Sovereignty under attack: The international society meets the Al Qaeda network

Review of International Studies

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 45-68

  Mendelsohn, Barak ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 13144297800     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210505006297     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. While acknowledging that there is no perfect definition of terrorism and that defining terrorism is a very controversial issue, I adopt Robert Jervis's attempt to define the phenomenon. Terrorism is 'the use of violence for political or social purposes that is not publicly authorized by leaders of recognized political units, including acts that are sponsored and supported by states, but not publicly avowed'. Robert Jervis, 'An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?' Political Science Quarterly, 117:1 (2002), pp. 37-8.
2. For example, see President Bush's speech in the UN General Assembly: 'President Bush Addresses the UN', Washington Post, 10 November 2001.
3. Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (1993), pp. 22-49.
4. For example, 'The Unreleased Interview: A Discussion on the New Crusader Wars', Jehad Online, Thunders of Truth', 〈www.jehad.net.〉; Interview with Gulboddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Afghani opposition group Hezb-e-Islami, Al-Hayat, 2 November 2002.
5. Even though it is not clearly stated this way, the idea is implied in Hedley Bull's work. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 16-17.
6. David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order The Revolutionary State in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
7. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 90-94.
8. For analytical reasons, this article posits Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organisations as distinct groups that can be identified even though they exhibit dense inter-group connections. Hopefully, the analytical benefits will compensate for the descriptive injustice. Those necessary presuppositions require accepting the conclusions of this study with caution, at least until further evidence surfaces to fill in the information gaps.
9. John Ruggie's seminal works in particular were a milestone in the study of sovereignty. For example, John Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 131-57.
10. Keohane avoids formulating a definition of sovereignty. See Robert O. Keohane, 'Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society', in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.), Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 165-86. On the definition problem, see Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 'The Social Construction of State Sovereignty', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-20.
11. Keohane avoids formulating a definition of sovereignty. See Robert O. Keohane, 'Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society', in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.), Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 165-86. On the definition problem, see Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 'The Social Construction of State Sovereignty', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-20.
12. Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation', p. 143.
13. Janice E. Thomson, 'State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research', International Studies Quarterly, 39 (1995), p. 219.
14. Stephen D. Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 9-12.
15. Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Durham. NC: Duke University Press. 1999), p. 11.
16. There are many divergent opinions regarding the date of birth of the state system. For one enlightening account, see Andreas Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth', International Organization, 55:2 (2001), pp. 251-87.
17. Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 10-11.
18. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 'Introduction', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1984), p. 1. Note that IS cannot exist without an international system. Yet, an international system does not require the existence of IS. According to Bull, an IS is distinct by states' recognition of their common interests and by their conception of themselves as bound by a common set of rules in their relations. See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13.
19. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 'Introduction', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1984), p. 1. Note that IS cannot exist without an international system. Yet, an international system does not require the existence of IS. According to Bull, an IS is distinct by states' recognition of their common interests and by their conception of themselves as bound by a common set of rules in their relations. See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13.
20. Buzan distinguishes between international regimes that have merely instrumental implications and the institutions of the IS which have much deeper constitutive effects. See Barry Buzan, The English School: An Underexploited Resource in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), p. 475.
21. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 41.
22. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
23. Ibid., pp. 17-18
24. Ibid., pp. 53-63.
25. Ibid., pp. 67-70.
26. Bruce Cronin, 'The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations', European Journal of International Relations, 7:1 (2001), pp. 103-130.
27. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 127.
28. Ibid., pp. 140-2.
29. Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, p. 243.
30. I b i d.
31. Barry Buzan briefly mentions that even in its most basic form, the IS legitimises intervention against regimes that threaten its established order, but he does not take this point further. See Barry Buzan, 'International Society and International Security', in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 275.
