Intergenerational justice and curtailments on the discretionary powers of governments

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 411-428

  Wood, Paul M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 12344309524     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics20042646     Document Type: Review

References (58)

1. Generally attributed to various North American indigenous oral traditions.
2. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 2. See aslo Dworkin's Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 184-210, in which he refers to "choice- sensitive" and "choice-insensitive" issues.
3. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 2. See aslo Dworkin's Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 184-210, in which he refers to "choice- sensitive" and "choice-insensitive" issues.
4. It is often presumed that conservation or sustainability policies are for the benefit of future generations. Strictly speaking, however, the purpose of Western government is to promote the public's best interests, which in turn is usually interpreted as the aggregate preferences of a government's extant electorate. So on the surface it might seem that governments have the mandate to legislate policies that will benefit future generations only to the extent that such policies are part of the current public's preference profile (i.e., to the extent that the current public, in the aggregate, wants such policies). But are governments directly responsible for the potential effects of their policies on future generations? Kenneth Peter ("Jefferson and the Independence of Generations," Environmental Ethics 24 [2002]: 373) correctly points out that "Justice between generations . . . seems to be a very difficult concept for Western political thought." This much is certainly clear: governments cannot be responsible for policy effects on all possible future people. Attempts to render a determination of such effects soon encounter either (a) the "repopulation paradox" (see for example, Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984], pp. 351-417), or (b) utilitarian calculations which quickly degrade into reductio ad absurdum arguments. In the former case it has been argued that major environmental policies can affect who comes into existence in the future. Those who do come into existence as an indirect result of such policies have no basis for complaint even if the policies appear to be "bad" polices because otherwise they would not have come into existence. For a discussion of the futility of utilitarianism as a means for determining intergenerational justice, see Paul M. Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy: Rethinking Society and Nature (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), pp. 85-106. It is also clear that we (individually, collectively, or by way of government policies) do not have any obligation to bring new people into existence (Richard Sikora, "Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?" in Richard Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978], pp. 112-66). A major purpose of the present article is to argue that governments have obligations to those who will inevitably come into existence anyway, at least to the extent that our actions and policies will affect them.
5. It is often presumed that conservation or sustainability policies are for the benefit of future generations. Strictly speaking, however, the purpose of Western government is to promote the public's best interests, which in turn is usually interpreted as the aggregate preferences of a government's extant electorate. So on the surface it might seem that governments have the mandate to legislate policies that will benefit future generations only to the extent that such policies are part of the current public's preference profile (i.e., to the extent that the current public, in the aggregate, wants such policies). But are governments directly responsible for the potential effects of their policies on future generations? Kenneth Peter ("Jefferson and the Independence of Generations," Environmental Ethics 24 [2002]: 373) correctly points out that "Justice between generations . . . seems to be a very difficult concept for Western political thought." This much is certainly clear: governments cannot be responsible for policy effects on all possible future people. Attempts to render a determination of such effects soon encounter either (a) the "repopulation paradox" (see for example, Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984], pp. 351-417), or (b) utilitarian calculations which quickly degrade into reductio ad absurdum arguments. In the former case it has been argued that major environmental policies can affect who comes into existence in the future. Those who do come into existence as an indirect result of such policies have no basis for complaint even if the policies appear to be "bad" polices because otherwise they would not have come into existence. For a discussion of the futility of utilitarianism as a means for determining intergenerational justice, see Paul M. Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy: Rethinking Society and Nature (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), pp. 85-106. It is also clear that we (individually, collectively, or by way of government policies) do not have any obligation to bring new people into existence (Richard Sikora, "Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?" in Richard Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978], pp. 112-66). A major purpose of the present article is to argue that governments have obligations to those who will inevitably come into existence anyway, at least to the extent that our actions and policies will affect them.
6. It is often presumed that conservation or sustainability policies are for the benefit of future generations. Strictly speaking, however, the purpose of Western government is to promote the public's best interests, which in turn is usually interpreted as the aggregate preferences of a government's extant electorate. So on the surface it might seem that governments have the mandate to legislate policies that will benefit future generations only to the extent that such policies are part of the current public's preference profile (i.e., to the extent that the current public, in the aggregate, wants such policies). But are governments directly responsible for the potential effects of their policies on future generations? Kenneth Peter ("Jefferson and the Independence of Generations," Environmental Ethics 24 [2002]: 373) correctly points out that "Justice between generations . . . seems to be a very difficult concept for Western political thought." This much is certainly clear: governments cannot be responsible for policy effects on all possible future people. Attempts to render a determination of such effects soon encounter either (a) the "repopulation paradox" (see for example, Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984], pp. 351-417), or (b) utilitarian calculations which quickly degrade into reductio ad absurdum arguments. In the former case it has been argued that major environmental policies can affect who comes into existence in the future. Those who do come into existence as an indirect result of such policies have no basis for complaint even if the policies appear to be "bad" polices because otherwise they would not have come into existence. For a discussion of the futility of utilitarianism as a means for determining intergenerational justice, see Paul M. Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy: Rethinking Society and Nature (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), pp. 85-106. It is also clear that we (individually, collectively, or by way of government policies) do not have any obligation to bring new people into existence (Richard Sikora, "Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?" in Richard Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978], pp. 112-66). A major purpose of the present article is to argue that governments have obligations to those who will inevitably come into existence anyway, at least to the extent that our actions and policies will affect them.
