Speaking and hearing: Habermasian discourse ethics, feminism and IR

Review of International Studies

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 155-165

  Hutchings, Kimberly ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 12944268802     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210505006352     Document Type: Review

References (41)

1. My initial encounters with it were as an undergraduate studying sociology and philosophy, when I read his earlier work, Knowledge and Human Interests, in which the model of psychoanalysis was used to represent the idea of knowledge oriented towards emancipation, and Communication and the Evolution of Society in which the promise of universal pragmatics is spelled out. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971); Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1979).
2. My initial encounters with it were as an undergraduate studying sociology and philosophy, when I read his earlier work, Knowledge and Human Interests, in which the model of psychoanalysis was used to represent the idea of knowledge oriented towards emancipation, and Communication and the Evolution of Society in which the promise of universal pragmatics is spelled out. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971); Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1979).
3. See in particular The Theory of Communicative Action, vols 1 & 2 (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987); The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
4. See in particular The Theory of Communicative Action, vols 1 & 2 (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987); The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
5. See in particular The Theory of Communicative Action, vols 1 & 2 (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987); The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
6. K. Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics (London: Routledge. 1996), pp. 58-80.
7. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
8. See J. B. Landes, 'The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration', and M. Fleming 'Women and the "Public Use of Reason'", in J. Meehan (ed.), Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse (London: Routledge, 1995); N. Fraser 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', in C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992).
9. See J. B. Landes, 'The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration', and M. Fleming 'Women and the "Public Use of Reason'", in J. Meehan (ed.), Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse (London: Routledge, 1995); N. Fraser 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', in C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992).
10. See S. Benhabib, 'The Debate over Women and Moral Theory Revisited' and J. Meehan 'Autonomy, Recognition and Respect: Habermas, Benjamin and Honneth' in Meehan, Feminists Read Habermas.
11. See K. Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), pp. 7-30.
12. C. Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
13. L. Nicholson (ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990).
14. This literature is now very extensive; its early preoccupations can be traced in: R. Grant and K. Newland (eds.), Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1991); V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); J. Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); J. True, 'Feminism', in Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001).
15. This literature is now very extensive; its early preoccupations can be traced in: R. Grant and K. Newland (eds.), Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1991); V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); J. Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); J. True, 'Feminism', in Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001).
16. This literature is now very extensive; its early preoccupations can be traced in: R. Grant and K. Newland (eds.), Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1991); V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); J. Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); J. True, 'Feminism', in Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001).
17. This literature is now very extensive; its early preoccupations can be traced in: R. Grant and K. Newland (eds.), Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1991); V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); J. Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); J. True, 'Feminism', in Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001).
18. S. Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
19. See S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 107-113; 169-202.
20. Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 36.
21. Ibid., p. 38.
22. Ibid., p. 38.
23. Ibid., p. 40.
24. Ibid., p. 40.
25. See my development of this critique of Benhabib in: Kimberly Hutchings, 'Feminism, Universalism and the Ethics of International Polities', in Jabri and O'Gorman (eds.), Women, Culture and International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 17-37; and 'Moral Deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive Universalism', Theory, Culture and Society, 14 (1997), pp. 132-42.
26. See my development of this critique of Benhabib in: Kimberly Hutchings, 'Feminism, Universalism and the Ethics of International Polities', in Jabri and O'Gorman (eds.), Women, Culture and International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 17-37; and 'Moral Deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive Universalism', Theory, Culture and Society, 14 (1997), pp. 132-42.
27. Hutchings 'Moral Deliberation', pp. 140-1. Benhabib herself would deny this conclusion; she argues that discourse ethics is not closed to any specific content, in the way that more substantive (or 'substitutionalist') moral theories are, and that this is its great strength (Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, pp. 13-14). However, although any opinion may be expressed in the process of 'discursive validation', some opinions contradict the norms underpinning the discursive exchange (they entail a 'performative contradiction for anyone who has accepted those norms) and it becomes impossible for them to be taken seriously. This does not mean that I disagree substantively with the kinds of exclusion that Benhabib envisages (such as, Racist speech), but I would argue that her account of this exclusion obscures the extent to which this exclusion is a moral/political decision, rather than simply a requirement of reason.
28. Hutchings 'Moral Deliberation', pp. 140-1. Benhabib herself would deny this conclusion; she argues that discourse ethics is not closed to any specific content, in the way that more substantive (or 'substitutionalist') moral theories are, and that this is its great strength (Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, pp. 13-14). However, although any opinion may be expressed in the process of 'discursive validation', some opinions contradict the norms underpinning the discursive exchange (they entail a 'performative contradiction for anyone who has accepted those norms) and it becomes impossible for them to be taken seriously. This does not mean that I disagree substantively with the kinds of exclusion that Benhabib envisages (such as, Racist speech), but I would argue that her account of this exclusion obscures the extent to which this exclusion is a moral/political decision, rather than simply a requirement of reason.
29. I. M. Young, 'Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought', Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
30. Ibid., p. 41.
31. Ibid., p. 59.
32. Ibid., p. 50. Young draws on Levinas and Irigary in formulating her notion of asymmetrical reciprocity. It could also be argued that her more political account of the moral encounter shares ground with Honneth's critique of Habermas; see Haacke in this volume.
33. Ibid., p. 53.
34. In fact, as I argue elsewhere, Young does not develop her insights in as radical a way as one might expect from her critique of Benhabib. In her recent work, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) her notion of communicative rationality becomes more Habermasian, in particular when she shifts the ground of her discussion from the liberal polity to the international sphere (ibid., pp. 236-75). See K. Hutchings, 'From Morality to Politics and Back Again: Feminist International Ethics and the Civil Society Argument', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29:3 (2004), pp. 239-64.
35. In fact, as I argue elsewhere, Young does not develop her insights in as radical a way as one might expect from her critique of Benhabib. In her recent work, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) her notion of communicative rationality becomes more Habermasian, in particular when she shifts the ground of her discussion from the liberal polity to the international sphere (ibid., pp. 236-75). See K. Hutchings, 'From Morality to Politics and Back Again: Feminist International Ethics and the Civil Society Argument', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29:3 (2004), pp. 239-64.
36. In fact, as I argue elsewhere, Young does not develop her insights in as radical a way as one might expect from her critique of Benhabib. In her recent work, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) her notion of communicative rationality becomes more Habermasian, in particular when she shifts the ground of her discussion from the liberal polity to the international sphere (ibid., pp. 236-75). See K. Hutchings, 'From Morality to Politics and Back Again: Feminist International Ethics and the Civil Society Argument', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29:3 (2004), pp. 239-64.
37. G. C. Spivak, 'Cultural Talks in the Hot Peace: Revisiting the "Global Village'", in P. Cheah and B. Robbins (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 340.
38. Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 40.
39. Spivak, 'Gender and International Studies', Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 27: 4 (1998), pp. 819-24.
40. Spivak, 'Cultural Talks in the Hot Peace', p. 340.
41. Spivak, 'Gender and International Studies', p. 824.