Top executive turnovers: Separating decision and control rights

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 25-37

  Neumann, Robert ^a   Voetmann, Torben ^b  

^a Danske Bank ^*  (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13244284694     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1187     Document Type: Article

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