7. It is often presumed that conservation or sustainability policies are for the benefit of future generations. Strictly speaking, however, the purpose of Western government is to promote the public's best interests, which in turn is usually interpreted as the aggregate preferences of a government's extant electorate. So on the surface it might seem that governments have the mandate to legislate policies that will benefit future generations only to the extent that such policies are part of the current public's preference profile (i.e., to the extent that the current public, in the aggregate, wants such policies). But are governments directly responsible for the potential effects of their policies on future generations? Kenneth Peter ("Jefferson and the Independence of Generations," Environmental Ethics 24 [2002]: 373) correctly points out that "Justice between generations . . . seems to be a very difficult concept for Western political thought." This much is certainly clear: governments cannot be responsible for policy effects on all possible future people. Attempts to render a determination of such effects soon encounter either (a) the "repopulation paradox" (see for example, Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984], pp. 351-417), or (b) utilitarian calculations which quickly degrade into reductio ad absurdum arguments. In the former case it has been argued that major environmental policies can affect who comes into existence in the future. Those who do come into existence as an indirect result of such policies have no basis for complaint even if the policies appear to be "bad" polices because otherwise they would not have come into existence. For a discussion of the futility of utilitarianism as a means for determining intergenerational justice, see Paul M. Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy: Rethinking Society and Nature (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), pp. 85-106. It is also clear that we (individually, collectively, or by way of government policies) do not have any obligation to bring new people into existence (Richard Sikora, "Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?" in Richard Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978], pp. 112-66). A major purpose of the present article is to argue that governments have obligations to those who will inevitably come into existence anyway, at least to the extent that our actions and policies will affect them.
8. Paul M. Wood, "Biodiversity as the Source of Biological Resources: A New Look at Biodiversity Values," Environmental Values 6 (1997): 251-68; Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy, pp. 35-84.
9. Paul M. Wood, "Biodiversity as the Source of Biological Resources: A New Look at Biodiversity Values," Environmental Values 6 (1997): 251-68; Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy, pp. 35-84.
10. Essential environmental conditions include the rate of solar influx, the orbit of the Earth around the sun, the average global temperature, and numerous others. While humans are attempting to adjust to minor changes in some such conditions (e.g., climate change and ozone depletion), we can assume that humanity could not adapt to a sudden, major change in any such conditions.
11. Reed F. Noss and B. Csuti, "Habitat Fragmentation" in Gary K. Meefe and C. Ronald Carrol, eds., Principles of Conservation Biology (Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates, 1994), pp. 237-64; Yrjo Haila, "Islands and Fragments," in Malcolm L. Hunter Jr., Maintaining Biodiversity in Forest Ecosystems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 234-64 .
12. Reed F. Noss and B. Csuti, "Habitat Fragmentation" in Gary K. Meefe and C. Ronald Carrol, eds., Principles of Conservation Biology (Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates, 1994), pp. 237-64; Yrjo Haila, "Islands and Fragments," in Malcolm L. Hunter Jr., Maintaining Biodiversity in Forest Ecosystems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 234-64 .
13. Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, The Sixth Extinction: Biodiversity and its Survival (New York: Doubleday, 1995); Stuart Pimm, G. J. Russell, J. L. Gittleman, and T. M. Brooks, "The Future of Biodiversity," Science 269 (1995): 347-50; Stuart Pimm and T. M. Brooks, "The Sixth Extinction: How Large, How Soon, and Where?" in Peter Raven, ed., Nature and Human Society: The Quest for a Sustainable World (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), pp. 46-62.
14. Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, The Sixth Extinction: Biodiversity and its Survival (New York: Doubleday, 1995); Stuart Pimm, G. J. Russell, J. L. Gittleman, and T. M. Brooks, "The Future of Biodiversity," Science 269 (1995): 347-50; Stuart Pimm and T. M. Brooks, "The Sixth Extinction: How Large, How Soon, and Where?" in Peter Raven, ed., Nature and Human Society: The Quest for a Sustainable World (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), pp. 46-62.
15. Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, The Sixth Extinction: Biodiversity and its Survival (New York: Doubleday, 1995); Stuart Pimm, G. J. Russell, J. L. Gittleman, and T. M. Brooks, "The Future of Biodiversity," Science 269 (1995): 347-50; Stuart Pimm and T. M. Brooks, "The Sixth Extinction: How Large, How Soon, and Where?" in Peter Raven, ed., Nature and Human Society: The Quest for a Sustainable World (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), pp. 46-62.
16. For a succinct statement of the "time-lag effect" on future generations, see Ernest Partridge, "On the Rights of Future Generations," in Donald Scherer, ed., Upstream/Downstream: Issues in Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 40-66.
