Democratization in Gulf monarchies: A new challenge to the GCC

Middle East Policy

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 37-57

  Kéchichian, Joseph A ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 12344284972     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1061-1924.2004.00175.x     Document Type: Review

References (106)

1. "President Delivers State of the Union Address, 2002," and "President Delivers State of the Union Address, 2003," both at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
2. th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy," at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2003/11/20031106-3.html.
3. The rationale for war against Iraq for the better part of 2002 and 2003 was, of course, centered on "weapons of mass destruction," not the search for democracy or freedom. Although the Bush and Blair administrations argued Iraq's WMDs were the most compelling reason for the United States and Britain to resort to war, in the summer of 2003, the emphasis changed. At first, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz testified to congressional committees that "the evil, dictatorial nature of former president Saddam Hussein's defunct government and the opportunity to turn Iraq into a beacon of hope for the rest of the Middle East," were equally valid reasons to go to war. See Michael Dobbs, "Wolfowitz Shifts Rationales on Iraq War: With Weapons Unfound, Talk of Threat Gives Way to Rhetoric on Hussein, Democracy," The Washington Post, September 12, 2003, p. A23. The logic of war shifted shortly thereafter when Mr. Wolfowitz maintained that the WMD issue was a "bureaucratic fudge," and that the real reason was America's need to shift its military bases from Saudi Arabia. For additional details, see Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Testing the Saudi 'Will to Power:' Challenges Confronting Prince Abdullah," Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 100-115.
4. The rationale for war against Iraq for the better part of 2002 and 2003 was, of course, centered on "weapons of mass destruction," not the search for democracy or freedom. Although the Bush and Blair administrations argued Iraq's WMDs were the most compelling reason for the United States and Britain to resort to war, in the summer of 2003, the emphasis changed. At first, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz testified to congressional committees that "the evil, dictatorial nature of former president Saddam Hussein's defunct government and the opportunity to turn Iraq into a beacon of hope for the rest of the Middle East," were equally valid reasons to go to war. See Michael Dobbs, "Wolfowitz Shifts Rationales on Iraq War: With Weapons Unfound, Talk of Threat Gives Way to Rhetoric on Hussein, Democracy," The Washington Post, September 12, 2003, p. A23. The logic of war shifted shortly thereafter when Mr. Wolfowitz maintained that the WMD issue was a "bureaucratic fudge," and that the real reason was America's need to shift its military bases from Saudi Arabia. For additional details, see Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Testing the Saudi 'Will to Power:' Challenges Confronting Prince Abdullah," Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 100-115.
5. The Bush administration has not altered its approach during the 2004 election year. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Simon Tisdall and Nicholas Watt, "Rebranding Bush as Man of Peace," The Guardian, January 3, 2004; for a thorough discussion of the president's preferences, see Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 2004).
6. The Bush administration has not altered its approach during the 2004 election year. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Simon Tisdall and Nicholas Watt, "Rebranding Bush as Man of Peace," The Guardian, January 3, 2004; for a thorough discussion of the president's preferences, see Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 2004).
7. Al Jazeera, November 12, 2002. See also James Risen and Neil MacFarquhar, "New Recording May Be Threat from Bin Laden," The New York Times, November 13, 2002, p. 1.
8. Doyle McManus and Sonni Efron, "The Iraq Dilemma: Do It Right or Quick?," The Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2003, pp. A1, A10, A11.
9. The internal repercussions of the war for Iraq are beyond the scope of this essay even if they are pertinent to GCC States' own internal developments.
10. Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 6, November/ December 2001, pp. 17-30. See also Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May/June 2002, pp. 47-63.
11. Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 6, November/ December 2001, pp. 17-30. See also Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May/June 2002, pp. 47-63.
