Carolina in 1929 and South Carolina in 1950. See Spencer D. Albright, The American Ballot (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 28-9; V. O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edn (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 640; and Arthur Ludington, 'Ballot Laws', American Political Science Review, 4 (1910), 63-8, pp. 63-4. One plausible difference between the non-reform states and the other states might be the nature of their party systems. There is no evidence, however, that the party systems across these five states were similar to each other and different from the rest of the states. See Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 41-54; and J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 182-3, at p. 211. In addition, Merriam's study of a number of state party central committees found nothing out of the ordinary about the party committees in Connecticut and North Carolina. See C. E. Merriam, 'State Central Committees', Political Science Quarterly, 19 (1904), 224-33. And, of course, party organizations controlled nominations in almost every state during the time examined here, including all five non-reform states. See C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 61-2.
45. A few state legislatures at this point in time had one-year terms for one or both houses, while Alabama and Mississippi had four-year terms for both houses.
46. Hubert Harry Basehart, "The Effect of Membership Stability on Continuity and Experience in U.S. State Legislative Chambers', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 5 (1980), 31-68.
47. Katz and Sala tested their theory using a longitudinal design in one legislative chamber. Given the differences in the Australian ballot design across the states and the significant variation in other key independent variables, particularly percentage of members returning to the chamber, we opted for a test using cross-sectional data. We doubt that time-series data for state legislative chambers during this period would document a rise of committee property rights for two reasons. First, in 73 per cent of the legislative chambers we studied committee retention rates were well under 50 per cent, meaning that legislators were more likely to take on new committee assignments than to keep old ones. Thus, any movement towards committee property rights in these chambers prior to 1909 would necessarily have been a very weak one at best. Secondly, even decades after the adoption of the Australian ballot the evidence for committee property rights in state legislatures is thin. Basehart, 'The Effect of Membership Stability on Continuity and Experience in U.S. State Legislative Chambers', for example, found little membership continuity on committees in fifteen state legislative chambers between 1963 and 1977. Squire's study of three state legislative chambers in the late 1970s found low committee retention rates in the California and Connecticut lower houses. Only the New York Assembly, which enjoyed an unusually high chamber membership retention rate, had committee retention rates similar to those in the US House. See Peverill Squire, 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 726-44, p. 739.
48. See Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 144-68; Squire 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Peverill Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 1026-54.
49. See Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 144-68; Squire 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Peverill Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 1026-54.
50. See Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 144-68; Squire 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Peverill Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 1026-54.
51. Note that the concern with committee retention rates is driven by an assumption that committees play an important role in the legislative process. While this assumption has long been true in the US House, it has not always been the case in some state legislative chambers. During the first decade of the twentieth century, for example, rules in both houses in Massachusetts, the senate in Rhode Island, and the lower houses in Maine, Vermont and New Hampshire required that every bill referred to committee be reported back to the full chamber. See Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, p. 169. Where committees exercise no gate keeping power we would assume there would be little incentive to continue membership on any particular committee. This assumption may be drawn into question, however, by the fact that the committee retention rate in the Rhode Island Senate was comparable to that of the US House at the time, while the figure for the lower houses in Maine and New Hampshire exceeded the mean for all lower chambers. Only in the Vermont House did very few committee members retain their assignments.
52. Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde and Peter Wissel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover', in Norman J. Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 24-49, at p. 30.
53. The percentage of first-term members in seven of the chambers in non-reform states was very similar to the percentage of first-term members found in the vast majority of other chambers. The exception was the South Carolina senate, which had fewer new members than most, but not all, of the other chambers. A table giving the percentage of first-term members in each chamber is available from the authors.
54. T. Richard Witmer, The Aging of the House', Political Science Quarterly, 79 (1964), 526-41, p. 538.
55. Allan G. Bogue, Jerome M. Clubb, Carroll R. McKibben and Santa A. Traugott, 'Members of the House of Representatives and the Process of
56. Louis Fisher, 'History of Pay Adjustments for Members of Congress', in Robert W. Hartman and Arnold R. Weber, eds, The Rewards of Public Service (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 25-52, at pp. 34-5; and Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 129.
