A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 8, 2004, Pages 537-547

  Karathanassis, G A ^a   Drakos, A A ^a  

^a ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13244249698     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1181     Document Type: Article

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