12. American sources suspected that Chalabi may have leaked secrets to Iran. See Edmund Sanders and Monte Morin, "Iraqi Police Raid Chalabi's Home, Offices," The Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2004, pp. A1, A6. See also Guy Dinmore, "CIA to Look at Chalabi's Links with Iran," The Financial Times, June 3, 2004, p. 2. When Washington anointed a long-time Chalabi foe, Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister quickly issued arrest warrants. Chalabi was accused of counterfeiting while his nephew, Salem Chalabi - then head of the Special Iraqi Tribunal set up to try Saddam Hussein - was charged with the murder of a finance ministry official involved in an investigation of Chalabi family business dealings. Although most of these charges were dismissed by late September 2004, Allawi emerged victorious, as the Chalabis were no longer contenders for power. See Edward Wong, "Iraqi Judge Closes Case against Ahmad Chalabi," The New York Times, September 28, 2004.
13. American sources suspected that Chalabi may have leaked secrets to Iran. See Edmund Sanders and Monte Morin, "Iraqi Police Raid Chalabi's Home, Offices," The Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2004, pp. A1, A6. See also Guy Dinmore, "CIA to Look at Chalabi's Links with Iran," The Financial Times, June 3, 2004, p. 2. When Washington anointed a long-time Chalabi foe, Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister quickly issued arrest warrants. Chalabi was accused of counterfeiting while his nephew, Salem Chalabi - then head of the Special Iraqi Tribunal set up to try Saddam Hussein - was charged with the murder of a finance ministry official involved in an investigation of Chalabi family business dealings. Although most of these charges were dismissed by late September 2004, Allawi emerged victorious, as the Chalabis were no longer contenders for power. See Edward Wong, "Iraqi Judge Closes Case against Ahmad Chalabi," The New York Times, September 28, 2004.
14. American sources suspected that Chalabi may have leaked secrets to Iran. See Edmund Sanders and Monte Morin, "Iraqi Police Raid Chalabi's Home, Offices," The Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2004, pp. A1, A6. See also Guy Dinmore, "CIA to Look at Chalabi's Links with Iran," The Financial Times, June 3, 2004, p. 2. When Washington anointed a long-time Chalabi foe, Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister quickly issued arrest warrants. Chalabi was accused of counterfeiting while his nephew, Salem Chalabi - then head of the Special Iraqi Tribunal set up to try Saddam Hussein - was charged with the murder of a finance ministry official involved in an investigation of Chalabi family business dealings. Although most of these charges were dismissed by late September 2004, Allawi emerged victorious, as the Chalabis were no longer contenders for power. See Edward Wong, "Iraqi Judge Closes Case against Ahmad Chalabi," The New York Times, September 28, 2004.
15. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Random House, 2002), especially pp. 148-180. See also Amatzia Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baathist Iraq: 1968-1989 (St. Martin's Press, 1991). For a more recent analysis of the Baath party, and what Saddam Hussein did to it, see Hazem Saghieh, Baath al-Iraq: Sultat Saddam Qiyaman wa Hutaman (London: Dar alSaqi, 2003).
16. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Random House, 2002), especially pp. 148-180. See also Amatzia Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baathist Iraq: 1968-1989 (St. Martin's Press, 1991). For a more recent analysis of the Baath party, and what Saddam Hussein did to it, see Hazem Saghieh, Baath al-Iraq: Sultat Saddam Qiyaman wa Hutaman (London: Dar alSaqi, 2003).
17. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Random House, 2002), especially pp. 148-180. See also Amatzia Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baathist Iraq: 1968-1989 (St. Martin's Press, 1991). For a more recent analysis of the Baath party, and what Saddam Hussein did to it, see Hazem Saghieh, Baath al-Iraq: Sultat Saddam Qiyaman wa Hutaman (London: Dar alSaqi, 2003).
18. According to the explanation proffered by National Security Council Advisor Condoleeza Rice to her European counterparts, President Bush planned an expanded and democratic Middle East that would amount to a "roadmap" for Arab and Muslim states which "export terrorism." As a result, other regional conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the civil war in Sudan, would have to await Arab democratic transformations before they could find their way towards balanced, viable and peaceful settlements. For an incisive commentary, see Hassan Abu Taleb, al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), December 8, 2003, p. 1.
19. Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State (The University of Chicago Press, 1980). See also Talal Toufic Farah, Protection and Politics in Bahrain: 1869-1915 (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1985).
20. Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State (The University of Chicago Press, 1980). See also Talal Toufic Farah, Protection and Politics in Bahrain: 1869-1915 (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1985).