57. Louis Fisher, 'History of Pay Adjustments for Members of Congress', in Robert W. Hartman and Arnold R. Weber, eds, The Rewards of Public Service (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 25-52, at pp. 34-5; and Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 129.
58. William Bianco, David B. Spence and John D. Wilkerson, 'The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 145-71, p. 147.
59. David Ray, 'Membership Stability in Three State Legislatures: 1893-1969', American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 106-12, p. 111; and David Ray, 'Voluntary Retirement and Electoral Defeat in Eight State Legislatures', Journal of Politics, 38 (1976), 426-33, pp. 430-1.
60. David Ray, 'Membership Stability in Three State Legislatures: 1893-1969', American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 106-12, p. 111; and David Ray, 'Voluntary Retirement and Electoral Defeat in Eight State Legislatures', Journal of Politics, 38 (1976), 426-33, pp. 430-1.
61. Katz and Sala, 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', p. 29, include a membership turnover variable in their model.
62. According to Hedlund and Hamm, 'The Evolution and Role of Committee Specialization in the Legislative Process', p. 21, 'Without doubt, the major driving force in terms of the various measures of individual legislator specialization is the amount of stability among the legislative membership. In fact, it accounts for almost 50 per cent of all of the significant relationships. As chamber membership stability increases, the average number of committee assignments, the level of committee experience, and the level of committee carryover increase.'
63. It may seem reasonable to charge the equations in Table 2 with being misspecified, because we failed to control for any effects of partisan change. One defence we can offer is that the period being studied experienced remarkable political stability. The mean percentage change in party membership between 1907 and 1909 for the fifty-seven chambers for which we have data was 5.5 per cent; the median was 3 per cent. These low levels of partisan change are not surprising. The South was, of course, a one-party region, particularly at the state legislative level. Nationally, in presidential contests only three states changed the party they supported between the 1904 and 1908 elections. And between the 1907 and 1909 elections, the Republicans lost only two seats in the US Senate and three seats in the US House. It strikes us as highly unlikely that any measure of partisan change will materially alter our results. Another potential concern might be that there were different numbers of 'desirable' committees in state legislatures compared with Congress. We do not find this concern to be compelling. The most important committees across American legislatures tend to be a constant set: a tax policy committee, an appropriations committee, some variant on a rules committee, and often a judiciary committee. Thus, we think we are on safe ground in suggesting that the number of desirable committees is roughly the same across legislative chambers.
64. Katz and Sala, 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', p. 30.
65. Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly.'
66. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives', and H. Douglas Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', in Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change, pp. 2-23.
67. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives', and H. Douglas Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', in Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change, pp. 2-23.
68. State legislative salary data were calculated from the Official Manual for the Use of Courts, State, and County Officials, and General Assembly of Kentucky (Frankfort: Frankfort Printing Co., 1910), p. 147. In addition we consulted James D. Driscoll, California's Legislature (Sacramento: Center for California Studies, 1986), p. 79; James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, rev. edn (New York: Macmillan, 1906), p. 336, and legislative staff in several states. We also entered state population as a proxy for professionalization, based on the consistent findings of a strong positive association between population size and level of legislative professionalization. See, for example, Christopher Z. Mooney, 'Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20 (1995), 47-67; and James D. King, 'Changes in Professionalism in US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (2000), 327-43. The results for that variable were virtually the same, both substantively and statistically, as for the annual salary variable.
69. State legislative salary data were calculated from the Official Manual for the Use of Courts, State, and County Officials, and General Assembly of Kentucky (Frankfort: Frankfort Printing Co., 1910), p. 147. In addition we consulted James D. Driscoll, California's Legislature (Sacramento: Center for California Studies, 1986), p. 79; James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, rev. edn (New York: Macmillan, 1906), p. 336, and legislative staff in several states. We also entered state population as a proxy for professionalization, based on the consistent findings of a strong positive association between population size and level of legislative professionalization. See, for example, Christopher Z. Mooney, 'Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20 (1995), 47-67; and James D. King, 'Changes in Professionalism in US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (2000), 327-43. The results for that variable were virtually the same, both substantively and statistically, as for the annual salary variable.
