State Subsidies, International Diffusion, and Transnational Civil Society: The Case of Frankfurt-Oder and Słubice

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Chessa, Cecilia ^a  

^a LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Civil society; European Union; German unification; Germany; Poland

Indexed keywords

EID: 1242292215     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325403260962     Document Type: Review

References (112)

1. The major source of tension concerned the fact that East Germans no longer needed a visa to travel to Poland, while Poles continued to require a visa (entailing a costly fee and per diem exchange) to travel to East Germany.
2. Frankfurt-Oder is the third largest city in the German state of Brandenburg, with a population of approximately 84,000. Słubice is located in the Polish voivodship of Gorzów and has about 16,000 residents.
3. For a detailed discussion of the role of Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), or Socialist Unity Party of Germany, in repressing the Polish oppositional movement based on newly accessible archival sources, see Manfred Wilke, Reinhardt Gutsche, and Michael Kubina, "Die SED-Führung und die Unterdrückung der polnischen Oppositionsbewegung 1980/81," German Studies Review 17:1(1994): 105-52.
4. See, for example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 255-92. Marc Morjé Howard makes a more general argument about the problems of post-communist civil society in "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," Journal of Democracy 13:1(2002): 157-67. For a more sanguine assessment of the Polish case, see Graeme Gill, Democracy and Postcommunism (London: Routledge, 2002), 170-71.
5. See, for example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 255-92. Marc Morjé Howard makes a more general argument about the problems of post-communist civil society in "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," Journal of Democracy 13:1(2002): 157-67. For a more sanguine assessment of the Polish case, see Graeme Gill, Democracy and Postcommunism (London: Routledge, 2002), 170-71.
6. See, for example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 255-92. Marc Morjé Howard makes a more general argument about the problems of post-communist civil society in "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," Journal of Democracy 13:1(2002): 157-67. For a more sanguine assessment of the Polish case, see Graeme Gill, Democracy and Postcommunism (London: Routledge, 2002), 170-71.
7. For a discussion of the evolution of Poles' attitudes toward European Union (EU) accession, see Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras, Democracy in Poland (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), 221-25. David Ost discusses the emergence of new political movements on the right and the left in "Letter from Poland, " The Nation, 25 November 2002.
8. For a discussion of the evolution of Poles' attitudes toward European Union (EU) accession, see Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras, Democracy in Poland (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), 221-25. David Ost discusses the emergence of new political movements on the right and the left in "Letter from Poland, " The Nation, 25 November 2002.
9. Interview, Frankfurt-Oder, January 1995.
10. James Q. Wilson, Political Organization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 7.
11. Grzegorz Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," British Journal of Political Science 21:3(1991): 300.
12. See Giuseppi Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics 44 (October 1991): 76. Also see Giuseppi Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 200-64.
13. See Giuseppi Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics 44 (October 1991): 76. Also see Giuseppi Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 200-64.
14. Di Palma, "Legitimation," 76.
15. Detlef Pollack has done a good job of describing this shift. Detlef Pollack, Was ist aus den Bürgerbewegungen und Oppositionsgruppen der DDR geworden?" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 40-41/95 (September 1995): 34-45.
16. See, for example, Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 128 (1991): 269-84; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
17. See, for example, Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 128 (1991): 269-84; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
18. See, for example, Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 128 (1991): 269-84; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
19. Stephen E. Hanson, "The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change," Comparative Political Studies 28 (July 1995): 306.
20. Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 56.
21. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post Communist Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 158.