21. Joe Stork, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch, 1997).
22. A. H. Khalaf, "The New Amir of Bahrain: Marching Sideways," Civil Society, Vol. 9, No. 100, April 2000, pp. 6-13. See also Al Tatawur al-Dimuqrati fil-Bahrayn: Ruyat Al-Awsat al-Arabiyyah wal-Dawliyyah (Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, 2001).
23. A. H. Khalaf, "The New Amir of Bahrain: Marching Sideways," Civil Society, Vol. 9, No. 100, April 2000, pp. 6-13. See also Al Tatawur al-Dimuqrati fil-Bahrayn: Ruyat Al-Awsat al-Arabiyyah wal-Dawliyyah (Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, 2001).
24. Quoted in Geraldine Bedell, "Bahrain/Democracy," DPA (German News Agency), December 14, 2003.
25. "Club Reopens after Compromise Reached on Early Lifting of Ban," Gulf News, October 24, 2004, p. 8.
26. "Al Khawaja is Charged," Gulf Daily News, October 17, 2004, p. 1. See also "Bahraini Activist Faces Trial for Dissent," The Associated Press, October 16, 2004; and Mohammed Almezel, "Bahrain Rights Activist Trial Put Off after Chaotic Scenes," Gulf News, October 17, 2004, p. 6.
27. "Al Khawaja is Charged," Gulf Daily News, October 17, 2004, p. 1. See also "Bahraini Activist Faces Trial for Dissent," The Associated Press, October 16, 2004; and Mohammed Almezel, "Bahrain Rights Activist Trial Put Off after Chaotic Scenes," Gulf News, October 17, 2004, p. 6.
28. "Al Khawaja is Charged," Gulf Daily News, October 17, 2004, p. 1. See also "Bahraini Activist Faces Trial for Dissent," The Associated Press, October 16, 2004; and Mohammed Almezel, "Bahrain Rights Activist Trial Put Off after Chaotic Scenes," Gulf News, October 17, 2004, p. 6.
29. "Loyalty Saluted," Gulf Daily News, October 3, 2004, p. 1; see also "Crowds Pledge Loyalty to Premier," Gulf Daily News, October 7, 2004, p. 1.
30. "Loyalty Saluted," Gulf Daily News, October 3, 2004, p. 1; see also "Crowds Pledge Loyalty to Premier," Gulf Daily News, October 7, 2004, p. 1.
31. For background details, see Habib Ishow, Le Koweit: Evolution Politique, Economique et Sociale (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989); and Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
32. For background details, see Habib Ishow, Le Koweit: Evolution Politique, Economique et Sociale (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989); and Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
33. Paul Aarts, "Parliamentary Politics in Post-War Kuwait: Withered Euphoria," JIME Review [Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economies], Vol. 9, No. 34, Winter 1996, pp. 39-56.
34. Nirmala Hanssen, "Spotlight on Women's Rights," Gulf News, October 27, 2004, p. 8.
35. The full text of the law is reproduced in Joseph A. Kéchichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia (Palgrave, 2001), pp. 209-218.
36. Political petitions gained popularity in the early 1990s, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but acquired a certain mystique more recently because of their breadth and depth. For sample petitions, see Kéchichian, Succession, op. cit., pp. 193-201. More recently, opposition to the 2003 American war in Iraq saw a group of Saudis, estimated by news agencies as 200 intellectuals, both men and women, petition the Saudi monarch to condemn the war. Presumably, they also demanded a measure of democracy at home, although the latter quest was not new. See Samir Awwad, "The Recent Bombings in Riyadh Were the First Attacks Carried Out by al-Qa'ida in the Saudi Capital." al-Rayah (Qatar), July 2, 2003, reproduced in Mideast Mirror, July 3, 2003, part B.