17. Craig Hilton-Taylor, 2000 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union, 2002).
18. Wood, "Biodiversity as the Source of Biological Resources"; Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy, pp. 34-84.
19. Anne E. Magurran, Ecological Diversity and Its Measurement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 1.
20. See for example, Jeffrey A. McNeely, Kenton R. Miller, Walter V. Reid, Russell A. Mittermeier, and Timothy B. Werner, Conserving the World's Biological Diversity (Gland, Switzerland, and Washington, D.C.: International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, World Resources Institute, Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund - U.S., and the World Bank, 1990), p. 17.
21. Jerry F. Franklin, "Structural and Functional Aspects of Temperate Forests" in Edward O. Wilson and Frances Pete, eds., Biodiversity (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), pp. 166-75.; Reed Noss, "Indicators for Monitoring Biodiversity: A Hierarchical Approach," Conservation Biology 4 (1990): 355-64.
22. Jerry F. Franklin, "Structural and Functional Aspects of Temperate Forests" in Edward O. Wilson and Frances Pete, eds., Biodiversity (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), pp. 166-75.; Reed Noss, "Indicators for Monitoring Biodiversity: A Hierarchical Approach," Conservation Biology 4 (1990): 355-64.
23. Wood, "Biodiversity as the Source of Biological Resources."
24. Robert Solow, "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economies," American Economics Review 64 (1974): 1-14; Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). For a critique of this neoclassical economic assumption and its role as a "modern cultural myth," see William E. Rees, "Globalization and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence?" Bulletin of Science, Technology AND Society 22 (2002): 249-68.
25. Robert Solow, "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economies," American Economics Review 64 (1974): 1-14; Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). For a critique of this neoclassical economic assumption and its role as a "modern cultural myth," see William E. Rees, "Globalization and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence?" Bulletin of Science, Technology AND Society 22 (2002): 249-68.
26. Robert Solow, "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economies," American Economics Review 64 (1974): 1-14; Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). For a critique of this neoclassical economic assumption and its role as a "modern cultural myth," see William E. Rees, "Globalization and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence?" Bulletin of Science, Technology AND Society 22 (2002): 249-68.
27. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10(1981): 185-246; "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).
28. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10(1981): 185-246; "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).
29. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10(1981): 185-246; "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).
30. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10(1981): 185-246; "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).
31. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10(1981): 185-246; "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).
32. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 190.
33. Dworkin, "Equality of Welfare," p. 185.
34. Dworkin, "Equality of Resources."
35. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 206.
36. Ibid., p. 207.
37. Ibid., p. 206.
38. Ibid., p. 207.
39. Ibid., p. 208.
40. Ibid., p. 2.
41. Ibid., p. 359.
42. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 234.
43. Ibid., p. 277.
44. The phrase "tyranny of the majority" was coined by Alexis de Tocqueville, in De la Démocratie en Amérique (1835).
45. Wood, "Biodiversity as the Source of Biological Resources."
46. Wood, Biodiversity and Democracy, pp. 83-106.
47. It could be argued, for example, that future generations would prefer those of us in the present generation to lead lives of bare subsistence precisely in order to conserve resources for those who will be born later. But of course, even more remote generations would want the same of their immediately preceding ancestors. Ultimately, utilitarianism could lead to the conclusion that any currently existing generation should lead lives of bare subsistence and should implement draconian population control policies, none of which is likely to be taken seriously by any generation.
48. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 238.
49. Although the term tyranny of the majority usually refers to discriminatory acts of a majority against a minority, it can also refer to a minority with power over the majority. If it has sufficient power, a minority can discriminate against a majority as in the case of South Africa's former apartheid regime. The central issue is the unjust wielding of power, not numbers of persons per se. This is relevant to the issue discussed here because future generations at any one time in the future could easily outnumber those of us in the present generation, but we hold the power to discriminate against them.
50. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 359.
51. Rodger Schlickeisen, "Protecting Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment," Tulane Environmental Law Journal 8 (1994): 181-220, http:// www.defenders.org/bio-co00. html; David Tilman, "Causes, Consequences, and Ethics of Biodiversity," Nature 405 (2000): 208-11.
52. Rodger Schlickeisen, "Protecting Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment," Tulane Environmental Law Journal 8 (1994): 181-220, http:// www.defenders.org/bio-co00. html; David Tilman, "Causes, Consequences, and Ethics of Biodiversity," Nature 405 (2000): 208-11.
53. Wayne L. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (New York: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 17.
54. Ibid., p. 27.
55. Of course, the concept of ecosystem types is dependent on a means of classifying ecosystems into distinguishable types. There are many ecoclassification systems in operation globally.
56. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992), p. 120.
57. The complete wording of Section 35(1) of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982, is as follows: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." In a series of court cases subsequent to 1982, judges have been attempting to articulate the exact meaning of Section 35(1), especially the specific content and scope of the rights at stake. It is an ongoing process.
58. For a comprehensive review of Canada's suite of environmental laws and their collective insufficiency for their stated purposes, see David Boyd Unnatural Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003).