22. Howard, "Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," 157.
23. In this article, I use the terms "organization" and "association" interchangeably. I utilize James Q. Wilson's definition of "formal voluntary association"; "By 'formal' is meant that class of associations with a clearly definable membership (thus excluding loose social movements) and a consciously adopted name (thus excluding many short-lived or casual associations and kinship networks); by 'voluntary' is meant associations whose members are generally not full-time employees and do not earn their livelihood as a result of their membership (thus excluding business firms and government agencies)." Wilson, Political Organization, 31-32. This latter point may appear problematic for my case study since my argument about East Germany is precisely that material incentives in the form of temporary employment have been largely responsible for the formation of civil society there. But my usage of "voluntary" here seeks principally to exclude organizations that employ members to operate an economic enterprise, that is, businesses. That some civil societal organizations employ several workers full-time and/or simultaneously resemble businesses is an example of the kind of ambiguity that I aim to highlight.
24. Interview, Frauen und Familien Zentrum, Frankfurt-Oder, July 1995.
25. Wilson, Political Organization, 34.
26. Ibid., 32.
27. Ibid., 35.
28. For a discussion of the problems associated with international aid for civil society, see Valerie Sperling, Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 220-56.
29. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer, eds., Nations in Transit 2001 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2001).
30. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," World Politics 53:1(2000): 1.
31. Karatnycky, Motyl, and Schnetzer, Nations in Transit, 41.
32. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), 300.
33. For a useful periodization of Polish-East German contact during the postwar period, see Jan Loboda and Stanisław Ciok, "Probleme und Perspektiven der deutsch-polnischen Zusammenarbeit in den Grenzgebieten," in Waldemar Pfeiffer, ed., Wissenschaftliche Reihe 1, Collegium Polonicum Słubice, Wissenschaftseinrichtungen und Strukturentwicklung in der Grenzregion: Modelfall Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt-Oder (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznan, 1995).
34. Szczecin and Rostock, Jelenia Gora and Dresden, and Sieniawka and Zittau, among others, also exhibited a high level of transnational, intercity activity, comparable to that which ensued between Frankfurt-Oder and Słubice.
35. As of 1996, there were 160 German-Polish marriages in the city of Frankfurt-Oder.
36. One of my interview partners in Frankfurt-Oder had been studying the Polish language in Gorzów at the time of the border closing and was forced to cease her studies and return home.
37. Ash, In Europe's Name, 353. Ash points out that Kohl did not mention the frontier issue at all in his "ten-point program" of November 1989. He further shocked many observers by suggesting to his partners in the 2+4 negotiations that a final treaty on the border was contingent on commitments from the Polish side to renounce all further claims to war reparations and to guarantee the rights of the German minority in Poland. See Ash, In Europe's Name, 230.
38. Ash, In Europe's Name, 353. Ash points out that Kohl did not mention the frontier issue at all in his "ten-point program" of November 1989. He further shocked many observers by suggesting to his partners in the 2+4 negotiations that a final treaty on the border was contingent on commitments from the Polish side to renounce all further claims to war reparations and to guarantee the rights of the German minority in Poland. See Ash, In Europe's Name, 230.
39. It must be noted that one of Kohl's central objectives in negotiating this treaty was to further advance and entrench the rights of the disputed German minority in Poland, regulated in Article 20, paragraph 2, of the treaty. For an excellent discussion of the complexities of this ongoing problem, see Patricia Davis, "Ethnic Germans in Poland! Bridge Builders or a New Source of Conflict?" German Politics and Society 31 (Spring 1994): 24-46.
40. It is worth noting at this point that Germany was instrumental in securing EU assistance for restructuring in Poland and Hungary during the 1989 meeting of the G-7; the EU/Poland Hungary: Assistance in Restructuring Economies (PHARE) program was the result.
41. The "multitiered" dynamic is more prevalent in Germany because certain competencies are guaranteed to the German Länder in the context of the German federal system; the Polish voivodships, on the other hand, are almost wholly dependent on the central government in Warsaw for their funding. This has remained the case even after the 1999 administrative reform that reduced the number of voivodships from forty-nine to sixteen and made provisions for regional elections. For a well-written account of the complexities of the multilevel dynamic on the German side, see Patricia Davis, "Marbled Diplomacy: Germany's Role in the Integration of East and West Europe," Working Paper 7.10 (Berkeley: University of California, Center for German and European Studies, April 1996).
