The case for shared sovereignty

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 69-83

  Krasner, Stephen D ^a,b  

^a Department of International Relation ^*  (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 12744260577     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0013     Document Type: Review

References (36)

1. The somewhat clumsy expression "Westphalian-cum-Vattelian sovereignty" reflects a quirk of intellectual history. The principle of nonintervention is traditionally associated with the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648. Yet the doctrine did not actually receive explicit articulation until a century later, when the French-speaking Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel penned his 1758 work on The Law of Nations, Or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. In fact, many of the specific provisions of the Peace of Westphalia, notably those related to religious toleration, violated what came later to be called "Westphalian" sovereignty. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), ch. 3.
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 79-84. A decade later, Samuel P. Huntington offered a complementary view contending that political mobilization without adequate institutionalization could lead to political underdevelopment. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).
3. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 79-84. A decade later, Samuel P. Huntington offered a complementary view contending that political mobilization without adequate institutionalization could lead to political underdevelopment. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).
4. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 98.
5. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January 2002): 216-20; Leonard Wantchekon, "The Paradox of Warlord Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation," American Political Science Review 98 (February 2004): 17-33.
6. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January 2002): 216-20; Leonard Wantchekon, "The Paradox of Warlord Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation," American Political Science Review 98 (February 2004): 17-33.
7. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January 2002): 216-20; Leonard Wantchekon, "The Paradox of Warlord Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation," American Political Science Review 98 (February 2004): 17-33.
8. Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review 91 (June 1997): 245-63. This logic of a self-enforcing equilibrium is consistent with John Locke's discussion of the right of rebellion in his Second Treatise of Government. Locke stipulates a set of condi tions that can justify rebellion; each of these conditions is tantamount to a violation of the basic constitutional structure of the polity.
9. Avner Greif emphasizes the importance of historical context for understanding the possibilities for self-enforcing equilibria. See Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-50; and Avner Greif, Institutions: Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
10. Avner Greif emphasizes the importance of historical context for understanding the possibilities for self-enforcing equilibria. See Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-50; and Avner Greif, Institutions: Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
11. For instance, Weingast in analyzing the successful transition to democracy in Nicaragua in the early 1990s notes the important role that outside observers played in the demilitarization process as well as the significance of the U.S. commitment to stop supporting the Contras, but does not explain why this commitment was credible. See Barry R. Weingast, "Political Foundations," 259.
12. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990). On the rulers' need to make deals to raise revenues, see Tilly on the Netherlands, p. 80, and Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-32. On the long-term economic and military advantages of democracy, see Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization 57 (January 2003): 3-42. Democracies were not, however, the only states to pursue effective policies. On the more central role played by autocratic states in late-industrializing countries of Europe, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
13. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990). On the rulers' need to make deals to raise revenues, see Tilly on the Netherlands, p. 80, and Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-32. On the long-term economic and military advantages of democracy, see Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization 57 (January 2003): 3-42. Democracies were not, however, the only states to pursue effective policies. On the more central role played by autocratic states in late-industrializing countries of Europe, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
14. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990). On the rulers' need to make deals to raise revenues, see Tilly on the Netherlands, p. 80, and Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-32. On the long-term economic and military advantages of democracy, see Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization 57 (January 2003): 3-42. Democracies were not, however, the only states to pursue effective policies. On the more central role played by autocratic states in late-industrializing countries of Europe, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
15. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990). On the rulers' need to make deals to raise revenues, see Tilly on the Netherlands, p. 80, and Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-32. On the long-term economic and military advantages of democracy, see Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization 57 (January 2003): 3-42. Democracies were not, however, the only states to pursue effective policies. On the more central role played by autocratic states in late-industrializing countries of Europe, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
16. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990). On the rulers' need to make deals to raise revenues, see Tilly on the Netherlands, p. 80, and Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-32. On the long-term economic and military advantages of democracy, see Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization 57 (January 2003): 3-42. Democracies were not, however, the only states to pursue effective policies. On the more central role played by autocratic states in late-industrializing countries of Europe, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
17. For a discussion of why Charles Tilly's classic account of European state-building no longer applies, see Anna Leander, "Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World," in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, eds., Copenhagen Peace Research: Conceptual Innovations and Contemporary Security Analysis (London: Routledge, 2004).
18. Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System," International Organization 58 (April 2004): 311-44, esp. Table 1 on p. 320.
19. On foreign assistance, see David H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-89 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For data on assistance as a percentage of government expenditures, see World Development Indicators Online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/ dataonline.
20. On foreign assistance, see David H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-89 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For data on assistance as a percentage of government expenditures, see World Development Indicators Online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/ dataonline.
21. Michael Lewin Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53 (April 2001): 325-61.
22. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (July 1997): 150; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 565-97.
23. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (July 1997): 150; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 565-97.
24. On the MCA, see http://mcc.gov/about_us/overview/index.shtml. For more on the World Bank Institute metrics, visit www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html.
25. On transitional administrations and their travails, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship," International Security 28 (Spring 2004): 5-43; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review 94 (December 2000): 779-802; and George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluating Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 50-52. The arguments presented here are elaborated in Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29 (Fall 2004): 85-120.
26. On transitional administrations and their travails, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship," International Security 28 (Spring 2004): 5-43; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review 94 (December 2000): 779-802; and George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluating Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 50-52. The arguments presented here are elaborated in Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29 (Fall 2004): 85-120.
27. On transitional administrations and their travails, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship," International Security 28 (Spring 2004): 5-43; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review 94 (December 2000): 779-802; and George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluating Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 50-52. The arguments presented here are elaborated in Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29 (Fall 2004): 85-120.
28. On transitional administrations and their travails, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship," International Security 28 (Spring 2004): 5-43; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review 94 (December 2000): 779-802; and George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluating Issues in Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 50-52. The arguments presented here are elaborated in Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29 (Fall 2004): 85-120.
29. Herbert Feis, Europe - The World's Banker, 1870-1914: An Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy Before World War I (New York: Norton, 1965), 332-41; and Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 90-107.
30. Herbert Feis, Europe - The World's Banker, 1870-1914: An Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy Before World War I (New York: Norton, 1965), 332-41; and Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 90-107.
31. "Revised NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA] Supplementary Agreement," 3 August 1959, articles 19, 22, and 28. The full text of the agreement is available at www.osc.army.mil. For a general analysis of Germany's situation after World War II, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
32. "Revised NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA] Supplementary Agreement," 3 August 1959, articles 19, 22, and 28. The full text of the agreement is available at www.osc.army.mil. For a general analysis of Germany's situation after World War II, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
33. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Articles 2 to 4, 12, and 15, www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html.
34. For other examples of the use of international judges, see William W. Burke-White, "A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement," Michigan Journal of International Law 24 (Fall 2002): 1-102.
35. Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, "To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank's Internal Contradictions," Harvard Human Rights Journal 14 (Spring 2001): 223; and World Bank, IBRD/IDA Project Information Document, Chad - (Cameroon) Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (23 June 1999), available at www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/td44305.pdf.
36. Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, "To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank's Internal Contradictions," Harvard Human Rights Journal 14 (Spring 2001): 223; and World Bank, IBRD/IDA Project Information Document, Chad - (Cameroon) Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (23 June 1999), available at www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/td44305.pdf.