37. Political petitions gained popularity in the early 1990s, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but acquired a certain mystique more recently because of their breadth and depth. For sample petitions, see Kéchichian, Succession, op. cit., pp. 193-201. More recently, opposition to the 2003 American war in Iraq saw a group of Saudis, estimated by news agencies as 200 intellectuals, both men and women, petition the Saudi monarch to condemn the war. Presumably, they also demanded a measure of democracy at home, although the latter quest was not new. See Samir Awwad, "The Recent Bombings in Riyadh Were the First Attacks Carried Out by al-Qa'ida in the Saudi Capital." al-Rayah (Qatar), July 2, 2003, reproduced in Mideast Mirror, July 3, 2003, part B.
38. Political petitions gained popularity in the early 1990s, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but acquired a certain mystique more recently because of their breadth and depth. For sample petitions, see Kéchichian, Succession, op. cit., pp. 193-201. More recently, opposition to the 2003 American war in Iraq saw a group of Saudis, estimated by news agencies as 200 intellectuals, both men and women, petition the Saudi monarch to condemn the war. Presumably, they also demanded a measure of democracy at home, although the latter quest was not new. See Samir Awwad, "The Recent Bombings in Riyadh Were the First Attacks Carried Out by al-Qa'ida in the Saudi Capital." al-Rayah (Qatar), July 2, 2003, reproduced in Mideast Mirror, July 3, 2003, part B.
39. F. Gregory Cause III, "The FP Memo: How to Save Saudi Arabia," Foreign Policy, No. 144, September-October 2004, pp. 66-70.
40. "Let Saudi Women Vote," The Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 2004, p. 9. See also Nawaf Obaid, "Saudi Women Must Get the Vote in 2009," The Financial Times, October 12, 2004, p. 15.
41. "Let Saudi Women Vote," The Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 2004, p. 9. See also Nawaf Obaid, "Saudi Women Must Get the Vote in 2009," The Financial Times, October 12, 2004, p. 15.
42. Jackson Diehl, "Sheikdom Democracy," The Washington Post, June 2, 2003, p. A17.
43. "In succession of Jasem, Tamim becomes Crown Prince of Qatar," Gulf Times, June 8, 2003, p. 1.
44. Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani was overthrown in a 1995 palace coup. He returned to attend his first wife's funeral. It may be useful to note that Shaykha Mawzah bint Ali bin Saud bin Abdul Aziz Al Thani was not the current ruler's mother.
45. "Qatar's Former Emir Returns Home for Wife's Funeral," Arab News, October 15, 2004, p. 3.
46. A recent essay referred to Qatar as "a dinky emirate whose quicksilver political reforms over the past few years could provide one model for 21st century Arab democracy." While the sentence was somewhat positive, the word dinky is quite insulting, and could have different meanings: small, minor, lesser, but also insignificant, petty, secondary, inferior, or inconsiderable, among others. See Carla Power, "Hillary Clinton Stand Back," Newsweek, November 10, 2003, pp. 31-32. Such epithets were not new in any sense of the imagination. On July 7, 1988, a prominent Democratic representative from California, Tom Lantos, referred to Qatar while addressing a hearing of the House International Relations Committee on a proposed arms sale to Kuwait. Representative Lantos asked Peter Burleigh, then-deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, about Stinger missiles that mysteriously found their way to Doha. At the time, a number of countries were accused of illegally acquiring these missiles from American allies fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When Burleigh explained that Washington was discussing the matter with Doha, Mr. Lantos interjected with these memorable words: "What is your reaction to a speck of a little country snubbing its nose at the United States?" [emphasis added]. See "Proposed Arms Sales to Kuwait," Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC: July 7, 1988, p. 38.
47. A recent essay referred to Qatar as "a dinky emirate whose quicksilver political reforms over the past few years could provide one model for 21st century Arab democracy." While the sentence was somewhat positive, the word dinky is quite insulting, and could have different meanings: small, minor, lesser, but also insignificant, petty, secondary, inferior, or inconsiderable, among others. See Carla Power, "Hillary Clinton Stand Back," Newsweek, November 10, 2003, pp. 31-32. Such epithets were not new in any sense of the imagination. On July 7, 1988, a prominent Democratic representative from California, Tom Lantos, referred to Qatar while addressing a hearing of the House International Relations Committee on a proposed arms sale to Kuwait. Representative Lantos asked Peter Burleigh, then-deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, about Stinger missiles that mysteriously found their way to Doha. At the time, a number of countries were accused of illegally acquiring these missiles from American allies fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When Burleigh explained that Washington was discussing the matter with Doha, Mr. Lantos interjected with these memorable words: "What is your reaction to a speck of a little country snubbing its nose at the United States?" [emphasis added]. See "Proposed Arms Sales to Kuwait," Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC: July 7, 1988, p. 38.