42. For a discussion of structural policy in the EU and the role of subnational governments, see Gary Marks, "Structural Policy in the European Community," in Alberta Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 221-24.
43. Davis, "Marbled Diplomacy," 6.
44. In July of 1990, the commission established a community initiative known as INTERREG, in which loans and grants would be made specifically to border areas within the EU. The aims were to "assist both internal and external areas of the Community in overcoming the special development problems arising from their relative isolation within national economies and within the Community as a whole, in the interests of the local population and in a manner compatible with the protection of the environment," as well as to "respond to new opportunities for cooperation with third countries in external border areas of the Community" (emphasis added). Official Journal of the European Communities, C215, 30 August 1990, 4. Cited in Ann Kennard, "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West Regional Integration: Transborder Cooperation on the Oder-Neisse Line," German Politics 4 (April 1995): 142.
45. In July of 1990, the commission established a community initiative known as INTERREG, in which loans and grants would be made specifically to border areas within the EU. The aims were to "assist both internal and external areas of the Community in overcoming the special development problems arising from their relative isolation within national economies and within the Community as a whole, in the interests of the local population and in a manner compatible with the protection of the environment," as well as to "respond to new opportunities for cooperation with third countries in external border areas of the Community" (emphasis added). Official Journal of the European Communities, C215, 30 August 1990, 4. Cited in Ann Kennard, "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West Regional Integration: Transborder Cooperation on the Oder-Neisse Line," German Politics 4 (April 1995): 142.
46. Germany in particular benefited in two ways from this agreement. First, the increased funding for jointly administered cross-border projects was reallocated from the PHARE budget, with the result that Poland ultimately was forced to utilize the funds in the western regions, as Bonn had initially desired. Second, the Bonn government was essentially receiving funding from a supranational institution for projects that it had promised to support in a bilateral capacity in the 1991 "treaty on good neighborliness."
47. Prior to this, the EU had provided assistance on an ad hoc basis via PHARE. According to Davis, of such projects funded in 1993, activities along the German-Polish border received by far the largest share of such EU expenditures, namely, 68 percent or 9.6 million ECU. Davis, "Marbled Diplomacy," 56.
48. Malte Letz, "Im Osten nichts Neues? Ostdeutsche Solidaritätsgruppen vor und nach der Wende," Neue Soziale Bewegungen Heft 3 (September 1994): 59.
49. For a further discussion of this point, see V. Eichener et al., "Organisierte Interessen in Ostdeutschland: Dimensionen und Forschungsfrage," in V. Eichener et al., eds., Probleme der Einheit (Marburg, Germany: Metropolis, 1992), 42-45.
50. Unser Land Verändert Sich: Deutschland 1990-1995 (Bonn, Germany: Pressen und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995), 114-15.
51. For a discussion of this innovation, see Norbert Wohlfahrt, Kommunale Sozialpolitik zwischen Bürokratie, Verbänden und Selbsthilfe, in Probleme der Einheit, 385-86.
52. Verzeichnis Förderungswürdiger Zwecke, in Das Finanzministerium Informiert (Bonn, Germany: Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995), 148-49
53. Quoted in "Der zweite Frühling der NPD," Die Zeit (23 April 1998): 17.
54. Interview, February 1996, Słubice.
55. Interview, March 1996, Słubice.
56. For example, the "heyday" of German-Polish interaction during the 1970s was not solely characterized by the establishment of "friendship societies" and the increased incidence of German-Polish romance. As the head of Słubice's city council explained to me, Poles from Słubice often traveled to Frankfurt-Oder to purchase what were even then considered to be superior foodstuffs and other consumer goods. Most Frankfurters resented this "buy out" of German products, sometimes even refusing to sell to "Pollacks." For many East Germans in the border regions, then, the closing of the border in October of 1980 represented a positive development. Interview, March 1996.
57. "Czy Niemlec z Polakiem...? Wynikl Bada? Sondażowych," Gazeta: 50 Lat Słubic, May 1995, 27.