70. State legislative salary data were calculated from the Official Manual for the Use of Courts, State, and County Officials, and General Assembly of Kentucky (Frankfort: Frankfort Printing Co., 1910), p. 147. In addition we consulted James D. Driscoll, California's Legislature (Sacramento: Center for California Studies, 1986), p. 79; James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, rev. edn (New York: Macmillan, 1906), p. 336, and legislative staff in several states. We also entered state population as a proxy for professionalization, based on the consistent findings of a strong positive association between population size and level of legislative professionalization. See, for example, Christopher Z. Mooney, 'Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20 (1995), 47-67; and James D. King, 'Changes in Professionalism in US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (2000), 327-43. The results for that variable were virtually the same, both substantively and statistically, as for the annual salary variable.
71. State legislative salary data were calculated from the Official Manual for the Use of Courts, State, and County Officials, and General Assembly of Kentucky (Frankfort: Frankfort Printing Co., 1910), p. 147. In addition we consulted James D. Driscoll, California's Legislature (Sacramento: Center for California Studies, 1986), p. 79; James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, rev. edn (New York: Macmillan, 1906), p. 336, and legislative staff in several states. We also entered state population as a proxy for professionalization, based on the consistent findings of a strong positive association between population size and level of legislative professionalization. See, for example, Christopher Z. Mooney, 'Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20 (1995), 47-67; and James D. King, 'Changes in Professionalism in US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (2000), 327-43. The results for that variable were virtually the same, both substantively and statistically, as for the annual salary variable.
72. State legislative salary data were calculated from the Official Manual for the Use of Courts, State, and County Officials, and General Assembly of Kentucky (Frankfort: Frankfort Printing Co., 1910), p. 147. In addition we consulted James D. Driscoll, California's Legislature (Sacramento: Center for California Studies, 1986), p. 79; James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, rev. edn (New York: Macmillan, 1906), p. 336, and legislative staff in several states. We also entered state population as a proxy for professionalization, based on the consistent findings of a strong positive association between population size and level of legislative professionalization. See, for example, Christopher Z. Mooney, 'Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20 (1995), 47-67; and James D. King, 'Changes in Professionalism in US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (2000), 327-43. The results for that variable were virtually the same, both substantively and statistically, as for the annual salary variable.
73. Fisher, 'History of Pay Adjustments for Members of Congress', p. 40-1.
74. Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p. 336.
75. Driscoll, California's Legislature, p. 79.
76. Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p. 336.
77. Bryce, The American Commonwealth, pp. 336-7.
78. Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism" ', p. 14.
79. See David Brady, Kara Buckley and Douglas Rivers, 'The Roots of Careerism in the US House of Representatives', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 489-510; Gary Moncrief, 'Professionalism and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: A Comparison to US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 33-48; Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', p. 9; Squire, 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly'.
80. See David Brady, Kara Buckley and Douglas Rivers, 'The Roots of Careerism in the US House of Representatives', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 489-510; Gary Moncrief, 'Professionalism and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: A Comparison to US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 33-48; Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', p. 9; Squire, 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly'.
81. See David Brady, Kara Buckley and Douglas Rivers, 'The Roots of Careerism in the US House of Representatives', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 489-510; Gary Moncrief, 'Professionalism and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: A Comparison to US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 33-48; Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', p. 9; Squire, 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly'.
82. See David Brady, Kara Buckley and Douglas Rivers, 'The Roots of Careerism in the US House of Representatives', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 489-510; Gary Moncrief, 'Professionalism and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: A Comparison to US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 33-48; Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', p. 9; Squire, 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly'.
83. See David Brady, Kara Buckley and Douglas Rivers, 'The Roots of Careerism in the US House of Representatives', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 489-510; Gary Moncrief, 'Professionalism and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: A Comparison to US State Legislatures', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 33-48; Price, 'Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Professionalism"', p. 9; Squire, 'Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures', and Squire, 'The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly'.