48. See Dale Eickelman, "Kings and People: Oman's State Consultative Council," Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 51-70.
49. See also Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Oman: A Council for the People," Arabies Trends, No. 19, April 1999, pp. 24-27.
50. Al Nizam al-Asasi lil-Dawlat [The Basic Statute of the State], Muscat, Diwan of Royal Court, 1996.
51. Nikolaus A. Siegfried, "Legislation and Legitimation in Oman: The Basic Law," Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000, pp. 359-397.
52. John Beasant, Oman: The True Life Drama and Intrigue of an Arab State (Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 2002), especially, pp. 14-21. See also Mark N. Katz, "Assessing the Political Stability of Oman," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, at http://meria.idc.ac.il.
53. John Beasant, Oman: The True Life Drama and Intrigue of an Arab State (Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 2002), especially, pp. 14-21. See also Mark N. Katz, "Assessing the Political Stability of Oman," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, at http://meria.idc.ac.il.
54. For a solid analysis, see Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar, Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East (Westview Press, 2002).
55. Other countries, including Jordan, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority, among others, joined in vociferous criticisms at various intervals.
56. El-Nawawy and Iskandar, op. cit., pp. 113-142.
57. According to a well-informed Lebanese journalist, Heir Apparent Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia voiced specific criticisms towards Al Jazeera to Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani, the ruler of Qatar, during a formal GCC Summit meeting. See Shaheen Sihbai, "Prince Abdullah Vents Fury at Al Jazeera" Al Anwar, January 17, 2002, p. 1.
58. 60 Minutes "Inside Al Jazeera," CBS News, October 10, 2001 [originally broadcast in May 2001], at http:// www.cnsnews.com/stories/2001/10/ 10/60minutes/314278.html.
59. Tajuddin Abdul Haq, "Abdullah Slams GCC Indecision," Arab News, January 1, 2002, p. 1.
60. I b i d.
61. Press Release, "Address to the Nation by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz," Washington, DC: Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2003.
62. See, for example, Khalid al-Ghanami, "Al-Insan wal-watan ahamun min Ibn Taymiyyah" [The Human Being and the Nation are More Important than Ibn Taymiyyah], Al-Watan, May 22, 2003, p. 6. Al-Watan, which championed the anti-extremist cause, was mired in controversy and suffered significant setbacks when its editor in chief, Mr. Jamal A. Khashoggi, was eventually muzzled. See Neil MacFarquhar, "A Saudi Editor Who Offended Clerics Is Ousted from His Post," The New York Times, May 28, 2003, p. A1. This setback notwithstanding, the assault on extremists was ongoing; see R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 400-13.
63. See, for example, Khalid al-Ghanami, "Al-Insan wal-watan ahamun min Ibn Taymiyyah" [The Human Being and the Nation are More Important than Ibn Taymiyyah], Al-Watan, May 22, 2003, p. 6. Al-Watan, which championed the anti-extremist cause, was mired in controversy and suffered significant setbacks when its editor in chief, Mr. Jamal A. Khashoggi, was eventually muzzled. See Neil MacFarquhar, "A Saudi Editor Who Offended Clerics Is Ousted from His Post," The New York Times, May 28, 2003, p. A1. This setback notwithstanding, the assault on extremists was ongoing; see R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 400-13.
64. See, for example, Khalid al-Ghanami, "Al-Insan wal-watan ahamun min Ibn Taymiyyah" [The Human Being and the Nation are More Important than Ibn Taymiyyah], Al-Watan, May 22, 2003, p. 6. Al-Watan, which championed the anti-extremist cause, was mired in controversy and suffered significant setbacks when its editor in chief, Mr. Jamal A. Khashoggi, was eventually muzzled. See Neil MacFarquhar, "A Saudi Editor Who Offended Clerics Is Ousted from His Post," The New York Times, May 28, 2003, p. A1. This setback notwithstanding, the assault on extremists was ongoing; see R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 400-13.