32. On the possibility of viewing globalisation and interstate interaction as two distinct processes currently at work, see David Armstrong, 'Globalization and the Social State', Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 461-78.
33. Two examples of studies that point at the decline of the state and the rise of non-state actors are Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
34. Two examples of studies that point at the decline of the state and the rise of non-state actors are Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
35. Bull's Anarchical Society focused on the issue of order in the IS. In his 1983 Hagey lectures he tried to deal more systematically with the question of justice in the IS. See Hedley Bull, 'Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures', in Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrel (eds.), Hedley Bull on IS (London: Macmillan Press and New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 206-45.
36. On the nuclear and chemical weapons taboo, see Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 'Norms and Deterrence: the Nuclear and Chemical Taboos', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114-52.
37. Cronin, 'The Paradox of Hegemony', pp. 103-30.
38. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'Introduction', in Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), Transnational Religion and Fading States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1997), p. 12.
39. William Zartman, 'Islam, the State and Democracy', in Charles E. Butterworth and William I. Zartman (eds.), Between the State and Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 234.
40. James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 10-13.
41. For example, Jihad of the heart (moral reformation), of the tongue (spreading the words of God), and of the hand (action according to God's will). See Johnson. The Holy War Idea, p. 19.
42. Ibid., p. 91.
43. See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
44. For example, Johnson, The Holy War Idea, pp. 16-17.
45. For example, Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), p. 166.
46. Ibid., pp. 82-137.
47. The September 11 Raid: a Comprehensive Understanding of the Event that Shocked the World (in Arabic), The Center for Islamic Studies and Issues, September 2002.
48. Osama Bin Laden, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. Publshed in al Quds al Arabi, 23 August 1996.
49. Interview with bin Laden, conducted by Peter Arnett of the CNN, March 1997.
50. Bin Laden, Declaration of War.
51. 'The New Powder Keg in the Middle East', Nida'ul Islam, 15 (October-November, 1996).
52. Bin Laden even issued two special communiqués in which he explained why the Fatwah that sanctioned the peace process is invalid. See Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 187-9.
53. 'The New Powder Keg in the Middle East'.
54. Bin Laden, Declaration of War.
55. Interview with CNN, March 1997.
56. From an interview with bin Laden held on 18 March 1997. Quoted in Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef. Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. 1999), p. 262.
57. Bin Laden was furious when Saudi Arabia allowed the US to deploy its forces in the kingdom after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He even offered to deploy his loyalists from among the 'Arab Afghans' so that the Saudis would not need the non-Muslim forces. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 133; Reeve, The New Jackals, p. 171.
58. Bin Laden was furious when Saudi Arabia allowed the US to deploy its forces in the kingdom after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He even offered to deploy his loyalists from among the 'Arab Afghans' so that the Saudis would not need the non-Muslim forces. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 133; Reeve, The New Jackals, p. 171.
59. Interview with CNN, March 1997.
60. The New Powder Keg in the Middle East'.
61. Fandy, Sawrfi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, pp. 192-3.
62. Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism.
63. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God.
64. Bin Laden, Declaration of War.
65. Interview with CNN, March 1997.
66. Interview with al-Jazeera, aired 10 June 1999; Bin Laden. Declaration of War.
67. The New Powder Keg in the Middle East'.
68. Interview with ABCNEWS. December 1998.
69. I b i d.
70. Interview with CNN, March 1997.
71. 'Bin Laden Lashes Out at the UN, US Attacks in Taped Massages', CNN, 3 November 2001.
72. Address of Osama bin Laden, Al-Jazeera, 3 November 2001.
73. Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, pp. 14-20.
74. Thomson, 'State Sovereignty in International Relations', p. 229.
75. Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, pp. 187-190.
76. 'This War is Fundamentally Religious', Address of Osama bin Laden, Al-Jazeera, 3 November 2001.
77. Bin Laden. Declaration of War.
78. Interview with ABCNEWS, December 1998.
79. Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001), p. 100.
80. Interview with al-Jazeera, 10 June 1999.
81. Hamid Mir, 'Osama Claims He has Nukes: if the US Uses N-Arms it will Get Some Response', Dawn, 10 November 2001.
82. Webster and Watson, 'Bin Laden's Nuclear Threat', The Times, 26 October 2001.
83. 'Second Report of the US Monitoring Group on Sanctions against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their Associates and Associated Entities', 1 December 2003.
84. Interview to the CNN, March 1997.
85. Bin Laden, 'Jihad against Jews and Crusaders', Al Quds al Arabi, 23 February 1998.
86. Interview with Frontline, May 1998.
87. Mir, 'Osama Claims He has Nukes', Dawn, 10 November 2001.
88. David Bamber, 'Bin Laden: Yes I did it', The Telegraph, 11 November 2001.
89. Osama bin Laden, 'Letter to America', Observer, 24 November 2002.
90. Interview with ABCNEWS, December 1998.
91. Michael Duran, 'Somebody Else's Civil War', Foreign Affairs, 81:1 (January-February, 2002).
92. Barry Buzan, 'From International System to IS: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School', International Organization, 47:3 (1993), pp. 327-52.