58. Ibid., 27.
59. Ibid., 27. The instantaneous dismissal of all six hundred Słubicans who had been employed at the microchip plant did little to improve relations during the immediate post-Wende period. These bad feelings were exacerbated when the former Polish employees experienced difficulties obtaining the severance pay that was officially due them.
60. Märkische-Oder Zeitung, 29 January 1999. The study did indicate that young Germans and Poles who had personal contact with one another were less likely to hold prejudices. This was particularly true of students at the Viadrina University.
61. I am reminded at this juncture of Ken Jowitt's profound distinction between "individualism" and "personalism." It is clearly "personalism" - ego unrestrained by anything except external obstacle or internal disability - that reigns at this border crossing. Jowitt, New World Disorder, 288. During the tenure of my field research there, I often thought that this crossing over of the "Rio Grande of Europe" warranted an anthropology dissertation of its own.
62. A special regulation was passed whereby Polish students who needed to take classes at the Europa University Viadrina in Frankfurt could move to the front of the line and merely flash a passport. This seemingly reasonable concession continues to generate hostilities on the part of residents of both cities, exacerbating an already acrimonious relationship between the student population and the locals.
63. For an astute account of these inequalities, see Krzysztof Wojciechowski, "Diskriminierung an der Grenze: Axiologische Topographie eines Tatortes," (unpublished manuscript, provided by the author). Of course, Polish border officials, when presented with the opportunity, do not hesitate to return the discriminatory behavior.
64. Wojciechowski, "Diskriminierung an der Grenze," 1.
65. Ibid., 1-2.
66. The actual number of such attacks is impossible to document due largely to the fact that most of them either go unreported or, for any number of reasons, do not make their way into any official statistics.
67. Zweiter Frühling, 16.
68. Because of the housing shortage in Frankfurt and the provisional status of many members of the faculty at the Viadrina University, some professors also took up residence in this dormitory. I also lived there during the various periods when I conducted research in this area and can attest to the fact that the noisy gatherings of local skinheads and related milieu kept me from venturing far after dark.
69. Interview, Frankfurt-Oder, February 1996.
70. Interview, Frankfurt-Oder, July 1995.
71. I b i d.
72. Ibid. Examples of such activities included vacations for German and Polish children with language training included and German-Polish orchestra and choir. Among its other projects, Frankfurt Bridge has raised money to help keep these projects alive and has been particularly successful in supporting the orchestra, which maintains an active profile in the region.
73. In this sense, Baldauf is not all too different from the equal rights ombudsman, who also has the capacity to distribute Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen monies to projects that she considers deserving.
74. "Viadrina" is the historical name of the region, stemming back to the late middle ages. In addition, it was the name given to the university that existed in Frankfurt-Oder between 1506 and 1811.
75. Interview, July 1995.
76. From north to south, the Euroregions include Pomerania, Pro-Europa Viadrina, Spree-Neisse-Bober, and Neisse.
77. The head of the city council in Słubice informed me that the Viadrina Euroregion was the only one of the four that had a grassroots component to its founding. Interview, March 1996, Słubice.
78. The tendency for the organization to posture itself toward the EU and its goals should already be evident from the choice of the name "Pro-Europa Viadrina."
79. The director of the Euroregion office studied Polish in Poland until 1981, when she was forced to return home after the border closing. When she lost her job at the microchip plant in 1990, she fell back on the "only other skill" she had: her ability to speak Polish. Interview, office of "Pro-Europa Viadrina," February 1996.
80. "Steiniger Weg zu den Brüsseler Euro-Millionen," Märkische Oderzeitung 12 December 1995. See also "Wie man die EU-Kuh Melkt und den Amtsschimmel Überlistet," Märkische Oderzeitung, 12 December 1995.