65. "Saudi Arabia and America: Time to Move On," The Economist, Vol. 362, No. 8257, January 26, 2002, p. 43.
66. Background details on Saudi Islamists are available in Reuven Paz, "Islamists and Anti-Americanism," MERIA Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2003, at http://meria.idc.ac.il.
67. Donna Abu-Nasr, "Saudis Allow More Anti-U.S. Protests," The Associated Press, April 10, 2002.
68. "Saudi Arabian Murmurs: Palpitations at the Kingdom's Heart," The Economist. Vol. 364, No. 8287, August 24, 2002, pp. 35-36.
69. "Saudi Religious Police Blocked Fire Rescue," Reuters, March 14, 2002.
70. Dekmejian, op. cit., pp. 400-413.
71. Patrick E. Tyler, "Saudi to Warn Bush of Rupture over Israel Policy," The New York Times, April 25, 2002, p. A1.
72. Thomas E. Ricks, "Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum Urged to Pentagon Board," The Washington Post, August 6, 2002, p. A1. See also Jack Shafer, "The Powerpoint That Rocked the Pentagon: The La Rouche Defector who's Advising the Defense Establishment on Saudi Arabia," August 7, 2002, published online by Slate at http://slate.msn.com/id/2069119/.
73. Thomas E. Ricks, "Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum Urged to Pentagon Board," The Washington Post, August 6, 2002, p. A1. See also Jack Shafer, "The Powerpoint That Rocked the Pentagon: The La Rouche Defector who's Advising the Defense Establishment on Saudi Arabia," August 7, 2002, published online by Slate at http://slate.msn.com/id/2069119/.
74. "Operations in Riyadh in Search for al-Qaida Members, 8 Saudi Soldiers Wounded in Clashes," at ArabicNews.com, November 18, 2002; see also Abdul Aziz Al-Hindi, "Over 100 Held for Al-Qaeda Links: Naif," Arab News, November 21, 2002, p. 1; and "Anti-Terrorism in the Gulf: Rooting Out Their Radicals," The Economist, Vol. 365, No. 8300, November 23, 2002, p. 44.
75. "Operations in Riyadh in Search for al-Qaida Members, 8 Saudi Soldiers Wounded in Clashes," at ArabicNews.com, November 18, 2002; see also Abdul Aziz Al-Hindi, "Over 100 Held for Al-Qaeda Links: Naif," Arab News, November 21, 2002, p. 1; and "Anti-Terrorism in the Gulf: Rooting Out Their Radicals," The Economist, Vol. 365, No. 8300, November 23, 2002, p. 44.
76. "Operations in Riyadh in Search for al-Qaida Members, 8 Saudi Soldiers Wounded in Clashes," at ArabicNews.com, November 18, 2002; see also Abdul Aziz Al-Hindi, "Over 100 Held for Al-Qaeda Links: Naif," Arab News, November 21, 2002, p. 1; and "Anti-Terrorism in the Gulf: Rooting Out Their Radicals," The Economist, Vol. 365, No. 8300, November 23, 2002, p. 44.
77. "The Muslim World and America: Sermons that Resound with the Clash of Civilisations," The Economist, Vol. 366, No. 8311, February 15, 2003, p. 41.
78. "Saudi Arabia: Growing Unease," Middle East International, No. 697, April 4, 2003, p. 26.
79. Thirty-four of the signatories met with Heir Apparent Abdullah at his Palace in Riyadh January 20th, 2003, for a three-hour meeting. See "The National Reform Document," February 17, 2003 [in author's possession]. Various versions of the document have been published to date, notably online at SaudHouse.com.
80. "Address to the Nation by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz," Washington, DC: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2003.
81. Diana Elias, "Kuwait Seeks Gunman Who Killed American," The Associated Press, January 21, 2003.
82. "Arrests and Shootings Heighten Security Risk," Country Report: Kuwait (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2003), p. 13. [Hereafter CR].
