Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure

Mind and Language

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 85-98

  Peacocke, Christopher ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1342332884     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00249.x     Document Type: Review

References (16)

1. Having Concepts; A Brief Refutation of the 20th Century. Mind & Language, pp. 29-47.
2. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992.
3. 'Three Principles of Rationalism', European Journal of Philosophy, 10, 3 (2002), 375-397, and Chapter 2 of The Realm of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
4. 'Three Principles of Rationalism', European Journal of Philosophy, 10, 3 (2002), 375-397, and Chapter 2 of The Realm of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
5. For more on non-conceptual content, see my paper 'Does Perception have a Nonconceptual Content?' The Journal of Philosophy, 98 (2001) 239-64.
6. Fodor's views on this issue are in his book Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), and mine are in A Study of Concepts.
7. See especially The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, London: Duckworth, 1981.
8. See in particular my paper 'How Are A Priori Truths Possible?', European Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1993) 175-199.
9. For an utterly different, non-factualist approach to the a priori, see Hartry Field's paper Apriority as an Evaluative Notion, repr. in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
10. See Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality, in Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg, MIT Press, 2003; also in Concepts, ed. E. Villaneuva, volume 9 (1998) of Philosophical Issues (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview), 43-88; Implicit Conceptions, the A Priori, and the Identity of Concepts, also in Villaneuva's collection, pp. 121-148; Explaining the A Priori: The Program of Moderate Rationalism, in New Essays on the A Priori, ed. P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 255-85.
11. See Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality, in Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg, MIT Press, 2003; also in Concepts, ed. E. Villaneuva, volume 9 (1998) of Philosophical Issues (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview), 43-88; Implicit Conceptions, the A Priori, and the Identity of Concepts, also in Villaneuva's collection, pp. 121-148; Explaining the A Priori: The Program of Moderate Rationalism, in New Essays on the A Priori, ed. P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 255-85.
12. See Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality, in Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg, MIT Press, 2003; also in Concepts, ed. E. Villaneuva, volume 9 (1998) of Philosophical Issues (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview), 43-88; Implicit Conceptions, the A Priori, and the Identity of Concepts, also in Villaneuva's collection, pp. 121-148; Explaining the A Priori: The Program of Moderate Rationalism, in New Essays on the A Priori, ed. P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 255-85.
13. K. Gödel, Collected Works Volume III: Unpublished Essays and Lectures, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
14. See S. C. Kleene, Mathematical Logic, New York: Wiley, 1967 esp. Chapter 6. The displayed transition is negation-introduction on the right, as given on p. 289 of Kleene's book, in the case in which the sets _ and _ are empty.
15. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1975.
16. For further discussion of the distinction between dispositionalism and relational individuation, see The Realm of Reason, pp. 40-49.