81. "Steiniger Weg zu den Brüsseler Euro-Millionen," Märkische Oderzeitung 12 December 1995. See also "Wie man die EU-Kuh Melkt und den Amtsschimmel Überlistet," Märkische Oderzeitung, 12 December 1995.
82. Interview, director of the Pro-Europe Viadrina office, Frankfurt-Oder, February 1996.
83. Interview, February 1996.
84. "Steiniger Weg," Märkische Oderzeitung, 12 December 1995.
85. "Steiniger Weg." See also "Helfen statt Administrieren: Geld für Euroreglonen," Märkische Oderzeitung, 12 December 1995. The point here is that the state government in Brandenburg hires experts using INTERRED II funds to assist in the review of project proposals.
86. "Steiniger Weg." See also "Helfen statt Administrieren: Geld für Euroreglonen," Märkische Oderzeitung, 12 December 1995. The point here is that the state government in Brandenburg hires experts using INTERRED II funds to assist in the review of project proposals.
87. Interview, director of Viadrina office, Frankfurt-Oder, February 1996.
88. Interview, February 1996. Examples of this have been the desire to create a joint German-Polish kindergarten and to establish a ferry connection between Frankfurt-Oder and Słubice. See also "Steiniger Weg," 3.
89. Interview, February 1996. Examples of this have been the desire to create a joint German-Polish kindergarten and to establish a ferry connection between Frankfurt-Oder and Słubice. See also "Steiniger Weg," 3.
90. This ensued in the case of the Collegium Polonicum, the Słubican component of the Europe University Viadrina.
91. Interview, February 1996. See also "Steiniger Weg."
92. Interview, February 1996. See also "Steiniger Weg."
93. Eisenhüttenstadt falls within the Viadrina Euroregion and is located just south of Frankfurt-Oder.
94. Davis, "Marbled Diplomacy," 39.
95. Documentation provided to me by the Euroregion office, Frankfurt-Oder, March 1999.
96. Interview, Euroregion Viadrina Office, March 1999.
97. This is a phrase borrowed from the local newspaper in Frankfurt-Oder that advised local activists as to the most efficient means of accessing EU Euroregion funding. "Wie Man die EU-Kuh Melkt und den Amtsschimmel Überlistet," Märkische Oderzeitung, 12 December 1995.
98. "Wir Brauchen Rat und Begleitung," Märkische Oderzeitung, 16 May 1994.
99. "Bei Uns Steht noch Jeder für sich Allein," Märkische Oderzeitung, 16 May 1994.
100. "Bei Uns Steht noch Jeder."
101. "Świat bez Granic," Gazeta Słubicka, February 1995, 1.
102. Ibid., 1.
103. Interview with members of Hope, March 1996, Słubice.
104. Unfortunately, I was not able to garner a specific example from my interviewees; however, it seemed clear that the women of Hope were concerned with the possibility of being consumed by their cross-border companion organization.
105. Hope interview, March 1996.
106. Hemlock met with considerable success in this endeavor and correspondingly attracted a good deal of local and national attention. While I was at Hemlock headquarters for an interview, journalists from Der Spiegel arrived to try and secure an interview with the group's leaders. The women, committed to maintaining the anonymity of their clients and trying to keep publicity to a minimum, patently refused.
107. Interview, February 1996.
108. The founders of Mandragóra sponsored a survey in Słubice's middle schools. They ascertained that 15 percent of the youth have contact with individuals who are addicted to drugs and that 7 percent have themselves used hard drugs. The situation regarding alcohol consumption is much worse. My interview partners (both social workers in the city) affirmed that these rates have increased to the current objectionable level during the years since the Wende.
109. From the Mandragóra statute (unpublished).
110. Domestic abuse comprises a further issue-area that Poles have been slow to address, even since the transition. Despite the severity of the problem of spousal abuse in Poland, at the time when I conducted my field research, there was not a single battered women's shelter either in łódź or in Warsaw.
111. Interview, March 1999.
112. Karatnycky, Motyl, and Schnetzer, Nations in Transit, 157.