83. "Al-Qaida Connection Also Claimed," CR-Kuwait, March 2003, p. 13.
84. Adnan Malik, "Police, Protesters Clash in Bahrain," The Associated Press, April 10, 2002.
85. "Elected Chamber Seeks Strengthened Powers," Country Report: Bahrain (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2003), p. 13.
86. "Conservatives Say Riots Were Premeditated," CR-Bahrain, March 2003, p. 15.
87. "Demonstrations Demanding Trial of Flaifel Continue," CR-Bahrain, March 2003, p. 16.
88. "Five Islamists Are Arrested for Planning Attacks in Bahrain," CR-Bahrain, March 2003, p. 17.
89. "The Men Accused of Planning Attacks are Released," CR-Bahrain, June 2003, p. 15.
90. "Omanis March Against War," Country Report: Oman (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2003), p. 13.
91. "American Found Dead in Oman," AlJazeera.net, January 1, 2004.
92. Arab Fund For Economic And Social Development, Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (United Nations Development Program, July 2002).
93. Arab Fund For Economic And Social Development, Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (United Nations Development Program, October 2003).
94. Jackson Diehl, "An Opening for Arab Democrats," The Washington Post, October 11, 2004, p. A23.
95. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004). Senior administration officials have insisted that a direct link existed between Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and Iraq, inter alia. In the absence of concrete evidence, however, all of these statements were nothing more than rhetorical overstatements. For a thorough analysis of these political exaggerations, see also David Barstow, William J. Broad and Jeff Gerth, "How the White House Embraced Disputed Arms Intelligence," The New York Times, October 3, 2004, p. A1.
96. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004). Senior administration officials have insisted that a direct link existed between Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and Iraq, inter alia. In the absence of concrete evidence, however, all of these statements were nothing more than rhetorical overstatements. For a thorough analysis of these political exaggerations, see also David Barstow, William J. Broad and Jeff Gerth, "How the White House Embraced Disputed Arms Intelligence," The New York Times, October 3, 2004, p. A1.
97. Christopher Marquis, "Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to Al Qaeda," The New York Times, January 9, 2004, p. A1. See also the first-hand exposé of the former director of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (Pantheon Books, 2004).
98. Christopher Marquis, "Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to Al Qaeda," The New York Times, January 9, 2004, p. A1. See also the first-hand exposé of the former director of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (Pantheon Books, 2004).
99. Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, et. al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).
100. "Think Tank: U.S. Overstated Iraqi Threat," The New York Times, January 8, 2004. See also Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews and George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). See also Barstow, Broad and Gerth, op. cit., Octobers, 2004, p. A1.
101. "Think Tank: U.S. Overstated Iraqi Threat," The New York Times, January 8, 2004. See also Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews and George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). See also Barstow, Broad and Gerth, op. cit., Octobers, 2004, p. A1.
102. "Think Tank: U.S. Overstated Iraqi Threat," The New York Times, January 8, 2004. See also Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews and George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). See also Barstow, Broad and Gerth, op. cit., Octobers, 2004, p. A1.
103. "Kuwaitis Vote in Parliamentary Elections," The New York Times, July 5, 2003. See also Diana Elias, "Kuwaitis Vote in Parliamentary Elections," The Associated Press, July 6, 2003.
104. "Kuwaitis Vote in Parliamentary Elections," The New York Times, July 5, 2003. See also Diana Elias, "Kuwaitis Vote in Parliamentary Elections," The Associated Press, July 6, 2003.
105. Although the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, lost a seat (now only with 2 representatives left in office), Salafi groups gained 5 seats, up 1. Shia parliamentarians were down to 5 seats (from 6) even if they fielded 50 candidates (out of a total of 250). Importantly, an estimated 24,000 Shia citizens were eligible to vote, and, according to anecdotal evidence, many exercised their rights to cast ballots. See Diana Elias, "Liberals Lose in Kuwait Parliament Vote," The Associated Press, July 6, 2003.
106. See "Democracy in Qatar to be Tribally Based," Gulf Times (Doha), January 8-9, 2004, p. 1.