On non-responsiveness in adverse selection models with common value

Topics in Theoretical Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 27-41

  Morand, Pierre Henri ^a,b   Thomas, Lionel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE FRANCHE COMTÉ   (France)

^b Univ́ de Franche Comté ^*  (France)

Author keywords

Implementability; Mechanism design; Non responsiveness

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444292548     PISSN: 1534598X     EISSN: 1534598X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1094     Document Type: Article

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